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The thesis starts with a review of the various branches of schizophrenia research, 
concluding that there is no evidence that biological differences should take precedence over 
psychological differences in people with schizophrenia, and that the opposite argument is as 
compelling. The purpose of the opening section is to critically evaluate and make explicit these 
key paradigm assumptions, and in doing so lay the framework for the rest of the thesis. The 
literature on normal adolescent development is then reviewed and a theory about late-adolescent 
onset schizophrenia put forward. The first empirical study demonstrates that levels of mild 
psychotic-like `symptoms' in normal teenagers were intimately linked to levels of psychological 
development. The second study shows that people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia showed on 
average a level of psychological development much more akin to young teenagers than normal 
adult controls. 
From the two studies it is speculated that psychosis-sufferers become stuck at that point 
in development where normal psychotic-like symptoms are most prevalent. Unlike `normal' 
adolescents, psychosis-sufferers fail to resolve this phase. The second part of the thesis focuses 
on the psychological mechanisms whereby this may come about and elaborates a theory of self- 
construction, threat and defence, within the context of the established literature on the Self. An 
empirical study reconstructs key episodes from schizophrenia sufferer's lives. It was found that 
clients experience a dilemma between self-actualisation goals and affiliative goals, and that the 
pressure of this dichotomy could explain the development over time of many of the symptoms of 
schizophrenia. Finally, hypotheses derived from the empirical self-construction chapter are tested 
in another empirical study, and the thesis as a whole is discussed. 
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Chapter 2'1 
2. Why does schizophrenia develop at late adolescence? 
Schizophrenia is one of the most researched, yet least understood problems. One of 
the cardinal features of schizophrenia has been neglected- that schizophrenia typically 
emerges at late adolescence. Around 25% of normal teenagers report finding adolescence 
distressing. Certain characteristics typical of adolescence are reviewed such as argumentative- 
ness, grandiosity, egocentrism and magical ideation, and it is demonstrated that they bear a 
distinct resemblance to phenomena seen in psychosis. For most adolescents, such phenomena 
pass with successful psychological development. It is proposed that psychosis in late 
adolescence is a consequence of severe disruption in this normally difficult psychological 
maturational process, and explanations are offered as to why and how this comes about. It is 
suggested that problems either in individuating from parents or in bonding to peers or both 
may lead to crucial self-construction difficulties, and that psychosis emerges out of this 
`blocked adolescence'. This approach allows professional services to side with both parents 
and clients simultaneously, and is normalising and stigma-free. 
I An abridged version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in 
Clinical Psychology Review (early 2000). 
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2.1.1 Introduction 
By any standards, schizophrenia is a major problem, both in terms of the degree of 
suffering (it is one of the most severe and debilitating of the mental disorders), prevalence 
(affecting roughly 1% of people; Sartorius, 1986) and cost (between 0.3 and 0.7 per cent of 
GNP of Western countries; McGuire, 1991). Despite enormous research effort, schizophrenia 
remains largely one of the great unsolved mysteries, and this has led many researchers to 
criticise the very concept and definition of schizophrenia (Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim, 1988; 
Boyle, 1990; see appendix A). At the very least it seems likely that the category of 
schizophrenia actually refers to "the broad range of disorders that have at some time been 
given the name "schizophrenia" (Wing, 1988, p326), i. e. a heterogenous category, containing 
a number of `schizophrenias' (Crow, 1980). Accordingly, it seems unlikely that that there will 
ever be one all-encompassing theory of schizophrenia. Given this diversity, it is not surprising 
that there are a large number of theories, of which few if any have survived empirical 
evaluation. In the continuing search for alternative theories, this paper offers another theory to 
be used eclectically with the established literature. The new theory is based on the one facet 
of schizophrenia that has been consistently overlooked. It has been said that there are three 
inescapable clinical facts about schizophrenia (Weinberger, 1987) 
1) Neuroleptic drugs have a therapeutic benefit. 
2) Stress is involved in onset and relapse. 
3) Late adolescence or early adulthood is the time when schizophrenia usually becomes 
clinically apparent. 
Research has been mainly targeted at the first two facts, (neuroleptics and stress) 
while the adolescence angle has been neglected. This is a big omission given the evidence 
that in the majority of cases, schizophrenia arises in late adolescence: a World Health 
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Organisation sponsored study in 9 countries found that 50.9% of their cases were aged 
between 15 and 25 (Sartorius, 1986; Jablensky and Cole, 1997)). 82.5% of participants were 
between 15 and 35. Most of these subjects were within 12 months of first showing psychotic 
symptoms (86%). All other studies have shown the same results; e. g. Häfner et al (1993b) 
found that 62% of males and 47% of females had symptoms before 25. 
A psychological-developmental theory is put forward that argues that early psychosis 
is a consequence of blocked psychological maturation during adolescence. This argument will 
be developed in two stages. First, evidence is considered of the link between schizophrenia 
and normal adolescent development by reviewing the parallels between, on the one hand, 
difficult periods and associated needs in normal teenagers and on the other, psychological 
disturbances that characterise the majority of young schizophrenia sufferers. Second, the issue 
of why normal adolescents might become blocked in their psychological development is 
examined, and finally how these blocks might lead to the precipitation of symptoms is 
explored. 
The last time psychological accounts of schizophrenia were attempted was in the 
1960's, and so it is important to stress that a new psychological theory does not imply a return 
to the theories of "schizophrenogenic mothers" and pathological families of three decades 
ago. This theory is more scientifically valid by the criteria of philosophy of science (Harre 
and Secord, 1972), and also does not blame family members; instead what happens is 
described as an unfortunate consequence of normal adolescent development. The beauty of 
the paradigm is that it supports both parents and child. 
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2.2 Comparison of Normal Adolescent Developmental `Turbulence' 
and Psychotic Disturbance 
In this section, the adolescence literature is selectively reviewed. Because the 
literature is so vast, the review is not comprehensive; instead one predominantly clinical 
framework is adhered to, and this no account is taken of other controversies in the 
adolescence literature such as cultural or historical variation. Although this is a useful 
framework, the thesis does not depend on it, in that it is uncontentious a 13 year-old's view of 
the world is different to a 19 year-old's. After setting out the general framework that 
adolescence research uses, first empirical data is considered that supports the existence of the 
phenomena. The theoretical explanation of the phenomena is examined where appropriate, 
and finally the relevance to psychosis is examined. 
2.2.1 The two basic psychological needs of adolescence 
1) Autonomy and individuation from the family. A major theme of the adolescence 
literature is that an adolescent needs to emerge from under the parents as a person in their 
own right. An individual needs to have their own control over issues such as when to go out, 
who to hang out with, what to eat, etc. Individuation from parents and others occurs at 
adolescence- in essence the teenagers says "I am of you, but I am not the same as you". 
2) Forging peer relationships. There is a need to be able to relate to peers in a way that can 
replace the lost attachment to the parents. For example, it has been postulated (Dunphy, 1972; 
Brown, 1986) that teenagers progress through same-sex gangs, to mixed sex gangs, to the 
formation of "romantic dyads". The empirical evidence suggests that although there is much 
variation between individuals and between genders, it can be generalised that peer 
Why does schizophrenia emerge during adolescence? 19 
relationships (heterosexual or homosexual) become far more important and usually in the 
larger part replace parental attachments (Berndt, 1979). 
2.2.2 Adolescent phenomenon 1: "Storm and stress" 
There is probably more stress during adolescence than in any other stage in the life- 
cycle. For example, Siddique and D'arcy (1984) found that 28% of their sample reported high 
levels of psychological distress. Interestingly, a large number of teenagers did not report 
unbearable stress, and current thinking is that the intolerability of stress has been over- 
estimated (Youniss and Smollar, 1985). Thus for a significant majority adolescence is very 
distressing. Coleman (1979) speculated that whether or not adolescents experienced distress 
related to how free they were to "budget" their problems. Ideally, they would only take on as 
many problems as they could focus on at any one time. An individual experiences distress 
when more major life events are forced on the adolescent than they can cope with at once 
(called the "focal theory"; Coleman, 1979). Distress is also thought to be related to how much 
the family supports the individual through this difficult time. Studies have shown that the 
number of life transitions occurring is inversely related to school performance and self- 
esteem (Simmons and Blyth, 1987). 
2.2.2.1 Stress and psychosis 
Given the implications of the focal theory, a first hypothesis regarding schizophrenia 
is: 
Schizophrenia arises because too many life events arrive at the same time for the adolescent 
to be able to handle them. Or Adolescents who develop psychosis have very poor skills to be 
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able to manage themselves and their traumas. This is close to traditional theories in the 
psychosis literature that say stressful life events bring on schizophrenia (in genetically 
vulnerable people) (Norman and Malla, 1993; Neuchterlein and Dawson, 1984). Some studies 
have estimated that as many as 70% of people who experience psychosis had stressful life 
events in the preceding 3 weeks (Brown and Birley, 1968). 
2.2.3 Adolescent phenomenon 2: Conflict between adolescents and parents 
Behavioural development in adolescence is characterised by there being much 
conflict between teenagers and their parents; this can be seen as a natural consequence of the 
need to individuate. This common stereotype of conflict between adolescents and their 
parents, and this has been borne out by research (Coleman, 1974; Rutter et al, 1976; 
Montemayor and Hansom, 1985). Conflict is less likely to be over "big" issues such as 
politics or religion; instead it is over issues of rule-breaking and non-compliance to parental 
requests. For example, Smetana (1989) asked normal family members to recount their 
versions of family disputes and justify the stances they took. The adolescents were likely to be 
arguing because they saw the issue as something that should now be under their personal 
jurisdiction (for example "cleaning one's room" for them would have been a matter of 
personal choice). Parents argued because they thought that the -issue was something parents 
should have authority over. In effect, the conflicts arise because adolescents are constantly 
gaining ground, negotiating their way from `subordinate' to `self-ordinate' beings. This is 
difficult for parents, who are unsure about relinquishing the protection they give their child. 
"The parental task is to accept as best they can the adolescent's call for greater freedom" 
(Coleman and Hendry, 1990, p. 84). They are also having to come to terms with another major 
role for themselves, that of middle-aged people with grown up children. 
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2.2.3.1 Conflict and psychosis 
Data on how much conflict there is in families of people with a psychosis is difficult 
to collect. An interpretation of the mass of family work (E. g. Wynne and Singer, 1963; Leff 
and Vaughn, 1985; Birchwood and Tarrier, 1992) is that there is much variation, from 
families with no dischord at all, to those with much. Our own data suggests that many are 
highly anxious about dischord; clients are significantly more likely (p<0.01) than student 
controls to endorse questionnaire items reflecting this difficulty, such as "People who argue 
with Mum are awful", "I never say things my Mum may not want to hear" (see chapter 7). On 
the other hand it is likely that most clients would like to be more independent and empowered 
regarding their families (Barham, 1993). For example, theories from the 1960's (e. g. Laing, 
1965) are very popular with clients partly because they blamed the parents for the client's 
illness, and in doing so empowered the clients. Clients themselves usually find the medical 
model alienating because it entails that sufferers themselves have no control over the illness 
and there is nothing they can do to get better, except take medication (Reeves, 1997). Clients 
are often very reluctant to accept that they are even ill (David, 1990). It also seems that many 
clients are really looking to have an issue on which they can legitimately oppose their parents, 
as if they were trying to start on the process of rebellion outlined above. Indeed, much of the 
psychosis literature resembles a battle between parents and their offspring as to who is `right' 
or who is 'to blame' for the illness (Clare, 1980). Parents are often keen to embrace the 
medical model because it blames the sufferer's body, and reassures the parents that they are 
not to blame (Clare, 1980). Rejecting the medical model has previously seemed to imply one 
has to blame the parents, in the absence of alternative psychological theories; however clients 
can be empowered without blaming parents. 
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2.2.4 Adolescent phenomenon 3: De-idealisation and autonomy 
Cognitive development is the driving force behind the adolescent's conflict 
behaviour. They would not be able to stand their ground and win their battles unless their 
perspective on their parent's behaviour had changed. A necessary part of gaining autonomy is 
a capacity for independent judgement and this entails a re-assessment and perhaps rejection of 
the old rules that used to bind them during their teenage years. Blos gives a poetic account: 
"Whereas previously the parent was overvalued, considered with awe, and not realistically 
assessed, he now becomes undervalued and is seen to have the shabby proportions of a fallen 
idol .... The adolescent becomes arrogant and rebellious, defies rules because they are no 
longer universal absolutes, but have to be tested for being inventions of a deranged despotic 
parent. " (Blos, 1962, p. 91). 
Does it happen? Steinberg and Silverberg (1986) devised the Emotional Autonomy 
questionnaire, based around the writings Blos (1962). One of the subscales is de-idealisation, 
and this was shown to increase linearly with age, for the 865 teenagers who completed it. The 
young adolescent begins to be aware of the fallibility of their parents: "What used to be the 
centre of his world and an authority on everything now becomes something human and 
motivated by hitherto unsuspected human motivations. " (Blos, 1962, p 185). 
If de-idealisation is the process that precedes and facilitates autonomy, then the 
mechanism of change is taken to be simply the learning about other people that comes from 
repeated exposure to them. This is to say that a simple, parsimonious account can be gleaned 
from considering development in this way, although regarding cognitive development in 
adolescence there are many complementary schools of thought (e. g. sociological work 
focusing on role changes and demands (Thomas, 1968); or lifespan-developmental work, 
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where the emphasis is on the contribution the individual themselves actively makes to 
change, e. g. Lerner, 1987. ) 
2.2.4.1 De-idealisation/ autonomy and psychosis 
To summarise the argument, de-idealisation may be an essential precursor to the 
development of autonomy which in turn may be essential to successfully completing 
adolescent development. Still seeing the world in a more childlike way would therefore make 
it very difficult for an individual to function as an adult. For example, still having idealised 
views of one's parents as especially powerful, knowledgeable `gods' , (like a small child 
perhaps does) would make doing the things that adults do- e. g. cooking, driving, etc., very 
intimidating. Two specific hypotheses are derived: 
1) Some people with a psychosis are not very autonomous, and still have a simplistic and 
idealised view of their parents. Their child-like viewpoint makes it difficult for them to 
operate autonomously in the adult world. 
Later in the thesis, empirical evidence is presented for this claim. Compared to 
students, psychotic clients were significantly more likely to endorse items such as "My Dad is 
always fair" and "I have never known my Dad to lie" (p<0.05; chapter 7). Compared to 
gender, age and educational level matched controls they score significantly higher on the 
idealisation subscale of Steinberg and Silverberg's (1986) Emotional Autonomy scale 
(chapter 4). On their overall scores on this scale, the psychosis group resemble 13 year olds 
more than older adolescents (chapter 3). 
As detailed above, one explanation for many of the characteristics of adolescent 
turmoil can be derived from the idea of developing autonomy and such concepts as "de- 
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idealising parents". In normal adolescents, part of the resolution of the uncomfortable 
period of adolescence comes with bonding to peers and leaving the family. The second 
hypothesis therefore is: 
2) Some individuals with a psychosis have gone part way towards an adult, autonomous 
view of their parents, but cannot relate to their peers and end up stranded in a social and 
psychological 'no mans land'. For these people, their relationship with their parents has been 
re-negotiated, and they are experiencing common adolescence phenomena, (for example 
conflict with their parents, depression). Unfortunately, the situation does not get resolved, 
because their peer relationships are not well developed enough, perhaps because they have 
not de-idealised their peers yet (this will be explored later). In these circumstances the 
condition of being a troubled teenager may gradually and insidiously deteriorate to become a 
partial or full psychosis. 
In another chapter of this thesis (chapter 6), data are presented where 80% of clients 
fitted the first hypothesis, whereas the remaining 20% fitted the second. Clients in the former 
group reported being anxious about ever expressing anger at their parents, and had strong 
rules about how they should behave towards their idealised parents. Clients in the smaller 
second group had no qualms at all about expressing anger towards their parents and behaved 
in an almost tyrannical fashion. 
Not only are there resounding parallels between teenage phenomena, as found in the 
adolescence literature, and psychological experiences seen in psychosis, but also the 
explanatory theories of adolescence are remarkably consistent with cognitive theories of 
psychosis, as is seen below. 
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2.2.5 Adolescent phenomenon 4: Depression and loss. "Heaven knows I'm miserable 
now" (Smiths, 1984) 
De-idealising parents is not going to be an entirely positive experience, because in 
return for the greater personal freedom that adolescents gain, they lose a lot in terms of 
security and attachment. This can lead to a sense of loss, depression and unsureness, amongst 
other things. Losing one's image of parents as ideal can be a great loss indeed. Often clients 
are reluctant to relinquish this comforting image. Some researchers have suggested it is as 
traumatic as a bereavement, as it is a bereavement of a kind. Does it happen? 
There is much evidence that a number of negative experiences such as depression and 
loss go hand in hand with the development of autonomy. For instance, Ryan and Lynch 
(1989) suggested that the Emotional Autonomy Scale in fact measured more negative factors 
to do with detachment than autonomy. This was because the scale correlated very well with 
some apparently negative phenomena such as the amount to which adolescents said their 
parents did not accept them, and their lack of "felt security". However the argument is that 
emotional autonomy is something that disposes the adolescent to take a much less 
sympathetic view of the parent than non- autonomous, still -idealising teenagers do. It should 
not be surprising, therefore that people high on Emotional Autonomy also endorse items 
associated with poorer parenting. 
2.2.5.1 Depression and psychosis 
Depression is so common in psychosis that there is a separate category in the ICD-10 
diagnostic criteria for "Post-schizophrenic depression" (WHO, 1990). Depression may come 
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from de-idealisation, but even if this is avoided, then depression may arise from a lack of 
individuation and adult functioning as it is suggested happens in some forms of psychosis. 
There is a significant prevalence of depression and anhedonia in psychosis. Often when the 
more florid symptoms of psychosis are in remission there is a depression still present, in a 
third of people (Birchwood et al, 1993). It has traditionally been thought that such emotion is 
a response to the losses involved with breakdown, such as loss of career aspirations, and loss 
of respect and standing amongst one's family and friends. It is suggested here that it may also 
be due either to thwarted needs for autonomy and the associated need to rebel against parents, 
or from the losses involved in a partial rebellion. 
2.2.6 Adolescent phenomenon 5: Egocentrism, grandiosity and self-consciousness 
Another important area of adolescence research that has enormous relevance for 
psychosis is adolescent egocentrism. David Elkind suggested that adolescents behave as if 
they carry an audience around in their imagination (Elkind, 1979). The idea of the "Imaginary 
Audience" can be used to explain many aspects of adolescent behaviour. For example, it 
lends teenagers a certain grandiosity: "Possibly because the adolescent believes he or she is so 
important to so many people (the imaginary audience) they come to see themselves, and their 
feelings as very special, even unique. " (Elkind, 1967, p. 1031). 
The stereotype of the self-absorbed teenager is well known, but is it realistic? 
Empirical testing has shown that in normals, egocentricity is high in early (13) and mid (15) 
adolescence, and then declines from mid to late adolescence (17) (with a further peak in a 
college sample). Self- consciousness increases from mid to late adolescence (Enright, Shukla 
and Lapsley, 1980; Lapsley et al, 1986). 
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Elkind (1967) offered an explanation of the phenomenon; the adolescents find it 
difficult to distinguish between what others are attending to and what they themselves are 
attending to. They assume if they themselves are obsessed by a thought or a problem, then 
other people must be obsessed by the same thing. Elkind suggested that this is because they 
have yet to develop that cognitive capacity. The paradigm Elkind used was based on Piaget's 
work on adolescence (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958). To understand this aspect of Piaget's 
theories for adolescence, it is necessary to understand Piaget's theories on younger children: 
Piaget saw cognitive skills as being learnt in fairly discrete stages, as the child 
progresses to being a fully equipped adult. He theorised that very young children have 
`animism' - they have such a limited knowledge of the way the external world acts that they 
do not know that an object out of their sight continues to exist. With time, children are able to 
form representations of the object which can stand independently in their minds, hence they 
`know' that objects exist independently (called the stage of `Preoperations'). The stage after 
preoperations ('Concrete operations') is where children have developed the ability to have 
two or more symbols for the same thing (for example, in conservation tasks children know 
that the amount of a substance stays the same even if its appearance is altered. At the final 
stage of Formal operations individuals are able to represent thoughts and abstract ideas to 
themselves. 
When Piaget and Inhelder extended the theory into adolescence, they postulated that 
the essential step away from egocentrism is to be able to conceptualise other people's 
thoughts. Elkind proposed that while an adolescent may now understand in principle the 
concept that other people may have a covert inner life and a unique perspective, in practice 
they have difficulty `differentiating between the objects toward which the thoughts of others 
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are directed, and those which are the focus of their own concern' (Elkind, 1967, p. 1029). 
In other words, unless they make an effort to work out what other people are thinking of, they 
automatically assume that other people think the same way they do about everything. Hence 
they are egocentric because they see their perspectives and needs as practically the only 
existing ones. 
A good analogy to what happens in adolescent egocentrism is found in privileged 
information tasks. It has been shown with younger children that when they have information 
that a story character does not have, they have difficulty realising that the story character will 
not make decisions based on that information (Mitchell et al, 1996). Similarly when an 
adolescent `attempts to cognise the thoughts of others, he fails to suppress his privileged 
information, his own perspective intrudes, with the result that he reproduces his own 
perspective rather than anticipating the perspective of the other'. (Lapsley and Murphy, 1985, 
p. 206). 
One might add to this debate that attachment-losses and de-idealising might also 
contribute to the formation of the imaginary audience. Adolescents start off with an 
unsophisticated and idealised opinion of all adults, not just their parents. As they progress to 
"debunk" their parents, they are left in a situation where the rest of the adult world then also 
needs to be debunked. This is a difficult task, all the more so because they are losing the 
protection of the parents (as parental credibility is being eroded). They are left exposed in 
front of a still somewhat idealised and quite frightening set of authorities in the adult world, 
without anyone to appeal to if it all goes wrong. Peers gradually take on a whole new 
importance, and are not as kind and supportive as parents are. Individuals are left much more 
open to criticism. For example, adolescence is a time when a person's self-esteem is 
frighteningly dependent on the attitude of opposite-sex peers (Arkowitz, Hinton, Perl and 
Why does schizophrenia emerge during adolescence? 29 
Himadi, 1978). Parents worry about naive teenagers falling romantically for a person who 
may not treat them well. When they are older and have more experience of romantic 
relationships, they may be less likely to accept poor treatment. 
Egocentrism diminishes in late adolescence, so it is assumed that the difficulty is 
overcome thanks to repeated social interaction and experience; hence it is from learning about 
other people and how they behave that egocentricity diminishes (Lapsley and Murphy, 1985). 
2.2.6.1 Egocentricity and psychosis 
The relevance of such egocentricity for psychosis is enormous. Many of the diagnostic 
criteria for schizophrenia would be seen typically as egocentric, for example the ICD-10 
includes "persistent delusions... such as religious or political identity or superhuman powers 
and abilities (e. g. being able to control the weather... )"; (WHO, 1990). Many people with a 
psychosis show extreme grandiosity, often to the extent that they believe they are Jesus or 
similarly important figures. Grandiosity or narcissism has always been seen as a basic drive in 
children that is overcome in adulthood (Kohut, 1992), but it has not been fully stated that one 
of the main things that helps one to overcome it is an appreciation of other people's existence 
and importance. Many sufferers spend so much time on their own that it is sort of true for 
them to say they are the most important people in the world- they are virtually the only people 
in their world environment (there is such a case in chapter 6)! Also, delusions of reference, 
(where sufferers feel passers-by or TV s are referring to them) are showing a version of 
animism- everything that other people do is interpreted as other people only being interested 
in the sufferer. Voices can be seen as more severe versions of reference experiences- other 
people are assumed to be so preoccupied with the psychosis sufferer that they neglect their 
own lives (and bodies) to devote all their time to communicating intimately with the sufferer. 
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Psychosis research has already tried to include the `Theory of Mind' literature 
(Frith, 1992). A classic observation of someone with a psychosis is that they have lost touch 
with what the people around them are really thinking, and become caught up in what they 
project onto other people as thinking. Laing (1965) described the way that people with a 
psychosis relate to other people as `fantasms'- that is they had a rather strange and unusual 
image of the other person in their heads and hence were not really relating to the other person 
at all. Of course, even the average person's understanding of what makes other people tick is 
always going to be an approximation to the complexity other people's experience. It cannot 
be assumed that even normal people have a particularly accurate understanding of other 
people; "object relations theory, broadly defined, rests on the assumption that in our 
relationships we react according to the internal representations we hold of people important to 
us, in the past as well as the person actually before us now.. . 
Thus our responses to those 
before us now may have only the vaguest of associations with present tense reality. " (Kroger, 
1996, p. 50-51). 
Similarly there is a large literature on people with a psychosis having various deficits 
when it comes to interpreting facially displayed emotions (Bellack et al, 1992); such social 
perception deficits must surely arise because there is an impaired concept of other people 
having such emotions. If there is only a limited conceptualisation of other people being angry 
- -in that clients conceive of other people's anger as entirely relating to themselves (the client) 
- it should not be surprising that clients have difficulties recognising facial expressions of 
anger. 
In summary, the ability to mentalise-for-others is something that develops during 
adolescence. During its development, it leads adolescents to be egocentric and self-conscious. 
It has been proposed that people with a psychosis remain egocentric (and perhaps get worse) 
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because they never develop a more sophisticated understanding of how other people work, 
such as is a vital part of individuation and autonomy, and "feeling like an adult"; without it, 
the adult world is a difficult place to operate. 
2.2.7 Adolescent phenomenon 6: the `Personal Fable' of spiritually significant events, 
uniqueness and indestructibility 
Blos wrote that adolescents reported experiencing many profound effects, things that 
seem to occur just for them, such as particularly striking scenes in nature or theories. For 
example: "mother nature becomes a personal respondent to the adolescent; the beauty of 
nature is discovered and exalted emotional states are experienced" (Blos, 1962, p. 93). Elkind 
called this sense of uniqueness and indestructibility `the personal fable'. Adolescents have a 
belief in their own indestructibility (e. g. `pregnancy will never happen to me/ I will never 
die'). "They believe that their thoughts or feelings are understood by no-one, least of all by 
their parents" (Elkind, 1967, p. 1031). (Presumably these feelings of loneliness and 
uniqueness come at times when they are forced to realise that everyone else does not see the 
world as they do, as their egocentricity had led them to believe. ) 
Does it happen and why? Enright, Shukla and Lapsley (1980) showed that a measure 
of "personal fable" followed the same pattern as egocentricity- decreasing from mid to late 
adolescence. The personal fable was explained by Elkind as deriving from the `imaginary 
audience'. "The emotional torments undergone by Salinger's Holden Caulfield exemplifies 
the adolescent's belief of his own uniqueness of experience. " (Elkind, 1967, p. 1031). Many 
adolescents keep diaries; these are used to confide thoughts and events that cannot be shared 
with real people; "posterity looks over his shoulder as he writes. " (Blos, 1962, p. 95). 
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2.2.7.1 Personal fables and psychosis 
As the personal fable is roughly akin to egocentricity, it should hardly need pointing 
out that experiences of uniqueness and loneliness, feelings of indestructibility and a sensation 
of things being especially significant, perhaps in a spiritual sense are fundamental experiences 
in psychosis; in fact they are intrinsic to the diagnostic criteria (ICD-10; WHO, 1979). A 
passage about adolescence by Barker (1951) cited by Blos shows this admirably: 
"Those exquisitely melancholy afternoons of my adolescence when I used to 
walk with the abstraction of a somnambulist through the damp avenues of 
Richmond Park, thinking that life would never happen to me, wondering why 
the banked fires of my anticipations, burning in my belly worse than raw 
alcohol, seemed not to show to strangers as I wandered in the gardens. And 
often it appeared to me, the frustration, in the disguise of an hallucination: 
looking between the trees that dripped with hanging mist I sometimes saw 
classical statues take on an instant of life, turning their naked beauty towards 
me; or I heard a voice speak out of a bush: `everything will be answered if you 
will only not look around'. And I have stood waiting, not daring to look 
around, expecting a hand on my shoulder that would tender an apotheosis or 
an assignation. But there was only the gust of wind and the page of a 
newspaper blowing breezily up and past me like a dirty interjection. Or a 
bicyclist flashed by, offering possibility until he reached me and decamping 
with it when he had passed. For I was suffering from a simple but devastating 
propensity: I was hoping to live. " (Barker, cited by Blos, 1962, p. 92) 
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The author's eloquence testifies to his sanity, and yet within the context of normal 
adolescence, here there are reference experiences, anhedonia, voices, apocalyptic cognition 
and others. 
2.2.8 Adolescent phenomenon 7: Mentoring and seeking "New Gods" 
After the loss of the idealised image of their parents, adolescents are in a position 
where they are used to having parent- type figures, and are now left without them. It is 
common for them to seek new authority figures who take on a profound significance and are 
held in idealised esteem. Famous writers or statesmen, religious or moral leaders, footballers, 
pop- stars or perhaps figures in the young person's immediate environment can become 
powerfully important mentors (Hendry, 1983). They can be idealised to the extent that it can 
be a bit like a crush. The need is for a perfect person to replace the perfect authority lost. 
"If a ten-truck truck 
Kills the both of us, 
To die by your side, 
Well the pleasure, the privilege is mine. " (Smiths, 1986). 
In psychosis, a powerful and omnipotent character is nearly always assumed by the 
individual to be behind the voices or thought manipulations (Chadwick and Birchwood, 
1994). Usually it is God or the Devil or somebody famous who is telepathically 
communicating with the client; by implication a very important person for someone so 
important to be in close contact with them. 
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2.2.9 Adolescent phenomenon 8: Psychosis-like experiences 
Little research has been done to see if the more extreme positive symptoms 
(hallucinations, delusions) are common in normal adolescents. Researchers investigating 
prodromes (the gradual deterioration preceding a psychotic relapse) have found that 
prodromes appear to be far more common than would previously have been expected 
amongst normal students. McGorry et al (1995) gave an amended version of the Early Signs 
Questionnaire (A scale filled in by sufferers every week to help them to notice if they are 
becoming unwell) to 657 high school students (mean age 16.5 years). They concluded that 
10-15% of students showed a clinically significant number of prodromal symptoms, 51% of 
all their students endorsed the "magical ideation" items, 46% reported unusual perceptual 
experiences, 22% reported blunt, flat or inappropriate affect and 18.4% of normal 16 year- 
olds reported social isolation or withdrawal. 
Our own research has shown that not only are such prodromal signs common 
in 
adolescence, but the incidence is directly related to scores on measures of emotional 
development. For example, among 12-18 year olds, people with the highest number of 
prodromal signs are usually those who are the most emotionally developed for their age (see 
chapter 3). This implies that prodromal signs go hand in hand with normal psychological 
development. 
2.2.10 Summary: still ill? 
In this section a description has been given of the parallels between normal 
`troubled 
teenager' phenomena and some of the main symptoms of young schizophrenia sufferers. 
It 
has been shown that conflict behaviour between parent and offspring during adolescence 
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reflects the need to individuate, and that it comes about mainly because of the stressful 
and often depressing process of de-idealising the parents. Moreover at the start of 
adolescence, individuals are grandiose, and demonstrate `personal fable' cognitions, which 
was shown to be closely related to the fact that they have a limited understanding of other 
people's minds. Similarities were drawn out between the normal troubled teenager, and the 
individual of a few years older who is actively psychotic. It was argued that schizophrenia 
may emerge from a troubled teenage state which fails to resolve with normal maturation, with 
the result that the selfsame teenage `troubles' now deteriorate into the appearance of 
psychotic symptoms. Two situations in which this might happen have been described: 
First there is the individual who has not individuated from his parents, who continues 
to regard them and others in an idealised, overawed manner. Second is the individual who has 
partially individuated from his parents, but has not managed to bond to peers, and hence does 
not get the resolution of the turmoil that leaving the family and bonding to peers normally 
brings. Both types of individual are stuck in the middle of the uncomfortable turbulent 
experiences of adolescence such as loneliness, grandiosity, depression and delusion-like 
fantasy, yet unlike most adolescents they do not emerge from them. 
Why does schizophrenia emerge during adolescence? 36 
2.3 From Adolescent Blocks to Psychotic Symptoms - Why and How? 
The turmoils of the individuating adolescent as he or she matures have been 
described, and the blocks that may occur in this process that leave some at-risk teenagers 
stuck in this psychotic-like phase. In this section an attempt is made to explain these 
disruptions in normal development- why they may come about, and how they might lead to 
psychotic symptomatology. 
2.3.1 Why might a non-autonomous individual show distress? 
Why is it that the first group of psychosis sufferers, (the group of non-autonomous 
individuals who remain bonded to their parents) do not just live happily in this state? Why do 
they show any distress at all? Part of the answer might be that there has evolved a powerful 
sexual and maturational propensity to individuate from one's parents, the thwarting of which 
creates enormous emotional turbulence. One of the many ingredients integral to this 
maturational process is the role of sex-hormones; sex-hormones have been shown to be 
related to symptomatology in psychosis. 
The drive to autonomy is not just an intellectual pursuit, it is also a biological goal. 
All group animals show a desire to be at the top of the hierarchy, and to find a mate. 
However, Gilbert (1993) has described an opposing mechanism, where an individual assumes 
a low-ranked position when threatened or defeated by a dominant other. Gilbert calls the 
latter the `involuntary subordination' response, and it includes the tendency to be submissive, 
appeasing and to have low self esteem. In ethology, there is considerable evidence that sexual 
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maturation can depend on attaining status in group hierarchical relations. In many old- 
world monkeys, males do not sexually mature while they are in the company of dominant 
males. In stump tailed macaques, males do not show an adolescent growth spurt until the 
dominant male is removed; soon after this the next- highest ranking male begins sexual 
development (Steinberg, 1988). Effects have been shown amongst female tamarins and 
marmosets; young females living in proximity to their mothers show suppressed ovulation, 
and yet if they are removed from this proximity they develop ovarian cyclicity within 4 weeks 
(Evans and Hodges, 1984). 
In humans, it has been shown that the timing of puberty can be influenced to a large 
extent by psychological factors. Brookes-Gunn and Warren (1985) found that more ballet 
dancers than normal controls were "late" maturers (55% vs 29%). Also, those dancers who 
had matured on time had a greater incidence of psychopathology and bulimia. They 
concluded that for dancers it would be disadvantageous to be mature because of the additional 
weight gain that adulthood would entail, and so this psychological factor had managed to 
delay menarche. Similarly, in a longitudinal study, Steinberg (1986) assessed how physical 
maturation and relationship measures developed together over a year. He found the usual 
results of more arguments, less cohesion and increasing autonomy with increasing physical 
development. He also found the reciprocal relationship in girls- autonomy and distance 
between parent and child resulted in increased physical development. Hence there is evidence 
that, like in ethology, a person's psychological environment can strongly affect puberty. 
One of the seminal findings in psychosis research concerns people who have 
recovered from a psychotic episode in hospital who return to live in the parental home. 
They 
are twice as likely to relapse than those who leave hospital to live independently (Brown and 
Birley, 1968). It has been shown that people suffering from schizophrenia perceive 
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themselves as being in a low ranked position and show all the features of Gilbert's 
involuntary subordination response (Birchwood et al, 1998). A degree of associated sexual 
inhibition is also likely to occur as part of this response. It would not have to be as extreme or 
dramatic as actual maturational or pubertal inhibition or even ovulation suppression to be 
relevant; though this might be happening. Some sort of effect might be expected in the sex- 
hormone levels of people with schizophrenia; interestingly, there are now a number of reports 
on the connection between sex- hormones and psychosis. 
Levels of sex-hormone in the blood have been seen to vary systematically with 
symptomatology in schizophrenia sufferers. Häfner et al (1993a) found that when levels of 
oestradiol (a female sex-hormone) were correlated with psychopathology measures, there 
were significant negative correlations with the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, paranoia 
measure and subjective well- being. They concluded that symptoms were better when 
oestradiol measures were high, and worse when they were low. (See also Oades and 
Schepker, 1994; Hernandez et al, 1994). Other researchers have used rats to attempt to show a 
relationship between symptoms and sex-hormones. Riecher- Rosier et a] (1994) "injected rats 
with schizophrenia" (i. e. a psychoactive drug) after injecting a test sub- group with 
oestrogen. They concluded that oestrogen raised the threshold for vulnerability for 
`schizophrenia'. One could speculate further on the biology involved (e. g. whether or not sex- 
hormones could be used as anti- psychotic medications). It is a relatively unexplored idea that 
psychology can affect biology in such a radical way, and there is a need for further research 
here. The current hypothesis is served well by the conclusion that there is some sort of 
irregularity in the sex-hormones of people with a psychosis. A proponent of the ethological 
theory could speculate that it is a biological drive to reach adulthood coming into conflict 
with a biological suppression effect that is due to the clients being in the proximity of 
dominant parents, because psychologically they `do not feel like adults'. They may still 
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idealise their parents, and peers, and yet they may be experiencing the same self- 
construction and individuation urges against their parents that vormals have. This may cause 
some discomfort because they may not feel that these urges are acceptable against ideal 
others. 
2.3.2 Why might it be difficult to individuate from one's parents? 
It has been argued that failure to psychologically mature and individuate from one's 
parents can in time lead to psychotic symptoms. But why is it so difficult for some at-risk 
adolescents to individuate? One reason may be the belief that to assert oneself against one's 
parents may provoke imagined hostility and criticism, and this is too psychologically 
traumatic to take. Rosenberg (1979) puts the point well: "Once the individual seriously 
attempts to fathom what others think of him, the conclusions that emerge are by no means 
palatable.. . In the early years the child has accepted the idea that others think well of him and 
has given the matter little thought. In early adolescence, when he is able to get outside his 
own viewpoint and see matters, including himself, from the perspective of others, he 
recognises the complexity of others attitudes towards him; he becomes aware of both their 
qualms and their sources of appreciation" (Rosenberg, 1979, p. 238-9). As Rosenberg pin- 
points, the perspective changes of adolescence may be unpleasant, and difficult for an 
individual to accept. In the next section, situations are considered in which such transitions 
may be more difficult than usual. 
2.3.2.1 It may seem unfair to rebel against `good' parents 
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It has been argued that it is almost better for adolescents if their parents are 
particularly harsh, because then the adolescents will not find it so difficult to find issues on 
which to oppose them, nor will they need much reassurance about how right they are (Blos, 
1967). (Here, for instance, peer groups can serve as a particularly potent source of outside 
validation; Berndt, 1982). But with parents who are `good' it may feel too insulting to try to 
take control and be assertive. After all, parents generally think they have their offspring's best 
interests at heart. Normally parents have to put up with a lot of apparently unreasonable 
behaviours and conflicting messages: "No individual achieves independence without a 
number of backwards glances" (Coleman and Hendry, 1990, p. 84). One moment adolescents 
are being unusually adult and taking the high moral ground on some issue against the parent. 
The next they are acting like a small child again, and using ways of behaviour thought by the 
parent to be long since gone, perhaps seeking reassurances like a much younger child would 
(Kroger, 1996). The lability of adolescent moods can be exasperating for parents. We have 
observed a similar pattern of rebelliousness cycling with guilt and more childish, reassurance- 
seeking behaviours operating in people with a psychosis (chapter 6). 
Many clients idealise their parents, and are particularly anxious to protect them. Thus 
it is hard for these clients to individuate against them and do their own thing. To de-idealise 
them may seem like an aggressive act against a God , or against someone they have a 
genuinely warm and close relationship with. 
For example, Dennis had been floridly ill for a period a year ago. He had been so in 
awe of his mother that he passively did whatever he thought she wanted of him. Every few 
months he would have built up such resentments and frustrations that he would have an angry 
verbal outburst. His mother took this as signs of a setback in his illness after a period of 
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having been "doing well". Den usually felt chronic guilt and shame after his outburst, and 
would return to being totally compliant for a few months (see chapter 6). 
"Opposition is true friendship"- William Blake. 
Parenting traditions have held that conflict in families is a bad thing. Research has 
shown that although conflict is unpleasant and difficult for all parties involved, it is actually a 
good thing because it reflects healthy self-assertion and rights to self-actualise on both sides 
(e. g. Lamborn, Mounts, Steinberg and Dombusch, 1991). A political system in which dissent 
is voiced and tolerated is generally held to be healthier than one in which no one is ever 
allowed to disagree. Conflict is good here because adolescents have rights to assert their 
needs as adults against their parents. Also they need to have practice of arguing skills if they 
are to bond to peers successfully. To reiterate, an interesting implication of this theory is that 
one does not have to take sides in the debate of parents vs. child. It reconciles the two because 
it says it is natural for both parties to have grievances with the other. (Also it implies that in 
some cases, the parenting is actually very good, so the child does not want to leave home! ) 
2.3.2.2 Intimidating parents 
Another situation where the adolescent may not feel able to individuate is in situations 
where the parent is frightening. Some parents take disagreement and difference as a threat to 
themselves, and try to disallow it. For instance, it has been suggested that people sexually 
abused as children are particularly at risk for schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Hunter, 
1991). This could be because a child living with a dominating and abusive parent perhaps 
copes by being extremely subordinate and wary of adults. A person who is dispositionally 
stuck in an involuntary subordinate role (Gilbert, 1993) may find this role impossible to break 
out of, even though it might later be possible to escape painful circumstances. The life 
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transition and role re-negotiations of adolescence for such an incapacitated person would 
be too difficult to attempt. Stuck in such a subordinate role, maintained by fear of adults, and 
unable to enter the adult world as one of them, and yet seeing all their friends successfully 
becoming adults, it can seem that there would be nowhere for the adolescent to go. They 
remain trapped in a child-like role when, in their eyes, everyone else is authoritative and 
powerful. 
2.3.2.3 Individuated from parents but facing problems with peers? 
Peer relationships may be so difficult and threatening that parental relationships are 
preferred, in the sense that clients are too anxious for them to be able to move away from the 
home base. In the same way that it is easier for individuals to interact with their parents when 
they have de-idealised them, there is a similar need to de-idealise and understand peers. Peers 
are often less tolerant, more competitive and perhaps more likely to be punitive. 
Evolutionary theorists have suggested that losing one's peer group invokes all the 
built-in fears of being alone and vulnerable ('left to the wolves'; Gilbert, 1993). It also means 
that they are then trapped in the safety of the family, but feeling unbearable anguish and 
despair over their failure to individuate and all this implies in terms of not being able to bond 
to peers. 
Although some (mainly female) clients actually get married and have children 
(Sartorius, 1986), most (mainly male) have enormous problems with romantic relationships. 
Around 90% of male clients asked in a recent study had never been on more than a couple of 
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dates (chapter 6). Our interviews showed that dating was such an impossible goal (though 
desperately desired) that it was never attempted. Some clients were terrified of dating; as one 
client put it "If you want to know the truth, I've never really had a girlfriend. Id like one in 
principle but not in practice. Mostly when I talk to girls I feel sure they hate me, they think I 
ma load of old rubbish, and how could I possibly think I am normal. " Dating is one of the 
most important and common ways of getting security, support and recognition from one's 
peer group. It is also the path to marriage and parenthood- the next `life-stage'. The 
consequence is that major life stages are cut off and most opportunities for self-construction 
(discussed in chapter 5) are lost. 
2.3.2.4 Objectite 
One of the characteristics of adolescence is high self-consciousness (Rosenberg, 
1979). It is striking that when a person is feeling `self aware', they can almost feel like an 
object in the other person's gaze. In such a state of objectite (Sartre, 1966), it is impossible to 
be `other aware' (Duval and Wicklund, 1972). Being locked into an awareness of one's self- 
for-others prevents other-awareness judgments. Also, an integral part of self-awareness is 
negative self-evaluation: "... we would argue that the objective state will be uncomfortable 
when endured for considerable time intervals. As the individual examines himself on one 
dimension after another, he will inevitably discover ways in which he is inadequate, and at 
such a point he will prefer to revert to the subjective state" (Duval and Wicklund, 1972, p. 4). 
Some clients hear critical voices that comment on their actions nearly all their time. For a 
person under such continual threat and relentlessly forced to be self-aware, an `agent 
perspective' (where they could step back and actively judge the behaviours of the other 
people in their life) is nearly impossible. They can never get out of the object state, because 
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their voices are always with them. It is true to say that getting the voices to stop is what 
sufferers desperately want most. 
Hence, for a shy teenager who is self-aware, it is unlikely they will be able to take an 
agent perspective long enough to start gaining an understanding of others. Their energies are 
more taken up dwelling on their deficiencies. It can be seen that de-idealisation and 
autonomy are unlikely to be forthcoming to someone locked into a state of objectite. 
2.4 How to get from adolescent phenomena to symptoms? 
In the process of separation from parents and attaching to the peer group, the normal 
teenager resorts to protective psychological mechanisms. They either defend their self from 
being controlled by powerful, idealised parents. Alternatively, they can defend against 
experiencing the void left from having no secure attachments during the interim phase. 
Similarly, psychosis-prone teenagers use the same mechanisms, but in a much more 
exaggerated and extreme form. In this section, a selective account is given of how when these 
normal defence mechanisms become overwhelmed, they might lead to psychotic symptoms. 
The two conditions mentioned, effectively representing extremes of attachment and 
autonomy, are a useful shorthand for summarising the individual's major goals (Trower and 
Chadwick, 1995); however autonomy and attachment have almost opposing aims; therefore, 
in effect, they create a double-bind in the head, although unlike the original double-bind 
concept (Bateson, 1956) this is not foisted on them by wicked parents but is an inevitable part 
of growing up. 
2.4.1 Lack of autonomy, lack of agency 
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One thing which comes with the development of autonomy is a growing sense of 
agency and ownership over one's life. Adolescents who do not develop a sense of autonomy 
from their parents will have less of a sense of ownership over their actions, and effectively 
only act in the context of their parents. These skills may not translate to the wider world away 
from their parents. Comparably, experienced teachers know that following instructions or 
being told the answers is not enough; they try to motivate students to find the answers for 
themselves. In therapy, clients are encouraged through the use of `Socratic questioning' to 
find answers for themselves, rather than the therapist imposing a solution on them (Rogers, 
1967). Paradoxically, the one skill that parents cannot directly enforce on their offspring is for 
children to be independent of their parents. It is a dilemma for parents desperately trying to 
solve their psychotic offspring's problems that it seems parents can't impose a solution. 
It is suggested that for many clients their deterioration in areas such as self-care 
(something also common in adolescents! ) is because these skills were learnt as `something 
one's parents wanted me to do' rather than as personal-goal-attaining behaviours in their own 
right. In a rejection of parental jurisdiction, skills such as these are also rejected because they 
are things the parents wanted, not what the adolescent wanted. After a psychotic episode, 
clients often display many different personality characteristics (Barham, 1993); it could be 
that these characteristics are the only ones that the clients actually feel originate 
fundamentally from themselves. In rejecting everything learnt under parental jurisdiction, it 
may appear that the individual loses all those skills. 
It should not be surprising that for clients who have struggled to have an autonomous 
self independent of their parents, issues of control and power jurisdiction should be prominent 
in their delusions. Many theorists have suggested that a biological deficit in the ability to 
place a feeling of ownership onto ideas and concepts is the primary factor in schizophrenia 
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(e. g. Frith, 1992); it is hoped it has been outlined how such a problem would arise 
fundamentally from psychological development. We believe that not only can clients feel 
thwarted in their attempts to construct an autonomous self for themselves, but worse, some 
clients feel compelled by others to take onboard an identity crafted by the other that feels 
completely alien to them. This concept is important in psychosis and is discussed in detail 
elsewhere (Trower and Chadwick, 1995; see also chapter 5). For clients who feel that their 
very actions and thoughts are imposed on them by the other people in their life, their self- 
hood seems to be like an alien entity. Clients who fit the situation for the first hypothesis, 
(where the client has not individuated from their parents) would be vulnerable to such 
alienation threats. Psychobiological urges to individuate mean they would see their 'for- 
parents' identity as alien. 
Some clients have such a fragile sense of identity that they have become extremely 
sensitive to interpersonal contact and can feel as if they are being controlled by the people 
they interact with (Trower and Chadwick, 1995). Many apparently unusual statements reflect 
the feeling of being engulfed, overwhelmed and controlled (e. g. "People take me over- they 
make me do things, think things. "). Clients also relate to voices in a way that is often similar 
to the way they relate to the real people in their lives (Birchwood, Meaden, Gilbert, and 
Trower, 1998). Some clients have discourses with their voices that are power struggles, 
usually where the voices are critical and commanding. Voices `take over' clients in a way 
similar to the way the people in their lives do, but here it is in a more fundamental way, 
because they are battling a character that is actually in their heads. Catatonia, and delusions of 
motor control, may arise where the voice character ̀ takes control' of even the person's motor 
functions, often a terrifying experience for the client. 
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2.4.1.1 Bizarre ideas 
One of the reasons that people learn at their own rate is that people need to structure 
incoming data and ideas in a coherent manner. Teasdale and colleagues (e. g. Teasdale and 
Barnard, 1993) suggested that `upper levels' are needed, where an active agent structures and 
sifts through material at `lower levels' (akin to accommodation and assimilation in Piagetian 
terms). People with a psychosis sometimes hold bizarre beliefs, often beliefs that contradict 
other convictions they hold or recently held. It seems likely that such incongruity reflects a 
lack of a higher organising agency in their thinking, allowing wild and disparate 
interpretations and conclusions to thrive unchecked. Hence an extremely overwhelmed person 
whose thinking is clouded (Harrop, Trower and Mitchell, 1996) might not assimilate their 
incoming material coherently, leading to the formation of bizarre ideas. This is especially true 
when clients are in an episode of florid illness. In this state, they are in such a blind panic that 
anything that enters their environment is enough to overwhelm them- hence perseveration and 
incongruity. 
2.4.1.2 Lack of attachment, too much agency 
The second situation was hypothesised to be when an individual has individuated 
from their parents and yet has not successfully attached to their peer group. Because they are 
plunged into a vacuum, with no other person to be attached to and `construct a self with' 
(Goffman, 1971), there is still a need for interaction. Existential theorists would argue that in 
the absence of a mirroring other, a person has no way to prove to himself he actually exists- 
and is plunged into `a pit of nothingness and despair' (Sartre, 1957, p. 241). For example, 
Andy was 18 when he first started withdrawing from interacting with even his family (see 
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chapter 6). He spent most of his time in his room, coming out only for meals (for 2 years). 
Andy, for instance was not `alone' in his room, even though he was not interacting with 
anyone. He had quite a rich inner life populated with many characters, with whom he 
`interacted'. Andy was a very important person in these delusions and voice interactions. This 
is something that applies to normal people, too: what literature there is on sensory deprivation 
and voluntary long-term isolation has shown a tendency for participants to develop a 
temporary psychosis (Bexton et al, 1954; Slade, 1984). Hence in the absence of a mirroring 
other, there is a need to invent characters who can provide mirroring. 
Another way of filling the void is to blame others for not recognising the importance 
of one's self; this need might lead to paranoid delusions about persecution (Trower and 
Chadwick, 1995). Benevolent voice characters (Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994) may be 
comparable to `imaginary friend' that children have. Loneliness and negative self-evaluations 
from losing one's peer group may be behind many of the experiences of reference, as well as 
some delusions. 
2.5 Implications 
2.5.1 The adolescence literature may be useful for normalising 
Our experience has been that some clients are very much in awe of their parents, and 
this creates problems for them because they find it difficult to be around them (see chapters 6, 
7). Other clients have urges to rebel against their parents but feel very bad about doing this. 
Such clients may benefit greatly from knowing more about normal adolescent development, 
especially given their isolation and lack of a `normalising' peer group. For example, it would 
be important for them to hear it is not unnatural to rebel against ones parents, or to think ill of 
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them. It is also permissible to have differences of opinion with them on major issues. 
Wild mood swings in this context are not evidence of going mad, but may be taken as a 
typical occurrence during adolescence. Like normal adolescents, it may be comforting for 
clients to know that although these experiences seem unique to themselves (and many will 
be! ), the feelings themselves may be typical for people undergoing adolescent maturation. 
(Obviously there are clients for whom anger is a problem, but therapy such as Rational 
Emotive Behaviour Therapy can be used to help them develop `healthy' adaptive anger (Ellis 
and Dryden, 1990). ) 
Parents could be encouraged to see the client in the light of being like a rebellious 
teenager. This would certainly be less worrying than a label of schizophrenia. This might 
make them feel less bad about any conflict that arises, and make them feel less alone, too, as 
conflict is something most parents experience, and does not reflect on their parenting skills. 
Particularly shy clients might benefit from being encouraged by their parents to let go a bit, 
and be reassured the world would not end if they fell out with their parents briefly over 
something. Many clients in our sample fear dire consequences such as being thrown out of the 
house or being sacrificed to the devil if they stand up to their parents even once or even in a 
mild way (chapter 6). "Adolescents could not grow into adults unless they were able to test 
out the boundaries of authority, nor could they discover what they believed unless given the 
opportunity to push hard against the beliefs of others. " (Coleman and Hendry, 1990, p. 89). 
2.5.2 People with a psychosis should be encouraged to work on their understandings of 
others 
It was argued earlier (section 2.2.6) that a fundamental skill that people with a late 
adolescent psychosis have not developed, (that usually develops during adolescence) is an 
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understanding of the psychology of the other, or theory of other minds. This is part of the 
perspective of the person as matured agent - to be able to objectively judge the world and 
others around us. It is this `agent perspective' that would enable people who are still very 
much in awe of their parents to individuate and rebel, something they probably want to do but 
don't know how to go about. For people who have individuated from their parents but are still 
very scared of their peers, a more thorough understanding of their peers will be a useful tool 
to enable them to gain the acceptance (and perhaps employment) they want. A better 
understanding of one's peers means one is more likely to be able to manipulate them to get 
what one wants in terms of autonomy and attachment needs. It has been shown that when 
people are less self-aware, they are more likely to be able to respond appropriately to social 
cues (Gollwitzer and Wicklund, 1985). It is also a good general rule that when one feels 
criticised and badly judged by others, looking at the causes, motivations and authority behind 
the judge's actions will be very valuable in understanding it. 
Clients who hear voices are often locked into a state of objectite, i. e. relentless self- 
awareness and disallowed from being able to judge others. They are self-focused to the extent 
where anything that enters their consciousness seems to portend critical references to 
themselves (e. g. planes going overhead, messages from the television). They may appear 
hyper-aware of others as the ones looking and judging and themselves as the one looked at 
and judged (for example as they watch for threats from others as they walk down the street), 
but they often do not see others as being separate existing psychological beings with 
vulnerabilities, motivations and beliefs of their own, unrelated to the client. Clients could be 
encouraged to watch other people and to come up with explanations of their behaviour that 
are internal to these other people. They could perhaps concentrate specifically on 
understanding their parents, as a start to the process of de-idealisation, if necessary. 
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A good example of what has been proposed in this section comes from Bertrand 
Russell 
"In adolescence, I hated life and was continually on the verge of suicide... 
Now, on the contrary, I enjoy life; I might almost say that with every year that 
passes I enjoy it more..... Largely it is due to a diminishing preoccupation with 
myself. Like others who had a puritanical education, I had the habit of 
meditating on my sins, my follies and shortcoming. I seemed to myself- no 
doubt justly- a miserable specimen. Gradually I learned to be indifferent to 
myself and my deficiencies; I came to centre my attention increasingly on 
external objects: the state of the world, various branches of knowledge, 
individuals for whom I felt affection. External interests, it is true, bring each 
its own possibility of pain: the world may be plunged into war, knowledge in 
some direction may be hard to achieve, friends may die. But pains of these 
kinds do not destroy the essential quality of life, as do those that spring from 
disgust with the self. " (Russell, 1930, p. 14). 
After nearly a century that has been predominantly characterised by introspective 
psychology, perhaps the time is due for a more exterospective psychology to take the 
ascendancy. 
2.5.3 Peer relationships and romantic relationships as important focuses 
Another common adolescent phenomenon is a need for acceptance- how ironic it is 
that a diagnosis of schizophrenia realises client's worst fears of being different in the most 
malignant sense. Much research to date has focused on parental and family relationships in 
ýy is, and the goal of this work seems to be a slightly un-natural situation of parents and 
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offspring living together in harmony. A greater emphasis on achieving peer relationships 
and leaving the family might be helpful. Most clients have very few friends, and those 
friends they have will be fellow users of psychiatric services. The area of romantic 
relationships is also of paramount importance to clients; many clients see a romantic partner 
as the most important thing (along with rewarding employment) that they would want for 
themselves in the long term (although many clients find it too threatening in the short term). 
Professional services are cautious about the area of romantic relationships (perhaps 
understandably so), and this is an area where much research is needed. It is suggested that 
clients may gain much from knowing more about the opposite sex, about whom many know 
very little. It often seems that the opposite sex is a source of fear for them. Many clients 
would benefit from being tolerably encouraged by their parents to look for romantic partners, 
as many seem to think this something their parents would not allow. 
2.5.4 Conclusions 
A theory has been presented in which psychosis that emerges in late adolescence is 
seen as a disorder of adolescent development- blocked maturation. There are a large number 
of similarities between common adolescent phenomena such as most people experience at 
that time, and many of the experiences of psychosis. It has been suggested that the problems 
may arise because individuals have difficulties in defining a self that is autonomous from 
their parents. Alternatively, the difficulties may be primarily in not being able to bond to 
peers. 
The theory has many useful implications for the treatment of psychosis. It is 
particularly hoped that the framework is more acceptable to clients, as it is more enabling and 
less stigmatising than the medical model (although it is by no means incompatible with drug 
treatment; chapter 1). It demystifies and normalises the experience of psychosis, by promoting 
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the view that this arises out of a stage everyone goes through. By contrast, the prevalent 
medical model view of schizophrenia reifies itself unnecessarily, confuses the issues and adds 
stigma. The model here enables professionals to take both the side of the client and the side of 
the parents, within a coherent and easily understandable framework. Conflict within the 
family is seen as representing healthy psychological development and the client is viewed not 
as someone who is medically ill, but more like a rebellious teenager going through the 
difficult process of maturing (or indeed as someone who needs to be encouraged to rebel). 
It is not suggested this model applies to every psychosis, for instance drug-induced 
psychosis or more reactive psychoses. Hassett (1997) has convincingly examined the 
psychological issues at stake in late-life psychosis. However the issues of self-construction 
should still be of paramount importance in these cases, especially in treatment (see chapter 
6). 
Chapter 3 
3. Prodromal Signs of Psychosis in Normal Teenagers 
Having proposed how some late-adolescent onset psychosis could be the result of 
blocked psychological development during adolescence, the question remained of how to test 
the theory. One interesting aspect of the theory is that it enabled a new approach to an old 
problem. Researchers have always wanted a way of identifying individuals at risk of psychosis 
as early as possible. It has been shown that the earlier in a psychotic phase help is given, the 
fewer effects remain in the long-term in terms of residual symptoms, probability of future 
relapse and social disability (World Health Organisation, 1979). Furthermore, helping people in 
their first episode of psychosis typically has a greater effect than intervening in later episodes 
(e. g. Macmillan et al, 1986). Accordingly, psychiatric services have reorganised themselves to 
speed up the time it takes to access care for people in their first episodes of psychosis 
(Birchwood and Tamer, 1992). If intervention could be made really early, the outcome might 
be better. It is widely understood that psychosis generally has an insidious onset of about 1-2 
years before florid psychological symptoms (Sartorius, 1986) and as mentioned in chapter 2, 
generally comes on in late adolescence. A long-standing holy grail paradigm - one which 
would be desirable, but too large to be undertaken by one centre - is a prospective longitudinal 
study of a large group of adolescents through the years leading to early adulthood. Such an 
epidemiological study would have to be large enough to include a few people who may develop 
a psychosis; statistically only about 1% of the general population go on to develop psychosis. 
Retrospective analysis of those who became psychotic and how they were functioning 
interpersonally during the years before breakdown might produce predictive indicators. If 
services had meaningful predictors then intervention at the very earliest possible would become 
a possibility. 
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Something similar to this has been attempted in Australia (McGorry et al. 1995) in a 
large study involving 2525 students. McGorry et al measured prodromal psychotic features in 
adolescents aged 12,14.5, and 16 to see if a recognisable prodrome was apparent at these early 
ages. So far only data for 16 year olds has been published (n=657). A surprising finding was 
that prodromal signs were far more common in 16 year olds than might have been expected. 
For example, 51% endorsed `magical ideation'- that they had unusual thoughts about things 
like telepathy, special powers, communications from God, TV, radio or others. By whatever 
criteria used, it appeared that at least 1/3 of the sample could be considered prodromal! They 
concluded that "DSM-III-R prodromal features are enormously prevalent among older 
adolescents and unlikely to be specific for subsequent schizophrenia. " (McGorry et al, 1995, 
p. 241). It was felt it was unlikely that prodromal signs could be used to identify people at risk. 
Such a result would probably not have surprised someone who works with adolescents 
as this life-stage can be particularly turbulent, as detailed in the previous chapter. McGorry et al 
did not have any specific theoretical orientation as to why prodromal signs should be so 
prevalent. Nor did they report using any relationship measures or having any theoretical 
position such as might inform the choice of such measures. The theory described in chapter 2 
provides a potential explanation as to why prodromal signs are so prevalent in adolescence, 
namely that psychotic-like experiences are an integral part of the cognitive changes involved in 
undergoing psychological maturation. 
The present study replicates McGorry et al's (1995) assessment of mild psychotic 
ideation and experiences in normal adolescents, and takes their study further because it also 
looks at the relationships participants have with their parents and peers. It was hypothesised 
that adolescents' scores on the psychosis measures would be linked to development as 
measured by the relationship questionnaires. The relationship questionnaires used were the 
Parental Autonomy scale and the Peer Autonomy scale, both derived from Blos' (1962) 
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account of psychological development (Steinberg and Silverberg, 1986; Webb, 1996). They 
assess a number of aspects of psychological development, including non-dependency, de- 
idealisation and individuation; for the purposes of the present study what they measure is 
characterised in a general way as `psychological maturity'. In previous work the two autonomy 
scales have been strongly linked to physical growth, argumentative-ness, felt closeness and 
dependency, and resistance to peer pressure (Steinberg and Silverberg, 1986; Silverberg and 
Steinberg, 1987; Steinberg, 1987; Webb, 1996; Ryan and Lynch, 1989). 
The hypothesised outcome that seemed most likely was schizotypy/ prodromal 
characteristics would show a peak in mid-adolescence, (as people encountered the turbulence 
of adolescence), and decline in older adolescents. It was also hypothesised that teenagers who 
showed high scores on the Parental Autonomy Scale would also show high scores on the 
schizotypy and prodrome measures. If this was found, the high schizotypy/ prodrome signs 
there would be reflecting the emotional changes and distress arising for a teenager who has 
gone some way towards developing a more mature relationship with parents. Finally it was 
unclear how the Peer Autonomy Scale could be hypothesised to enter the picture - individuals 
who showed relatively low scores for peer autonomy might have close and supportive 
relationships with their peers and thus might be expected to show fewer signs of distress (i. e. 
fewer schizotypy/ prodromal signs). Alternatively, low Peer Autonomy scores might reflect 
over-dependence on an unsupportive and competitive group of peers, and hence be might be 
associated with higher schizotypy/ prodrome scores. 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
Four hundred and eighty teenagers took part in three age groups; males and females 
were analysed separately as previous work has shown them to develop differently (Steinberg 
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and Silverberg, 1999). The number of teenagers in each group, as well as the average ages 
are shown in table 3.1. The first two age groups came from King Edward's High School in 
Coventry. The oldest age group was somewhat larger; because 16-17 year-olds are closer in age 
to when psychosis first arises, more subjects were recruited for this age group and it was 
around 4 times bigger than the other age groups (see table 3.1). The older adolescents came 
from two schools- Cadbury's school, Bournville, Birmingham, and Cooper's Company and 
Coborn school, Essex. The ethnic mix was 66% White European, 24.3% African, 4.6% Asian, 
and 5% other. Participants were given a booklet to fill in by their teacher during class, with the 
instructions that they were taking part in a survey about common experiences during 
adolescence. Incomplete answers were discarded (around 30 in total). 
3.1.2 Instruments 
Parental Autonomy: the Emotional Autonomy Scale (Steinberg and Silverberg, 1986, see 
appendix B) 
This scale is based on Blos' (1962) work on psychological development during 
adolescence. Although Blos' perspective is possibly an over-clinically orientated viewpoint of 
adolescence, the scale has nevertheless been shown to relate well to many facets of adolescent 
development including physical development, (in fact it is a better predictor of physical growth 
than chronological age; Steinberg, 1988). It consists of 20 Likert-scale items rated on a one to 
four scale as to how much the participant agrees with a given statement. The items concern 
four subscales of emotional autonomy. The first subscale, de-idealisation, contains statements 
about parental character traits such as "My parents hardly ever make mistakes". Dependency 
statements are about using the parents as support in times of emotional stress (e. g. "if I was 
having a problem with one of my friends, I would discuss it with my mother or father before 
deciding what to do about it". Individuation statements are about being different to the parents 
(for example, "There are some things about me my parents do not know"). The subscale that 
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was perhaps the most relevant for this study was the `parents as people' scale, because these 
statements assess the degree to which the teenager sees their parents as real people (for 
example "When they are at work, my parents act pretty much the same way they do when they 
are with me. ") These statements reflect the extent to which the teenager has developed the 
mentalising-for-others abilities that are the basis of overcoming adolescent egocentrism 
(Elkind, 1980; see chapter 2). Steinberg and Silverberg (1986) report the internal consistency 
of the Parental Autonomy Scale to be 0.75 (Cronbach's alpha). 
Peer Autonomy Scale (Harrop and Trower, Appendix B; Webb, 1996). 
This scale is essentially the same as Steinberg and Silverberg's scale but adapted to refer 
to peers rather than parents. For example "My parents and I agree on everything" became 
"My 
friends and I agree on everything. " It consists of 15 items, again on a 1-4 Likert scale. A split- 
half reliability test of the peer scale has shown a reliability coefficient of rtt=0.8 (Webb, 
1996). 
Previous work has shown that the peer scale can be a significant indicator of physical 
development (again, it is a better indicator of physical development than chronological age). It 
correlates negatively with the parental autonomy scale, in that as adolescents 
became more 
autonomous from their parents they became more dependent/ attached to their peers (Webb, 
1996). This reflects the prevalent opinion in adolescence research that as teenagers 
become 
more independent from their parents, they become attached to their peers (Dunphy, 1972; 
Brown et al, 1986). 
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Schizotypy questionnaire (Claridge and Broks, 1984) 
The schizotypy questionnaire was designed to measure mildly psychotic features in the 
general population of adults. It follows the theoretical stance that people with the symptoms of 
schizophrenia represent the extreme end of a continuum, with people with many symptoms 
(but not enough to merit diagnosis) in the middle, and those with few at the other end. Items 
are both perceptual, experiential and cognitive, for example, Item 30: "Do you believe dreams 
can come true? ". The schizotypy scale has been demonstrated to have good psychometric 
properties (Cronbach's coefficient alpha = 0.86; Claridge and Hewitt, 1987). Claridge and 
Hewitt (1987) showed that items such as "Do you believe in telepathy? " were endorsed by I in 
3 people in the general population. 
Early Signs Scale (Birchwood et al, 1989) 
The Early Signs Scale (ESS) is designed for use with psychotic individuals whose 
symptoms are in remission. By completing the questionnaire fortnightly, they are able to gain 
some sort of objective measure of how ill they are currently; hence it is especially useful for 
individuals who have little insight into their own current well-being. When a certain score is 
reached, medication can be increased, or an individual can come in to hospital for some short- 
term respite. Early Sign profiles are tailored to suit each individual's own `relapse signature' 
(Birchwood et al, 1989), and they effectively quantify what good nurses can do for clients they 
know well. As was mentioned above, if an episode of florid psychosis can be identified and 
treated in its earliest stages, it is likely the individual will be frankly psychotic for a shorter 
period. The scale has reliability of 0.93 as measured by Cronbach's Alpha (Birchwood et al, 
1989). 
The Early Signs Scale includes detailed descriptions (e. g. Item 9: "Feeling stubborn or 
refusing to carry out simple requests. Have you noticed at home or at work you have been less 
willing or reluctant to do simple favours that you are asked e. g. If your Mum asked you to put 
some ironing away, what has been your reaction?. "). Each item is rated on a frequency scale 
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(e. g. "Not a problem- 0 times a week" or "Moderate problem- several times a week but not 
daily. "). There are four subscales within the ESS: Anxiety, Depression, Disinhibition and 
Incipient Psychosis. If the schizotypy scale deals with mild psychotic symptoms in the normal 
population, then the Early Signs scale is more likely to be assessing hard-core psychotic 
features. It was preferred to some of the many symptom profile questionnaires such as the Brief 
Psychiatric Rating Scale (Overall and Gorham, 1962) because these were thought to reflect a 
medical view of schizophrenia and over emphasise physical symptoms, and also because the 
Early Signs Scale offers more detailed verbal descriptions of symptoms. 
3.2 Results 
Table 3.1 gives the average scores by age group and gender for the four main scales. 
The data are graphed in Figures 3.1 to 3.4. Figure 3.1 shows how parental autonomy scores 
varied with age. Parental Autonomy scores can be seen to increase for both males and females 
throughout adolescence. Conversely, Peer Autonomy scores decreased through adolescence 
(figure 3.2), except for older teenage females whose scores were higher than mid-teen females. 
Although parental and peer scales follow the opposite general trend they did not correlate 
(Pearson's correlation: r=0.017, n=479, p=0.9) possibly suggesting that teenagers do not 
develop with regard to parents and peers at the same time (Coleman's focal theory, 1979). 
Schizotypy also decreased with age (figure. 3.3); a surprising result was that schizotypy 
was largest in youngest teenagers. Unfortunately the teachers of the 12-13 year olds found that 
the Early Signs scale was too difficult for students to complete; hence it is difficult to interpret 
the results for the other two groups although as with schizotypy, late teens scored higher than 
mid teens (figure. 3.4). Early Signs scores (and all its subscales) correlated well with 
schizotypy scores for all groups (see table 3.2), so it seems reasonable to presume that Early 
Signs scores would have followed the same pattern in 12-13 year olds as schizotypy. Females 
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scored higher than males on both symptom measures. Females were also much higher than 
males for parental autonomy, and consistently lower than males on peer autonomy. 
Table 3.1 Table describing participants by age, gender, origin and mean scores on the 4 
measures. 
12-13 years 14-15 years 16-17 years 
Females Age (mean) 12.6(l. 1) 14.7 (0.7) 17.0 (0.7) 
Number in group 53 33 162 
Parental Autonomy score: mean (s. e. ) 55.1 (1.01) 56.8 (1.00) 56.75 (0.51) 
Peer Autonomy score: mean (s. e. ). 36.96 (0.61) 34.53 (1.12) 35.95 (0.23) 
Schizotypy: mean (s. e. ) 22.1 (0.78) 16(l. 25) 19.17 (0.47) 
Early Signs: mean (s. e. ) n/a 24.27 (2.04) 27.3 (1.1) 
Males Age (mean) 12.8(l. 2) 14.5 (1.3) 16.8 (0.9) 
Number in group 54 43 135 
Parental Autonomy score: mean (s. e. ) 53.7 (1.04) 54.2 (1.07) 55.72 (0.51) 
Peer Autonomy score: mean (s. e. ). 38.65 (0.83) 37.12 (0.56) 36.93 (0.29) 
Schizotypy: mean (s. e. ) 18.72 (0.93) 13.5 (1.3) 16.7 (0.45) 
Early Signs: mean (s. e. ) n/a 21.81 (2.73) 26.9 (1.19) 
Table 3.2: Table showing how the two symptom measures, the Early Signs Scale and 
Q nhivýtv. w nýrrnlnturl within noch nrnnn 
n r p 
14/ 15 Females n =32 r =0.70 p =0.000 
14/ 15 Males n =43 r =0.68 p =0.000 
17 Females n =162 r =0.60 p =0.000 
17 Males n =135 r =0.50 p =0.000 
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Fig 3.1 Graph showing Parental Autonomy scores for males and 
females at early, middle and late adolescence. 
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Fig 3.2 Graph showing Peer Autonomy scores for males and 
females at early, middle and late adolescence. 
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Fig 3.3 Graph showing Schizotypy scores for males and 
females at early, middle and late adolescence. 
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Fig 3.4 Graph showing Early Signs scores for males and 
females at early, middle and late adolescence. 
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3.2.1 Inter relations between the 4 scales 
The most important analyses were to find if scores on the two autonomy scales (i. e. the 
relationship measures) could be used to predict scores on the schizotypy/ prodrome measures. 
Table 3.3 shows the scores on schizotypy/ prodrome measures correlated with scores on both 
of the autonomy measures. At most ages there were clear trends towards schizotypy/ prodrome 
scores being linked to both parental and peer autonomy measures, with the relationship 
reaching statistical significance in many cases. In all significant cases, high autonomy was 
linked to high schizotypy/ prodrome scores. The effect was especially strong for 17 year olds 
possibly reflecting the fact that this age-group included more participants. It seems likely that 
many of the trends seen, would have reached significance if these groups hadn't had smaller 
sample sizes than the others. 
3.2.2 Using relationship measures to produce sub-samples 
The correlations demonstrated a strong relationship between schizotypy/ prodrome 
measures and relationship measures, but it would be ambitious to expect the relationship to 
hold for the entire group. Research has shown that adolescence is only stressful for around a 
quarter of individuals (Sidique and D'arcy, 1984). Hence for this study, the patterns of 
autonomy and schizotypy/ prodrome measures for the entire class were not going to be as 
important as considering people at the extremes of the relationship measures relative to their 
peer group. Parental and peer autonomy measures were thus used to select sub-groups at the 
extremes of autonomy, and the schizotypy/ prodrome scores of these teenagers were tested. 
Individuals were selected in each group whose autonomy scores were '/z standard deviation 
higher and lower than the mean for both parental and peer autonomy. Figure. 3.5a represents 
the two autonomy scales as a mapping space and these two types of comparison are shown in 
figure 3.5b. 
Table 3.3 Correlations between Parental and Peer Autonomy measures and two 
measures of prodromal symptoms. 
Group: Schizotypy significance Early Signs significance 
age, sex Correlation p value Scale p value 
r correlation r 
12/13 FEMALES 
(n=53) 








Parents 0.319 0.075 0.393 0.026* 
Peer 0.413 0.019* 0.423 0.0161° 
14/15 MALES 
(n=43) 
Parents 0.131 0.404 -0.038 0.80 




Parents 0.172 0.029* 0.362 
Peer 0.049 0.539 0.11 0.17 
17 MALES 
(n=135) 
parents 0.199 0.02* 0.316 
peers -0.086 0.322 -0.046 
0.59 
*=p value is less than or equal to 0.05 
** =p value is less than or equal to 0.01 
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Figure 3.5a How each student was allocated a group depending on their Parental and Peer 
Autonomy scores. 
High Parental 





Figure 3.5b: Selection of high versus low parental autonomy 
and high versus low peer autonomy comparison groups. 





Figure 3.5c: Illustration of `corner' comparison: (high parent/ high 
peer) versus {low parent/ low peer) sub-groups. 
ine to be determined: %2 
ndard deviation' from 
id 








Figure 3.5d: This diagram shows how the equations for the 
lines involved in `corner' comparisons were determined. 
Midline is y= ax + b, 
where the gradient, a= X2-7- X1 
Y2-Y] 
b is calculated by putting (X1, Y2) or 
(X2, Y1) into the equation y= ax +b 
To find Point D (cx, dy): 
cx is put into midline equation 
y=ax+b, 
Tan (90 -2) = gradient a, 




Cl = (cy - dy) Sin 2, 
To calculate average CI: 
n 
Mean CI C1r2 ) 
n 
Horizontal componant DL 
=' Y2 mean Cl " Cos 2 
Lines V2 ̀standard deviation' either 
side of midline: 
y=ax+b± DL 
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Y2 
Y1 
Figure 3.5e: Illustration of `reverse' comparison (high parent/ 
low peer) versus {low parent/ high peer). 
X, X2 
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The first two items for each group in table 3.4 show that using just the extremes of each age 
group revealed strong statistical associations. A non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney U test) 
was used rather than a t-test because the numbers in each group were fairly small, not normally 
distributed and also because in a non-parametric test one or two large outliers would not affect 
the comparison. The means and standard deviations of the two groups are recorded under the U 
and p values for each group in table 3.4. 
With both parental and peer autonomy being functionally related to autonomy, the most 
appropriate comparison using both scales was to compare quadrant A with quadrant I, but the 
numbers in each group are too small for the comparison to be meaningful (e. g. 3 in each group 
for 14/15 year old females). To increase the numbers in these `corner' groups, the cohort was 
split diagonally as illustrated in figure 3.5c. As described in the previous paragraph, when 
using just one autonomy measure, a convention was established of using 'h standard deviation 
above and below the mean. This convention was respected for the corner analysis, using some 
basic geometry illustrated in figure 3.5d. The mid-line of the distribution was found for each 
age-group (figure 3.4c), and then the average perpendicular distance of each teenager from this 
mid-line was calculated (see figure 3.5d). This was effectively the standard deviation of the 
points from the mid-line. Finally a similar comparison was used to compare { low parental, high 
peer) with {high parental, low peer}, illustrated in figure 3.5e. These comparisons are also 
reported in table 3.4. 
For the youngest two age groups, (excepting 14-15 year old males), higher scores on the 
schizotypy/ prodrome measures were always linked to higher autonomy scores, be that parental 
or peer autonomy. Using the subscales of the ESS, for 14- 15 year old females, Anxiety, 
Depression and Incipient Psychosis were consistently linked to parental and peer autonomy, 
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For 17 year olds, parental autonomy is particularly well linked to high scores on the 
schizotypy/ prodrome measures, including all subscales of the ESS. For females, peer 
autonomy is not as well linked to schizotypy/ prodrome measures, showing a trend but only 
reaching statistical significance for anxiety. When combined with parental scores, (i. e. in the 
high parent/ high peer analysis), there is still a strong relationship with schizotypy/ prodrome 
measures. For males, Peer autonomy is still linked with schizotypy/ prodrome measures, but 
the direction appears to have changed, because here it is low peer autonomy which is linked to 
high schizotypy/ prodrome scores, along with the reverse `diagonal' comparison to that which 
worked for females, between high parent/ low peer scores (this reverse comparison does not 
show any interesting trends for any other group). 
Figure 3.6a shows the distribution for 16-17 year old males in more detail and depicts 
the autonomy mapping space; it shows that all the particularly high Early Signs Scale scores 
tend to be low on parental autonomy (this relationship is shown in table 3.3 to be significant). 
Figure 3.6b illuminates the result by showing the basic descriptive statistics for each of these 
groups across the same mapping space. The same trend can be seen using schizotypy for this 
group (figure 3.7). Conversely, all the high schizotypy and Early Signs Scale scores tend to be 
higher on parental autonomy in figures 3.8 and 3.9). The same trends were also observed in the 
female sample, although only one graph is included for brevity's sake (figure 3.10). Again, the 
lower part of the figure (fig. 3.10b) shows the differences in average Early Signs Scale scores 







35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 
Parental Autonomy 
High Early Signs: > 11 0 Low Early Signs: <11 
I+ 
Figure 3.6a Graph illustrating profile of 16-17 year old MALES LOW EARLY SIGNS scores: the two 
Autonomy scales are depicted as a mapping space, and each adolescent is depicted in this space 
as either high or low Early Signs. 
Output table 
N= 135 Low Parental Medium Parental High Parental 
. 
21.55 31.11 26.63 26.43 High Peer 
standard deviation= 10.06 19.62 9.93 SD 
number per group= 11.00 18.00 8.00 N 
23.71 23.41 32.67 26.60 Medium 
sd limits: 12.11 10.40 17.50 SD Peer 
58.73 21.00 22.00 12.00 N 
52.79 26.29 25.05 33.67 28.33 Low Peer 
38.65 13.23 12.00 13.69 SD 
35.20 7.00 21.00 15.00 N 
23.85 26.52 30.99 
Figure 3.6b Table showing basic descriptive statistics for the nine 'quadrants'. 
16-17 year old males Early Sig 
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Parental autonomy 
High schizotypy: > 10 - Low Schizotypy: <10 
Figure 3.7a Graph illustrating profile of 16-17 year old MALES LOW SCHIZOTYPY scores: the two 
Autonomy scales are depicted as a mapping space, and each adolescent is depicted in this space 
as either high or low Schizotypy. 
Output table 
16-17 year old males SchizotypXZ 
standard deviat 
mean-+- 









sd limits: 5.13 4.83 
58.73 21.00 22.00 
52.79 ýff l 
38.65 3.70 5.54 
35.20 7.00 21.001 
Parental 




4.01 SD Peer 
12.00 N 
17.90 Low Peer 
3.51 SD 
15.00 N 
15.38 16.91 17.26 
Figure 3.7b Table showing basic descriptive statistics for the nine 'quadrants'. 
16-17 year old males SchizotypY/2 
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Figure 3.8a Graph illustrating profile of 16-17 year old MALES HIGH SCHIZOTYPY scores: the two 
Autonomy scales are depicted as a mapping space, and each adolescent is depicted in this space 
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Parental Autonomy 
High Early Signs: > 42 Low Early Signs: < 42 
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Figure 3.9a Graph illustrating profile of 16-17 year old MALES HIGH EARLY SIGNS scores: the two 
Autonomy scales are depicted as a mapping space, and each adolescent is depicted in this space 
as either high or low Early Signs. 
Output table 
N= 135 Low Par Medium Par 
21.55 31.11 
standard deviation= 10.06 19.62 
number per group= 11.00 18.00 
23.71 23.41 
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16-17 year old females Early Signs 
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Figure 3.10a Graph illustrating profile of 16-17 year old FEMALES HIGH EARLY SIGNS scores: the two 
Autonomy scales are depicted as a mapping space, and each adolescent is depicted in this space 














29.27 High Peer 
28.43 Medium 
Peer 
24.56 Low Peer 
37.39 13.16 10.26 14.49 SD 
34.51 13.00 21.00 12.00 N 
23.30 25.56 33.40 
Figure 3.10b Table showing basic descriptive statistics for the nine 'quadrants'. 
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3.3 Conclusions 
The data show clearly that mild psychotic-like psychological experiences are present for 
normal teenagers throughout adolescence; this confirms the findings of McGorry et al (1995) 
that prodromal signs are remarkably common in 17 year olds. Youngest teenagers show the 
highest levels of schizotypy in this study, which could be interpreted as schizotypy representing 
a way of thinking that is more child-like and simplistic. As expected, late adolescents show 
more `symptom' signs than mid-adolescents, possibly reflecting the strains of psychological 
maturation. The data here compare well with the adolescence literature, confirming the 
established finding that many individuals find adolescence difficult (e. g. Sidique and D'arcy, 
1984). The average Early Signs Scale score for the 17 year olds was 27 which compares 
surprisingly to people with a psychosis- each psychotic client has their own "relapse signature" 
and hence their own score beyond which they are becoming unwell, but it is not uncommon for 
scores in the mid 30's and 40's to be indicative of the need for care in some form, be it a short 
respite inpatient stay or medication (Birchwood, 1996). 
The data also show that schizotypy/ prodromal signs are closely related to relationship 
measures. For all age groups, high Parental Autonomy scores are related to higher schizotypy/ 
prodrome scores. For older teenagers both extremes of high and low peer autonomy are linked 
to higher schizotypy/ prodrome scores. To my knowledge this link has not been shown before 
in the context of psychosis. It seems fair to relate these higher schizotypy/ prodrome scores to 
the process of reaching adulthood and becoming less attached to the parents. 
Interpreting the result is difficult, and real answers may only be obtained with a 
longitudinal study with larger numbers of participants. But these preliminary data suggest that 
there are two explanations of the mild psychotic experiences endorsed here: because schizotypy 
is highest in early teens, psychotic-like thinking might be equated to childish-ness in thought. 
This is consistent with the theory proposed in chapter 2, that blocks in psychological 
development underlie psychosis (although it might be taken to be inadvertently insulting and 
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unsympathetic by psychosis sufferers). Careful inspection of the schizotypy/ prodrome 
measures in appendix B may suggest an alternative explanation: far from measuring psychosis- 
like phenomena, these scales may inadvertently only tap typical childish thoughts. For 
example, a belief in evil spirits is not thought to be a developmental failing in a 13 year old 
(question 28, Schizotypy). Similarly, a belief that one's body is changing shape may not be 
inappropriate in a person undergoing puberty (question 19, Schizotypy). Although there are not 
many questions that lend themselves to such dual meanings, caution is needed in drawing 
conclusions from scales designed and tested on adults being used on adolescents. 
The other explanation for high schizotypy/ prodrome prevalence in adolescence is that 
(as the theory suggested) developing autonomy is difficult and disturbing, and hence would be 
accompanied, if only transiently, with distressing experiences of unsureness and emotional 
turbulence. This is borne out by the data in that for each class, it is those students who have 
highest parental autonomy who have highest schizotypy/ prodrome scores. High peer autonomy 
is associated with highest schizotypy/ prodrome scores for most age groups. For the oldest 
teenagers, low peer autonomy is connected to high schizotypy/ prodrome scores, reflecting that 
peer autonomy decreases with age. This seems to indicate that people at either extreme for peer 
autonomy are vulnerable to distress when things get tough - possibly because they are either 
too dependent or too remote and isolated from their peers for them to be a useful source of 
support. 
Where does this leave someone looking for predictive indices for the early 
identification of potential schizophrenia? A simplistic view of the data here would suggest that 
one possible path into psychosis is trodden by those people highly on parental autonomy, 
because in this study high parental autonomy is always associated with high schizotypy/ 
prodrome scores. Possibly of these the most vulnerable would be those with no peer support 
(either very high or very low on peer autonomy) - those who have individuated from parents 
but not made the corresponding attachment to peers in the terminology of chapter 2. However, 
it is essential to bear in mind here that these patterns, (for example of high autonomy and 
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psychosis-like scores) are normal healthy signs of maturation. (More accurate and extensive 
measures of autonomy into early adulthood will be needed to illuminate whether this is truly a 
pathway to psychosis or not. ) There is a danger in extrapolating too far from these data, 
because the data only indicate how normal adolescents fare up until leaving school. Leaving 
school or leaving home may be the biggest single factors in changing psychological well-being. 
Future work could study 19-22 year olds if suitable samples can be found - university students 
and unemployed school-leavers suggest themselves as two potential populations. 
In fact these sorts of life changes may well be most difficult for individuals who have 
prior to them been relatively sheltered, and have therefore not psychologically matured as 
much. Therefore, it may well be the low autonomy and therefore low schizotypy/ prodrome 
scorers that will be most vulnerable to the changes involved in leaving home. This is an 
implication of the theory in chapter 2 which suggests that the people most at risk are the people 
who show low scores for parental autonomy, because these people have never properly 
negotiated adolescence. People who gain autonomy from parents late on (or not at all, except 
perhaps covertly) will find it most difficult to leave home and enter a more adult world. If the 
low parental autonomy group are at risk this is interesting because at the age of 17 they show 
no signs of individuation and hence low scores on schizotypy/ prodrome measures. 
In sum, it is an encouraging start that despite the limitations support for the theory has 
been found in a relatively small sample, and in a relatively simple study. The data suggest a 
relationship between relationship measures and measures of psychotic-like thinking. Such a 
connection does not appear to have been demonstrated before in the literature, especially not 
with a theory to explain the relationship. Future research is needed to continue the study further 
into early adulthood. Another continuation of this study would be to investigate how people 
who have already had a psychotic breakdown fare on the autonomy questionnaires; this is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
Chapter 4 
4. Measuring the Autonomy of People with a Psychosis 
The data in the previous chapter showed a relationship between autonomy measures 
and mild psychotic-like symptoms, and are consistent with the theory in chapter 2. Another 
way to evaluate the theory was to see how people who have already had a psychotic 
breakdown scored on the autonomy measures. Theoretically, the people most vulnerable to 
psychosis would be the people who were lowest on parental autonomy coming into adult life. 
It was therefore hypothesised that people who have had a breakdown and still show residual 
symptoms should be particularly low on parental autonomy. It is commonly known that 
clients are particularly dependent on their parents, and this is often thought to be a 
consequence of their condition; unfortunately, there is no way of showing whether any low 
parental autonomy came first or not, short of a huge prospective longitudinal study. At least if 
it could be empirically shown that clients were remarkable in their autonomy profiles, then 
this would be consistent with the theory and not discordant. It was hypothesised that clients 
would be low on Parental Autonomy and either very high or very low on Peer autonomy. 
Given this hypothesis, the question remained of what comparison group would be 
appropriate to show that psychosis-sufferers are particularly low on parental autonomy; i. e. 
low relative to whom? Given that autonomy is something that changes with age in normals, 
controls had to be matched for age. Gender, ethnicity and educational level have all been 
shown to have an influence on incidence for both psychosis and parental autonomy 
(Birchwood et al, 1992; Steinberg, 1988). Hence adult controls who had no previous 
psychiatric history were matched for all these factors. Another comparison was to use the data 
from the previous chapter to see what age-group of adolescents the participants most 
resembled. 
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4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
Participants were consecutive referrals to the study from psychiatrists in South 
Warwickshire, Northern Birmingham and South Birmingham Mental Health NHS Trusts. 
(Ethical approval was obtained from all 3 trusts and the relevant documentation is in 
appendix Q. 33 clients (25 men and 8 women) with an ICD-10 diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia were interviewed; a further 8 clients declined to take part. All diagnoses were 
made by Colin Campbell, Steve Chung, Mike Radford, or Femi Oyebode, all consultant 
psychiatrists (see appendix A for a consideration of reliability and validity of diagnoses). The 
mean age was 32.4 years (s. d. =9.7). Interviews generally took one session of 45 minutes, 
although for one or two more impaired clients it took longer. All interviews were done in the 
client's homes, or on an outpatient basis at St. Michael's Hospital in South Warwickshire, the 
Queen Elizabeth Psychiatric Hospital in South Birmingham and the Archer Centre in North 
Birmingham. No one else was present during the interviews. No clients were included who 
were currently misusing drugs or alcohol, or who had a primary organic impairment. All 
clients were in "regular and meaningful contact" with their parents. 
Controls were employees of the University of Birmingham. Matching for educational 
level meant that, for example, some were labourers, some caterers, some white-collar workers 
and some students; 7 people declined to take part when asked. Their average age was 31.7 
years (s. e. = 12.7). To show that they matched the clients group, a matched-pairs t-test showed 
that the distribution of the differences between ages was compatible with a distribution 
around 0 (t=-0.37, df=32, two-tailed p=0.71). The mean difference between ages for pairs was 
0.45 years, (s. e. =1.2). Both groups had an average number of years of education of 13 years; a 
matched pairs t-test showed no difference between the two groups in terms of education (t= - 
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0.89, df=32, two-tailed p= 0.38). Controls also matched the psychosis group for gender and 
ethnicity. No one with a previous psychiatric history was used as a control. 
4.1.2 Measures 
The questionnaires used were, The Emotional Autonomy scale (Steinberg and 
Silverberg, 1986), the Peer Autonomy scale (Webb, 1996) (as described in chapter 3). Some 
of the items in this scale were inappropriate for an older group because they mentioned 
school; clients were instructed to answer these items replacing `school' with `work') 
The SCL-52 or the Brief Symptom Inventory is a symptom inventory derived from the 
longer SCL-90 (Derogatis and Melisaratos, 1983; see appendix B). It has test-retest reliability 
of 0.87, and has been shown to be well validated with both clinical and normal populations. It 
was used in this study primarily to ensure that the normal control group was significantly 
lower on psychopathology than the client group, which proved to be the case - means were 
respectively 28.4 and 63.9, (Levene's t test assuming unequal variances t= -3.06, p=0.006). 
4.2 Results 
The psychosis group were significantly different from the normal control group on 
Parental Autonomy (means were 52.1 and 56.8 respectively; matched pairs t-test: t=2.55, df= 
32, two-tailed p=0.015). All 4 sub-scales of the parental autonomy scales were significantly 
different for the two groups, especially the parents-as-people scale (see table 4.1). 
No effect was found for peer autonomy (means 37.0 and 36.8 respectively, matched 
pairs t-test: t= -0.29, df=32, p=0.77), however the variances were strikingly 
different (21.2 for 
psychosis group and 5.6 for controls). These differences are best seen graphically in Fig. 4.1 
The sample sizes are only small but it seems that more of the psychosis group (in fact around 
half) are at either extreme for peer autonomy. 
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Figure 4.1 Graph showing autonomy profiles of psychosis sufferers compared to 
matched normal adult controls. 
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Table 4.1: Table showing differences between the psychosis group and normal controls for 
the parental autonomy scale with all its subscales, and the peer autonomy scale. The means 
for the nsvchosis Lyroun are on the left 





Means 52.1 56.8 13.7 15.4 14.5 14.2 10.6 11.5 13.6 15.2 37.0 36.8 
s. d. 6.0 6.9 2.7 2.8 2.1 2.9 2.1 1.9 2.8 1.8 4.59 2.37 
t 2.55 1.68 3.5 2.58 1.9 -0.29 
p 0.015 0.048 . 001 . 006 
0.025 0.77 
Comparison with the data from the previous chapter showed that the psychosis group 
scored below the scores for 15 and 17 year olds, and were even below 13 year olds for 
parental autonomy (see figure 4.2). T-tests showed that the psychosis group was significantly 
below 17 year olds males and females together (t=-3.16, df=328, p=0.001), and below 15 year 
olds (t=1.66, df=106, p=0.06). On Peer autonomy the psychosis group was less different 
(figure 4.3), and none of the differences were significant. Finally figure 4.4 shows a 
scatterplot of all the 17 year olds and the psychosis group, plus the matched adult control 
group. 
Within the psychosis group, 18 were fairly young and were in remission from their 
first episode of psychosis. Analyses showed that this group was significantly lower than the 
rest of the psychosis group for peer (but not parent) autonomy (see figures 4.2 and 4.3; t= - 
2.23, df=42, p=0.015). This effect was due to age alone, because the same difference was 
seen between the matching younger versus older controls. 
Autonomy in people with a psychosis 86 
19/ 33 of the psychosis group were living at home with their parents, compared to 7 of 
the control group. Comparing clients living away from home with controls living away 
showed that the psychosis group had significantly lower parental autonomy (t=-1.73, p=0.04) 
and significantly higher peer autonomy (t=2.01, p=0.026). Comparing clients living at home 
with controls at home showed the psychosis group had significantly lower parental autonomy 
(t=-1.85, p=0.03) but no difference in peer autonomy (t=0.18, p=0.42). Within the psychosis 
group, those living away from home showed the same parental autonomy as those living away 
(t=-0.522, p=0.3), but significantly higher peer autonomy (t=2.03, p=0.02). No such 
difference was seen within the control group, as those living at home did not differ 
significantly from those living away on either parental (t=0.22, p=0.41) or peer autonomy (t=- 
0.69, p=0.25). In summary, controlling for living arrangements showed that the psychosis 
group had significantly lower parental autonomy than controls irrespective of whether clients 
were living at home or away. For the psychosis group in particular, living away from home 
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4.3 Conclusions 
The data are consistent with the theory that people who are most vulnerable to 
psychotic breakdown are those who are lowest on parental autonomy. Those who have had a 
breakdown are particularly low on parental autonomy when compared to both adult matched 
controls and teenagers. The comparison with teenagers shows they are significantly below 15 
and 17 year olds, and are even below 13 year olds, although not significantly. The data also 
indicate that clients also tend to show especially high or especially low peer autonomy with 
regard to both teenagers and normals. In conjunction with the previous chapter this indicates 
that unusually close or distant peer relationships might be vulnerability factors for psychosis. 
There is no way of showing from these data whether the autonomy differences 
observed are due to an extensive period of illness and perhaps hospitalisation, or vice versa. 
The fact that the psychosis group is below even the youngest teenagers suggests that at least 
some of this is an effect of the illness and hospitalisation. Younger, first episode clients were 
lower than older clients for peer autonomy but this was shown to be due to age alone, as the 
same effect was seen amongst normal controls. Clients living at home also had lower peer 
autonomy scores than those living away, and this trend was not seen in the controls. This 
suggests that the experience of living away is related to higher peer autonomy in psychosis 
sufferers, possibly reflecting their isolation from the community, which is likely to be higher 
than for controls. 
The Parental autonomy scale is made up of 4 sub-scales- Non- dependency, De- 
idealisation, Parents-as-People and Individuation. That psychosis sufferers are very dependent 
on their parents is common knowledge. It is not well known that a psychosis group would 
idealise their parents. Sample questions in this category are "my parents hardly ever make 
mistakes" and "I try to have the same opinions as my parents". (It might be said that such 
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statements have a slightly different meaning in the context of psychosis, therefore a limitation 
of the study might be that it is unclear to what extent these scales designed for teenagers can 
be used on a psychotic adult population. ) The Parents-as-People scale was the most 
significantly different from controls of the sub-scales. This is particularly interesting because 
the Parents-as-People scale directly reflects the Theory of Mind-style capacities that are 
hypothesised to be acquired during adolescence (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, Elkind, 1979). 
Many of the psychosis group were surprised to even be asked such questions such as "I might 
be surprised to see how my parents behaved when they are with their parents", because to 
them, it was never likely that their parents were not parent-like in every aspect of their lives. 
Together with the idealisation, this suggests that, like the young adolescent, psychosis 
sufferers have only broad-brush notions of what makes their parents tick, and could profit 
from a closer observation and understanding of the other people in their lives. One reason 
why some clients have such limited understanding of others is because they are mostly self- 
focused and suffer from objectite (chapter 2); in the Individuation sub-scale, another facet of 
objectite is observed. The statements in this section refer to whether or not the participant 
feels that they have no secrets from their parents and that their parents "know everything there 
is to be known about me. " In chapter 7 the idea is investigated empirically that many clients 
even feel their own thoughts are open to scrutiny from their parents. 
It is an encouraging sign for a new theory when that theory prompts an 
investigation into something hitherto unsuspected and meets with some support, as was seen 
here with the Idealisation and Parents-as-people sub-scales. As was mentioned in the previous 
chapter, if the concept of autonomy could be refined and enlarged upon, then application to 
psychosis might be even more telling. Future research might also want to reproduce the 
results in a larger psychosis group. 
To look more closely at how psychosis comes about, the next empirical study (chapter 
6) considers a small number of psychosis sufferers in much detail to examine the dynamics of 
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their interactions, and how the psychology might translate into symptoms. To do so, 
questionnaire techniques are abandoned in favour of a more qualitative approach, using a 
framework derived mainly from Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (Dryden, 1990). 
Another theoretical outline is needed before this can be done, to provide a form of 
representation that makes the interactions more amenable to study. It is common to use 
continuum theories to describe psychosis as an extension of normal functioning (Claridge and 
Broks, 1984). As well as describing psychosis in terms that seem more normal, the next 
chapter (chapter 5) describes normal interactions in a more existential manner, from their 
philosophical roots, which is a format that lends itself to uncovering fundamentals behind the 
symptoms and their functions. 
Chapter 5 
5. Psychosis and the Seif: Construction, Deconstruction and 
Recovery 
From the previous chapters it was concluded that two major developmental tasks in 
adolescence are to disengage from the family and engage with a peer group. These stressful life 
tasks are often accompanied by psychotic-like phenomena, as inevitable consequences of the 
types of cognitive changes going on, as the individual struggles out of the chrysalis of childhood 
and metamorphoses into adulthood. Having passed through these transition periods, the 
psychotic-like phenomena usually disappear as the person psychologically matures into 
adulthood. However a proportion of people become stuck in the middle of the transition, and the 
accompanying psychotic-like features are not transitory, and in fact get much worse. 
In this chapter the hypothesis is explored that a key to understanding the symptoms lies 
in a closer appreciation of how normal people experience and construct themselves. The theory 
of self construction, threat and defence put forward by Trower and Chadwick, (1995) is used to 
explain this process, and to show how in people diagnosed schizophrenic, the normal threats to 
self construction attempts overwhelm the individual and block or severely disrupt the self 
construction process as a whole. By way of illustration before addressing the theory proper, it 
can be said that the processes involved are particularly stark and important for normal 
adolescents, who (as detailed in chapter 2) have just developed the cognitive processes involved 
in conceptualising themselves in terms of interpersonal traits (which pre-teens don't do; 
Rosenberg, 1979), and thus are coming to terms with the realisation that other's don't 
necessarily have the high opinion of themselves that they have. Adolescents have also physically 
changed to an extent that their body-image (and hence much of their self-image) is enormously 
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tenuous (Simmons, and Blyth, 1987). They are also fast approaching adulthood, which requires a 
major realignment of thinking on many, many topics (Eikind, 1980). These sorts of uncertainties 
about themselves lead to a situation described by Rosenberg (1979): 
"For youth in particular, self-presentation is likely to assume the function of 
testing and attempting to validate one or more self-hypotheses... In a groping and 
tentative way, different selves may be rehearsed- the glamour girl, the caustic 
wit... Hence the common sense question `What is he trying to prove? ' has 
profound psychological significance, for that is precisely what the adolescent is 
trying to do. A girl wants a date in order to have evidence that she is attractive. 
... When an adolescent- or anyone else- tries to achieve a certain goal, he does so 
not simply for the advantage it affords, but because it enables him to prove 
something about himself to himself. What concerns them is the uncertainty about 
what they are like, and what motivates them is the desire to know, to achieve 
certainty. Yet ultimate certainty forever eludes us so that the responses of others 
are required not only for confirmation but for the lifelong reconfirmation of our 
working self-hypotheses. " (Rosenberg, 1979, p. 48) 
This process of self-construction is the focus of the current chapter, because careful 
reformulation of self-construction theory leads to important insights into some of the notoriously 
puzzling and bizarre symptoms of schizophrenia. That the self is a key concept in understanding 
schizophrenia is a long-standing idea that has recently received renewed interest (Alanen, 1994; 
Hingley 1992). Davidson and Strauss (1992) have shown that an emergent sense of self is an 
integral part of the recovery process. Bentall, Kinderman and Kaney (1994) have shown 
evidence that paranoid delusions serve the function of defending the self and maintaining self 
esteem. Trower and Chadwick (1995) have extended this model and shown evidence of two 
types of threat to and defence of self giving rise to two types of paranoia. In addition the concept 
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of self is a key component in recent developments in cognitive behaviour therapy (Chadwick, 
Birchwood & Trower, 1996). 
The topic of the self in schizophrenia has also had many distinguished contributors. In 
particular, it was well recognised by the founding fathers of the classification and development 
of the concept of the psychoses- Kraepelin, Bleuler, Jaspers, Meyer, Schneider, Sullivan and 
Freud himself- that major disruption in the integrity of self was a core component in these 
disorders. The topic of the self has been out of favour both within psychiatry - with the advent of 
descriptive, diagnostic and biological approaches to mental illness- and within mainstream 
psychology with its positivist approach to empirical observation and experimental manipulation. 
But, it is now clear that the "self' is an area of recognised importance in cognitive psychotherapy 
in particular - both rational-emotive behaviour therapy (Ellis, 1994) and cognitive therapy (Beck, 
1983)- and increasingly so again in mainstream social psychology following the emergent 
paradigm of constructivism (Stevens, 1997). Indeed the methodologies and theories now exist in 
experimental cognitive, social and clinical psychology to pursue research into these concepts 
(e. g. Suls 1993). 
Some of the problems inherent in earlier self theories have been at least partially 
overcome in post-modernist and existentialist accounts in which the self is conceptualised as a 
social construction rather than an independent psychological object (Mahoney, 1991; 
McCullough, 1994). This view provides an opportunity for revisiting the topic of the self and 
schizophrenia. Following this line of reasoning, this chapter draws on Trower and Chadwick's 
(1995) account to summarise a reformulation of self construction theory which is intended to 
provide psychological understanding and therapeutic implications of psychotic phenomena. This 
account begins with an analysis of the concept of self by concentrating on the necessary and 
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sufficient conditions for the construction of a social self. It is then proposed that the construction 
of self is a fundamental human need but that the self is not a given and is never secure- it has to 
be empirically constructed, and continually maintained, and is always under threat. Some of the 
inevitable problems are considered in the construction and maintenance of self, giving rise not 
only to undesired and insecure selves, but more seriously to the collapse of the self. An attempt 
is made to identify some of the main kinds of failure and suggest some of the types and 
symptoms of psychosis associated with dysfunctions in self construction. Finally some recent 
findings are summarised in the light of these predictions. 
5.1 The necessary and sufficient conditions for self 
Trower & Chadwick (1995) proposed that there are three necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the construction of self, namely an objective self (the reflected self, or empirical, 
phenomenal, public, behavioural self) a subjective agent (reflective, conscious agent), and the 
Other (encompassing an equivalent subjective agent and objective self). 
5.1.1 The objective self. 
The objective self is the product - the self that is constructed. This, the most 
familiar 
aspect of self in everyday life, refers not to some mysterious inner entity, but to the observed, 
behavioural, public self, or what James (1891) called the phenomenal "me". The objective self as 
defined here is close to Sartre's concept of Being-For-Others (Etre Pour Autrui) 
5.1.2 The subjective agent. 
In order to construct an objective self, I as agent self must first define and present my 
`self' i. e. perform self-presentational acts (Goffman, 1959). As subjective agent (Harre 1979) 
1 
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choose the roles, the rules and the subsequent actions - the self presentation behaviours - that 
constitute the objective self, and I monitor (i. e. observe and judge) those behaviours, and also 
monitor the feedback from the other. As agent I not only have the power of action but the 
cognitive processes of observing, interpreting, inferring, attributing, evaluating, recalling etc. I 
evaluate and generate self presentational behaviours according to rules - social and moral rules 
of conduct which as agent I know the other will recognise and value (Harre, 1979) - and also 
according to the guiding concepts I have of a desired possible self (Markus & Nurias, 1986). The 
evaluative function is particularly complex, and entails not only the direct evaluation of my own 
actions, but the evaluation of the other's evaluation of my own actions. In addition I can evaluate 
the other's action (these meta-appraisals were mostly clearly drawn out by Laing, 1969, and are 
currently conceptualised as a theory of other minds; Frith, 1992; Mitchell et al, 1996). These 
appraisals have important ontological (self objectifying) implications, as explained in the next 
paragraph. The subjective agent as defined here is close to Sartre's concept of Being-for-Itself 
(Etre Pour Soi). 
5.1.3 The other 
In order to become an objective self, the presented self must be recognised as a legitimate 
social and moral self by the other (Harrel, 1979). The other therefore has two interlinked powers. 
The first power is to be able to reify the presented self into an objective self, for in the very act of 
observation, the appraiser can objectify that action, that self-presentation behaviour, and thus 
objectify the other's self, turning him into a Being-For-Others. The second is the power to define 
or redefine the presented self, and thereby influence how the self is presented. The second power 
enables the other to implicitly or explicitly state the social and moral rules according to which 
self presentations must conform in order to be recognised as a legitimate social self. The other of 
course is also an agent, and I (as subjective agent) am also an other. For the present purposes, the 
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other's role and function is defined as observer, and the power emphasised of providing the 
"public" objectivity of an audience which transforms the presentations of self into the objective 
self. This transformation is a vital part of the theory, and asserts that there can be no objective 
self without recognition by the other. 
5.2 Motivation and Limitation of Self Construction 
In this section it is proposed that there are two opposing imperatives involved in the 
process of self construction. The first is the motivation that I, as agent, have to construct an 
objective self, in accordance with my desired self concept, and which entails gaining the other's 
recognition. This is described here as the existential imperative. The second is the imperative to 
construct a self that conforms to the other's desired self concept for me. This is described as the 
moral imperative. This distinction has similarities in common with the distinction drawn by 
Higgins (1987) between the ideal self (one's hopes, aspirations and wishes) and the ought self 
(one's sense of duty, obligations or responsibilities), and is a distinction that, as Higgins points 
out, has been made by a number authors. The two imperatives are particularly akin to what are 
known in REBT as `musts' (Dryden, 1995), one of the core types of irrational beliefs. In this 
section each imperative is described and then the interaction of the two detailed. 
5.2.1 The existential imperative. 
The existential imperative is the proposition that the making of a self is the most 
fundamental human passion and need. This idea is perhaps most explicitly expressed by the 
humanist-existential thinkers, with such concepts as the drive toward self-actualisation (Rogers, 
1961; Maslow, 1973), and the concept of being-for-itself (etre-pour-soi) (Sartre, 1943/57), and 
by the "self' school of psychoanalysts with the concept of narcissistic need (Kohut, 1973). 
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Rogers (1961) describes the motive to become a self as "man's tendency to actualise 
himself, to become his potentialities" (p. 351). By this he means "the directional trend which is 
evident in all organic and human life - the urge to expand, extend, develop, mature - the 
tendency to express and activate all the capacities of the organism, or the self ... 
it exists in every 
individual, and awaits only the proper conditions to be released and expressed. It is this tendency 
which is the prime motivation for creativity as the organism forms new relationships to the 
environment in its endeavour most fully to be itself. " (p. 351) 
Rogers identifies a number of components of becoming that self which one truly is. The 
first is self-direction or autonomy, by which a person gradually chooses the goals toward which 
they want to move. He becomes responsible for himself. He decides what activities and ways of 
behaving have meaning for him, and what do not. The second is what he calls "toward being 
process. " This concerns being more openly in a process, a fluidity, a changing, flowing current. 
He quotes Kierkegaard's description of the individual who really exists - of someone constantly 
in process of becoming. The third is "toward being complexity", that is to be, quite openly and 
transparently, all of ones complex and changing and sometimes contradictory feelings, with 
nothing hidden. Fourth is " toward openness to experience. " This involves being in a close 
relationship to one's own experience rather than being closed off to them -a child-like 
acceptance. The fifth is "toward acceptance of others". Closely related to this openness to inner 
and outer experience in general is an openness to and an acceptance of other individuals. Sixth is 
"toward trust of self'. This involves developing "more trust of the processes going on within 
themselves, and have dared to feel their own feelings, live by values which they discover within, 
and express themselves in their own unique ways. " 
Psychoanalysts within the school of "self psychology" express the drive to become a self 
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in rather more dramatic terms. Kohut (1977), argues that all people have at infancy and 
throughout life a primitive narcissistic drive or ambition within them to be grandiose and 
exhibitionistic, to have a tendency to regard themselves as omnipotent and to become enraged or 
thrown into despair when thwarted. These "archaic" drives are healthy and necessary, but must 
be modified through appropriate experiences with mirroring and idealised self-objects - 
significant others who are functionally part of the self - to a mature realism with a stable and 
secure self. Kohut (1977) sees it as essential to the child developing a self that he has a 
dependable "mirroring" parent (mother). The child performs and thereby seeks confirmation of 
its valued self by the mirroring self-object. The self will only develop if he receives loving, 
valuing reflections from the other. As Miller (1979, cited in Mollon, 1993) puts it: " the child has 
a primary need to be seen, noticed and taken seriously as being that which it is at any given time, 
and as the hub of its own activity. " 
For the existentialists the drive to become a self is the fundamental human project. 
Taking Sartre's (1943/1957) account, man's passion is to become a real, tangible being-in-the- 
world. His account emerges from the phenomenological nature of consciousness. Consciousness 
has no identifying characteristics, no content, no "being" or essence of its own, but can only 
reflect upon objects outside of itself. This emptiness or "no-thingness" of consciousness is what I 
experience, according to Sartre, as anguish, and underlines the need to become, i. e. to fill the gap 
and become a real object. From this comes the drive to construct a self, to become a real me in 
the world. In technical terms, the Being-For-Itself (eire pour soi) seeks to become a Being-for- 
Others (etre pour autre). How does he try to achieve this? There are various ways, but one way 
is to play a particular role or act a part: 
"... he is playing at being a waiter.. .A child plays with 
his body in order to explore it, to 
make an inventory of it. The waiter plays with his situation in life in order to realise it... " 
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But since I (and the waiter) can only play at being x, I can never actually become x. So the 
project to become is a never-ending project, with all the implications this entails, of a continuous 
process, of freedom to change, of insecurity and so on. In addition, I cannot realise or become a 
self alone, but only through the other, a feature elaborated on later, and which echoes the 
principle discussed by Kohut of the necessity of the mirroring self-object. 
5.2.2 The moral imperative. 
This proposition is that any individual will, to varying degrees, experience a moral 
imperative to construct a self which the other wishes them to construct. Harre (1979) among 
others has argued that people construct themselves and each other according to "moral" rules 
that specify and guide the behaviour required to be a warranted and legitimate "social being. 
" 
This works at the macro level - the level of the social group or generalised other, where 
it 
reflects general social rules or norms of conduct - or at the level of the specific other, where 
it 
may reflect the personal wishes of the individual other. The reward for conforming to the rules 
of the other (both the generalised and the specific other) is that the other is more likely to give 
the recognition that is needed to become an objective self. The other may evoke the moral 
imperative in order to try to make sure that the individual will present himself in the way he 
ought. The punishment for refusing to conform to the rules is that the other is more likely to 
refuse to give recognition, or will attempt to redefine the actor by means of a shaming 
label - two 
types of threat which are described later. The problem with the moral imperative, then, 
is that it 
can be in direct conflict with the existential imperative. To interpret Sartre 
(1943/1957) this is 
because I wish to found my own being - to be the author of my own self construction - 
but the 
other (who I need to achieve this) may wish to be the author of my self construction, and uses 
the 
moral imperative to try to achieve this control. 
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5.2.3 Interactions of the existential and moral imperatives. 
In co-operative relationships, people may negotiate their existential and moral 
imperatives without conflict. If A wishes B to affirm his presented self, B may agree to do so if 
A also agrees to modify his behaviour to conform in significant ways to B's requirements, which 
may include A giving affirmation of his (i. e. B's) presented self. Thus people affirm and 
objectify each other but maintain mutual respect. However in dysfunctional relationships, there 
may be conflict between the existential and moral imperatives. These conflicts are discussed 
below. 
5.3 Self-construction process 
Given the dynamics of the existential and moral imperatives how does this self- 
construction process work in social interaction? Goffman's idea (Goffman, 1959), like Sartre's, 
draws on the metaphor of drama -a person attempts to construct 
his self by means of self 
presentation performances before an audience. Goffman proposed that people are engaged in 
`impression management' all the time, acting in accordance with the type of person they wish to 
appear as. A good illustration of what Goffman meant by self-presentation comes from a story he 
cited involving Preedy, a man arriving on the beach at the start of his holiday: 
"But in any case he took care to avoid catching anyone's eye. First of all, 
he had to make it clear to those potential companions of his holiday that they 
were of no concern to him whatsoever. He stared through them, round them, over 
them- eyes lost in space. The beach might have been empty. If by chance a ball 
was thrown his way, he looked surprised; then let a smile of amusement 
lighten 
his face (Kindly Preedy), looked around dazed to see that there were people on 
the beach, tossed it back with a smile to himself and not a smile at the people, 
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and resumed carelessly his nonchalant survey of space. 
But it was time to institute a little parade, the parade of the Ideal Preedy. 
By devious handlings he gave any who wanted to look a chance to see the title of 
his book- a Spanish translation of Homer, classic thus, but not too daring, 
cosmopolitan, too- and then gathered together his beach-wrap and bag into a neat 
sand-resistant pile (Methodological and Sensible Preedy), rose slowly to stretch at 
ease his huge frame (Big-Cat Preedy), and tossed aside his sandals (Carefree 
Preedy, after all). " (Sanson, 1956; cited in Goffman, 1956). 
The story illustrates the various roles the self-conscious man sees himself as playing in 
this situation. Self-presentation has been defined as the attempt to control images of self before 
real or imagined audiences, and thereby to influence how audiences perceive and treat the actor 
(Schlenker, 1980). This sort of self-presentation is goal- driven -e. g. to attain one's love goals 
one seeks to display the appearance and behaviour that will arouse feelings of love in the target. 
Other authors have argued that the goal being achieved is not merely some social or material 
advantage, but the goal of proving one's own reality in the world. "It is difficult to maintain our 
self-view as a profound philosopher if others consider our ideas trite or trivial; as a wit, if they 
yawn at our jokes; as a dignified figure, if they puncture our pretension. " (Rosenberg, 1979, 
p48). Hence, Rosenberg describes that we get something unique from other people that we can't 
get from ourselves-confirmation of whether we are what we think we are. At a more 
fundamental level, we have no way of being certain of our very existence without the other's 
mirroring (Sartre, 1943/1957). 
Trower and Chadwick (1995) operationalise the process of self construction as a 
sequence of stages. The process begins with self-presentation behaviour for others, as just 
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described. In terms of the current model, this means I attempt to get the other to affirm my self 
as presented (for example by means of the moral imperative), and thereby enable me to achieve 
my goal of self construction. The second stage is the perceived, anticipated or imagined 
evaluation by others of the self so presented. This is where I judge whether the other accepts or 
is indifferent to the presented self, or rejects and redefines my presented self as in breach of the 
moral imperative. The third stage is the evaluation of self by the actor him or herself, consequent 
upon the other's evaluation . This is where I accept, am 
indifferent to or reject the other's 
affirmation or redefinition of my presented self. 
In functional, co-operative relationships the process may be simple: A as agent presents 
to B as agent. Second, B observes and thereby "objectifies" A as an objective self; third B 
appraises his objective self-through-the-eyes-of-the-other. Here A succeeds in his self 
construction goal. In the following section ways are explored that this process can fail in 
conflictual relationships. 
5.4 Threats to the Self 
The construction of the objective self in the way described above occurs in an ideal 
world. In the real world the process often falters or breaks down, resulting in a variety of what 
Goffman called "spoiled identities" (Goffman, 1956). Social psychologists, philosophers and 
others have identified a whole range of sophisticated ways that people prepare for, recover from 
or repair identities, such as giving "justificatory accounts" (Harr6,1986). However further along 
this continuum comes into the realm of dysfunctional "selves" (e. g. as in personality disorders) 
or worse, into the failure to construct a self or the collapse of self, as may be the case in some 
types of schizophrenia. 
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There are three major forms that self construction failure may take: 1) the Insufficient 
Self where the self as agent apparently lacks the skill repertoire, the self-efficacy etc. to construct 
behavioural self-presentations. 2) The Insecure Self in which the agent, on account of the 
existential imperative, produces their desired self-presentations but the other is largely absent (as 
in neglect, indifference or abandonment) and thus cannot achieve the status of objective self. 3) 
The Alienated Self in which the objective self is imposed and controlled by the other by means 
of the moral imperative. The Insufficient self is not enlarged on here, but the second and third 
forms of vulnerability are focused on, as briefly outlined in Trower and Chadwick (1995). 
5.4.1 Insecure Self. 
The self as agent may fail to construct an objective self due to the lack of the attentive, 
'objectifying' or 'mirroring' Other. The agent needs the other in order to be - to be an objective 
self in the real world. If the other is indifferent or negligent - if the other fails to value, nurture 
or even attend to the self as presented, or worse still is completely absent - then the agent has a 
problem - of failing to be in the profound sense of Sartre's nothingness, or more exactly no- 
thingness - of not being a thing, or object in the world. The essence of the 
insecurity threat is 
that the other leaves me unconstructed (consistently negligent) or deconstructed (inconsistently 
negligent, mirroring sometimes, and then withholding), but either way, of not being an objective 
self. 
A dramatic example of this failure of mirroring is given by Kohut (1977). In responding 
to her young child, the mother 
"... responds - accepting, rejecting, disregarding - to a self that, in giving and 
offering seeks confirmation by the mirroring self-object. The child therefore 
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experiences the joyful, prideful parental attitude or the parent's lack of interest.. . as 
the acceptance or rejection of his tentatively established, yet still vulnerable 
creative-productive-active self. If the mother rejects this self just as it begins to 
assert itself as a centre of creative-productive initiative (especially of course if her 
rejection or lack of interest is only one link in a long chain of re-buffs and 
disappointments emanating from her pathogenically unempathic 
personality)... then the child's self will be depleted and he will abandon the 
attempt to obtain the joys of self-assertion and will... " (page 76). 
In the psychoanalytic literature this phenomenon is known as "narcissistic vulnerability" - 
referring to the fragility and uncertainty in the sense of self. This leads to strong reactions to the 
"narcissistic injuries" of feeling slighted, ignored or treated without respect or empathy. The 
most prominent reaction is of narcissistic rage (Kohut, 1972) - with secondary reactions of 
depressive withdrawal or of a retreat to an arrogant, grandiose and somewhat paranoid state of 
mind. According to Mollon (1993), these overt reactions seem to be protective responses to a 
more fundamental injury or break-up of the sense of self. 
Mollon (1993) gives examples of client's who felt unreal, who had a sense of 
disappearing, who had a dread of evaporating, of having no sense of self etc. when significant 
others ignored them or looked through them. He gives a specific clinical example of a client 
who, if she felt she was not being focused upon by another person, would feel overwhelmed with 
an uncertainty over who she really was, or even doubts about her existence. Her response was 
often to fly into a rage (the narcissistic rage which comes from a need to make other's obey one's 
will). 
The origins of this problem are classically to be found in early abandonment - the 
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experience of insecure-avoidant or insecure-ambivalent attachment, where the self-other bond is 
tenuous. Bowlby usefully distinguished various stages in the response to breakdown in bonding - 
the first two being protest and despair (Bowlby 1969). During the protest stage the person may 
vigorously pursue the other, try to compel, coerce etc. the other to be securely there. They may 
use care eliciting or care giving manoeuvres to maintain the bond; they may use guilt, attraction, 
power to bring the recalcitrant other into line. They may take the role of masochist or "poor me" 
to 'pull' from and thereby lock the other into the reciprocal role of sadist or persecutor. Using the 
present concepts, these manoeuvres would be described as emanating from the moral imperative. 
However once they have entered the despair stage, the scene is set for future psychopathology 
and what Masterson (1989) calls abandonment depression. This arises when the mother's 
continuous unavailability or inconsistency produces the climate in which the child's real self will 
not be able to emerge. 
What is the evidence for this Insecurity threat in early development? Blatt and Homann 
(1992) in their review of the extensive parent-child interaction research literature, characterise 
one pattern of parental style as one of being psychologically unavailable, uncaring and 
neglectful, and if affection was given, this was inconsistent. They related this to what they call 
anaclitic depression, in which the individual intensely and chronically fears being abandoned and 
left unprotected and uncared for. Goodman and Brumley (1990) found lack of maternal 
responsiveness and affectional involvement was most characteristic of schizophrenic mothers. 
What is the evidence for the unavailability pattern in the families of schizophrenics? The 
argument here may not concern high EE families so much as low EE caregivers. Both Leff and 
Vaughn (1985) and Smith (1993) have written about a subgroup of low EE 'burnt-out' relatives 
in inner city areas where the low EE response reflects apathy and indifference rather than calm 
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concern, and may be engendering apathy, negative symptoms and increasing levels of social 
impairment - even reinforcing social withdrawal. 
5.4.2 Alienated Self. 
It was considered earlier that the self as agent may not be able to construct an objective 
self due to the other being psychologically absent - apathetic, indifferent, disinterested , 
preoccupied and generally unavailable. But the self as agent may fail to construct an objective 
self due to a diametrically opposite reason, namely the other being excessively present and 
intrusive - of not only mirroring the objective self but of taking possession of it, by means (it is 
argued) of the mechanism of the moral imperative. To be my objective self, I as agent must 
construct the self presentation for the other, and the other must empathically recognise and value 
this self as my self, freely constructed. But if the objective self is controlled and indeed 
constituted by the other, then it is not my self but an alien self imposed upon me. 
Sartre develops this notion in his analysis of `being-for-others' (1957/1943). First he 
develops the thesis that I can only become a real object in the world by being recognised as such 
by the other. But secondly he states: 
... we must recognise that we experience our 
being-for-others in the form of a 
possession. I am possessed by the Other; the Other's look fashions my body in its 
nakedness, causes it to be born, sculptures its, produces it as it is, sees it as I 
shall never see it. The Other holds a secret - the secret of what I am. He makes 
me be and thereby he possesses me, and this possession is nothing other than the 
consciousness of possessing me. I in the recognition of my object-state have proof 
that he has this consciousness. By virtue of consciousness the Other is for me 
simultaneously the one who has stolen my being from me and the one who causes 
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"there to be" a being which is my being. Thus I have a comprehension of this 
ontological structure: I am responsible for my being-for-others, but I am not the 
foundation of it. " (1943/57, p. 364) 
In other words A is looked at, evaluated and labelled by B, and thereby becomes an 
objective self defined and constituted by the other as labelled by the other. A feels like an object, 
as labelled, experienced through shame and self-consciousness. Sartre uses the term objectite to 
identify this quality or state of being an object. 
One client, Jane, diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic, said one of her main fears was 
being taken over - 'everything being taken from me, your personality. You can't be yourself. 
You're not in control of your own person'. She dreaded the idea of someone ̀ telling you what to 
do. Like you have to do what someone else says all the time. I'd just run away. I won't let anyone 
get near me. If someone cared for me I'd feel they want to take my life over, be swallowed up, 
overwhelmed. That would be possessive caring - being the other's property. ' 
In reviewing the expressed emotion and social support research in schizophrenia, 
Davidson and Strauss (1992) comment that a "highly critical and over-involved family milieu 
can be seen as interfering with the development of an active sense of self by fostering negative 
appraisals and undermining a person's efforts at establishing his/her own sense of agency" (page 
142) 
To recap, if you are in the objectite state, you, as object, lose your sense of agency to the 
other as subject, i. e. ability to stand back and be an observer and hence judge of yourself and 
creator of your actions. According to Sartre, when you are object for the other as subject, you 
experience the other as being able to control your being as object, much as a puppeteer controls 
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the puppet. In the extreme forms just described, there are examples of clients who feel so deeply 
penetrated by the other that the other can control their thoughts, movements and sense of self. It 
is not difficult to imagine that a person, when in such a phenomenological state, will fail to 
attribute thoughts and actions to self as agent and will instead attribute thoughts and actions 
(which are in fact their own) to the other (whether real or hallucinated). The notion of being an 
object possessed and constituted by the other may help to explain a number of schizophrenic 
symptoms which have external control as their theme. These would include voices referring to 
the individual in the third person, voices criticising, delusions of influence - both control and 
somatic passivity - and some of the thought disorders, including thought insertion, thought 
broadcast, thought withdrawal and movements being controlled. Chadwick and Birchwood 
(1994) found that malevolent voices were extremely powerful (omnipotent) and all knowing 
(omniscient), and in the case of command hallucinations, individuals felt compelled to carry out 
the voice's commands. 
How do clients respond or cope with the experience of alienation? There are at least three 
ways - constructing a false self, avoidance or withdrawal, and 
by turning the tables and 
alienating the other. 
The first way of coping with the experience of being the other's object is by constructing 
a false self, behind which the true self may hide. Winnicott (1960) introduced the term 'false self 
into psychoanalysis. He saw this as a part of the personality based on compliance to an 
environment which did not respond to the infant's own inner initiative. For example: 
... the mother who 
is not good enough... repeatedly fails to meet the infant's gesture; 
instead she substitutes her own gesture which is to be given sense by the compliance of 
the infant. This compliance on the part of the infant is the earliest stage of the False Self 
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and belongs to the mother's inability to sense her infant's needs. 
Another way of dealing with being the other's object is to escape or avoid the other, as in 
the case of Jane referred to earlier. A study by Egeland et al (1993) showed this to be true of 
children with over-intrusive mothers - they developed a characteristic "defence" of avoiding 
interaction. 
Such a response pattern also appears to be fairly typical of those relapsing schizophrenics 
who are exposed to high Expressed Emotion relatives - the critical, the intrusive and the hostile. 
Leff and Vaughn, (1985) give some examples: a mother waves her hands and snaps her fingers 
in front of her daughter's face in an attempt to elicit some kind of response; disregards requests 
for privacy, walk into the patient's bedroom unannounced, monitors a patient's routine activities 
such as bathing and dressing, offers unsolicited advice. The common response was protective 
withdrawal. A young man spent more and more time by himself, retreating to his room or going 
for solitary walks. During arguments he ceased to speak at all - he would cower in a corner of the 
room and put his hands over his ears as if to shut out the noise. (Interestingly depressed controls 
tended to seek out comfort and support) (Leff and Vaughn, 1985, p. 114). Altorter et al (1992) in 
a detailed micro-analysis of verbal and non-verbal behavioural sequences, found schizophrenic 
patients displayed evasive reactions to negative affective style of the relative. Specifically they 
found a decrease in patients non-verbal behaviour following negative affect statements, and an 
increase following positive statements. They interpret this as the patient's way of withdrawing 
from the communicative situation, eventually resulting in 'freezing' behaviour. 
Enabling separation and modifying such communications is a key part of family 
intervention and helps reduce relapse. However there are additional problems with those who 
have introjected/incorporated the parent, particularly when this takes the form of a malevolent 
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voice, from which the client cannot escape. 
The third way of dealing with alienation is by turning the tables and absorbing the other: 
Sartre again: 
... if in one sense my being-as-object is an unbearable contingency and the pure 
'possession " of myself by another, still in another sense this being stands as the 
indication of what I should be obliged to recover and found in order to be the foundation 
of myself. But this is conceivable only if I assimilate the Other... Thus my project of 
recovering myself is fundamentally a project of absorbing the Other. (1943/1952 p. 365) 
A may try to "absorb" B by not only observing B's self-presentations but labelling them 
bad, worthless or even wonderful etc., hence constituting B's objective self and thus having 
control of it. This way A is free of control and controls the other in turn (though in the process he 
has lost his own objective self). 
It is most likely that this third way of responding to alienation would be the strategy of 
someone with perceived high self-esteem or moral superiority or specialness, such as the 
narcissist, or the manic or the angry paranoid. The other two strategies will be most likely used 
by those who are low in self-esteem and powerless. 
A number of experimental social and clinical psychologists have looked at various facets 
of alienation. One area is concerned with self-consciousness or self-focused attention- a major 
part of the phenomenology of being an object for the other. Duval and Wicklund first developed 
this into a theory known as Objective Self Awareness Theory in 1972. Recently Ingram (1990) 
showed that heightened self-focus was associated with a wide range of psychopathological 
states, including alcohol abuse, depression, and various forms of anxiety. 
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The effects of increased self-consciousness are likely to vary depending on the perceived 
self-esteem of the individual. Something is known about those with low self-esteem. Hope, 
Gansler and Heimberg (1989), looking at self-awareness and social phobia in particular, 
reviewed a number of studies showing the effect of this state: being painfully aware of one's 
physiological arousal, e. g. sweating, disrupted performance at a task, amplifying whatever 
emotional state one was in, heightened sensitivity to negative feedback such as rejection, tending 
to attribute negative outcomes to the self and related to this a reversal of the usual self-serving 
bias. Furthermore the self-focused anxious person becomes more aware of discrepancies 
between ideal and actual performances (alias selves) and an increased likelihood of disengaging 
from the desired course of action. 
However the effects of increased self-consciousness on people with perceived high self- 
esteem is likely to be different. As Bentall and his colleagues have shown, deluded subjects 
showed an increase in the self-serving bias effect (blame others and not themselves for negative 
outcomes), which supports what was speculated earlier about turning the tables on the other. 
5.5 Integration and conclusion 
The insecurity threat and the alienation threat were described in terms of dispositional 
vulnerabilities, such that for any given individual, threats of one type will predominate over the 
other, leading perhaps to sociotropic (dependent) versus autonomous (independent) interpersonal 
styles, as defined by Beck (e. g. Clarke and Beck; 83). 
However there are likely to be intra-personal cycles - where a person oscillates between 
insecurity and alienation, as may occur in certain types of borderline personality disorders - and 
Psychosis and the Self: Theoretical Issues 113 
interpersonal cycles - insecure person A tries to ensnare person B as his Other by means of the 
moral imperative, thereby creating alienated self experiences in B, who withdraws, avoids etc., 
leading to further insecurity in A, and exacerbation of this particular vicious cycle. This 
interpersonal cycle would not only maintain, for example, high EE interactions, but probably 
lead to an exacerbation of them, to the point where a `breakdown' occurs leading to yet another 
hospital admission for the family member who is in the subordinate position in the interaction. 
Furthermore there are probably simultaneous occurrences of insecurity and alienation. 
For example B imposes an alien objective self on A, but ignores or in other ways devalues any 
attempt by A to present an authentic (i. e. their own) self to B or anyone else. A is thereby caught 
in a complete trap - entrapped in an alien self and 
blocked from constructing a self. One of the 
few options left is to withdraw into a vacuum of nonbeing, which may help explain negative 
symptoms, or wildly procrastinates between approach and avoidance. In fact this 
latter is the type 
of picture that Masterson (1988) paints in his portrait of the borderline - that mothers show 
both 
over-involvement (uses the child for her own dependency needs) and inconsistent (stops the 
child "individuating" i. e. authentic self presentation). Indeed Bezirganian et a] (1993) showed 
this to be true in a large-scale study - that both child-rearing practices 
had to be present together 
to be "pathogenic". 
It has been argued that many problems, particularly in psychoses, will at least involve a 
problem in the construction of self, and have described two of the major threats to this- the 
unavailability of the mirroring other, or the intrusive possession by the other. 
Cognitive 
psychotherapy has rather neglected this topic. This approach would suggest a new research 
agenda, examining the specific ways that people with schizophrenia are 
failing to construct their 
selves, and to develop therapy in the direction of enabling them to repair the process and 
begin 
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again - or for the first time - to construct a self, providing them with the enabling conditions - 
the mirroring others - to carry out this project. 
Chapter 6 
6. Empirical Analysis of Self-Construction within Conflicts 
In the previous chapter a theory was outlined of self construction, threat and defence, and 
there was speculation on the basis of the psychiatric literature about some of the consequences of 
threat to, and breakdown of, self construction in schizophrenia, including some of the symptoms 
that may result from self construction failure. The next part of this thesis was to empirically 
examine and understand the process of failure in self construction in a sample of people 
diagnosed as schizophrenic. The approach to this task was to ask participants to identify a set of 
interpersonal events where threats to-self construction were most likely to occur, and to devise 
an ecologically valid methodology for examining those events in a way that would reveal the 
crucial psychological processes. 
The earlier chapters on adolescent blocks highlighted relationships with families and 
peers as the two most likely arenas for turbulence and quasi-psychotic experiences. Conflicts in 
family and peer relationships were therefore the two areas where closer scrutiny was likely to be 
fruitful. That family relationships are important has obviously also 
been found by many 
investigators; a large number of studies have consistently found a significant relationship 
between psychotic relapse and certain types of attitudes held by family members towards the 
index client (Bebbington and Kuipers, 1994). These types of attitudes and communications that 
family members exhibit have been labelled as high `expressed emotion' (EE; Vaughn and 
Leff, 
1976), and include critical, hostile or emotionally over-involved attitudes towards the index 
client made by family members during the Camberwell Family Interview (Vaughn and 
Leff, 
1976). The theory of self construction might be able to explain one crucial cause of the effect 
these communications have, namely that the high EE communications that are so consistently 
linked to relapse may constitute one or other (or both) of the two types of threat to self 
construction, and that at least some of the symptoms that characterise relapse may be construed 
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as forms of defence against such threats (e. g. paranoia, command hallucinations) or 
manifestations of an actual breakdown in autonomy of the self (e. g. delusions of passivity and 
control). Even short of actually causing relapse, high EE communications may block self 
development, causing the individual to become trapped in a dependent role without self integrity, 
with consequent negative symptoms or at least a pattern of chronic social withdrawal. 
Given this line of reasoning, the aim of the study was to identify, analyse and compare 
accounts of interaction episodes that constituted conflicts in high EE families, to analyse these 
interactions in terms of our model of interpersonal threats to self, and to compare them with low 
EE families. In order to carry out these analyses, a structured interview was developed, using a 
methodology which was based on the paradigm of discursive psychology (Potter 
& Edwards, 
1992; Harre and Gillett, 1994) rather than traditional experimental psychology, with the former's 
focus on the social construction of everyday situations, and the emphasis on an 
individual's 
particular construction of conflicts. The basic approach, therefore, was to encourage participants 
to describe their conflicts as unfolding stories of specific interactions 
between themselves and a 
significant other (parent or peer), with a focus on how the client saw 
his `self' being constructed, 
reconstructed or deconstructed, and the psychological sequelae of this process in terms of 
beliefs, actions and emotions. However rather than obtain accounts using the 
initial tabula rasa 
approach of grounded theory, the structured interview developed 
for the present study was 
theory-driven, the theory being the self construction theory, operationalised within a rational- 
emotive behaviour therapy (REBT; Ellis, 1994) framework. 
The interview - described fully in the Method section and 
in Appendix B- is designed to 
help the participant give an account of the conflict, from the point where they started 
to feel an 
emotional reaction to an event, to the moment when they 
judged the incident ended. The aim is 
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to help the participant to identify at least two and up to five chained sequences or stages, each of 
which may contain perceived threats to self of either the insecurity or alienation types. The first 
sequence begins with a description of an interpersonal event, e. g. a critical comment by the 
other. The participant gives their appraisal of this event in terms of a threat to self, and a 
description of and rating of how he felt and what action he took or wanted to take, e. g. anger and 
a critical counter-retort. This first sequence is then followed by the identification of a second, in 
which the participant is asked to describe the other's reaction to his actual or imagined response 
behaviour (e. g. an escalation of criticism), his appraisal of this second reaction (again in terms of 
a threat to self) and his emotional and behavioural reaction to this (e. g. a counter-escalation of 
anger and angry behaviour). There may be a third, fourth or even fifth sequence, each linked to 
the preceding one to make a complex chain. The final sequence explores the participant's self 
construction outcome, and the emotional and behavioural consequence of that outcome. 
The main prediction of this study was that a typical sample of people diagnosed as 
suffering from schizophrenia, and especially those who are living with or are closely attached to 
a high expressed emotion family, would show demonstrable blocks to self construction. The 
study aimed also to identify types of blocks, to unravel the psychological pattern of these blocks, 
to explore the relationship between self construction problems and psychotic symptoms, and 
explore connections between these phenomena - self construction blocks and symptoms - and 
family relationships. Expressed emotion was measured by the Camberwell Family Interview 
(Vaughn and Leff, 1976), which was also useful because it obtained the viewpoint of the other 
family members involved in the conflicts. Self construction blocks were measured by the ABC 
Structured Interview (see appendix D). A number of questionnaires were also used to assess 
other aspects of family life: the Self and Other scale (Trower, Dagnen and Chadwick, 1997), the 
Impact inventory (Kiesler, 1987), and the Level of Expressed Emotion scale (Kazarian et al, 
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1990). Details about client's symptoms were obtained from case notes and interview, and also 
the SCL-52 (Derogatis and Melisaratos, 1983), the Beliefs about Voices Questionnaire 
(Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994), and the Manchester scale (Kraweieka et al, 1977). 
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants 
Participants were consecutive referrals to the study from psychiatrists and other mental 
health workers in South Warwickshire, Northern Birmingham and South Birmingham Mental 
Health NHS Trusts. (Ethical approval was obtained from all three Trusts and the relevant 
documents are included in appendix Q. In all there were 35 referrals, of which 9 were excluded 
because they fell outside our inclusion criteria, and 5 did not want to participate. The inclusion 
criteria were a) an ICD-10 diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia or delusional disorder; b) age 
range 17 to 45 c) living with or in "regular and meaningful contact" with the parental family. 
People were excluded if a) they had primary organic impairment, b) were currently misusing 
drugs or alcohol. The number of participants was 21, including 17 men and 4 women, age range 
17 to 45 (mean age = 30 years, SD = 1.9). Six had a history of drug misuse (but not currently). 
All clients had at least 2 and at most 5 acute admission, and a psychiatric history ranging from 
six months to 7 years. All were receiving neuroleptic medication. See appendix A for a 
consideration of the reliability and validity of diagnostic categories. 
6.1.2 Procedure 
All participants were approached in accordance with the procedure laid down in the 
ethical approval documentation (see appendix Q. All patients volunteered for the study, and 
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were approached to meet with a psychologist for a few sessions "to discuss relationship and 
family issues". The confidentiality of what they might disclose was emphasised, as was the fact 
that nothing would be entered in their case notes, and that the interviews would not have any 
effect on their medication or future treatment from the services. All participants were seen on an 
outpatient basis. The interviews were conducted by the author (a postgraduate psychologist) and 
Peter Trower PhD, a senior lecturer and clinical psychologist trained in REBT. 
6.1.3 Measures 
ABC Structured Interview 
The ABC interview protocol is described in detail below; a summary how it should be 
administered is in appendix D. The interview is based largely upon, and conducted according to 
the well-established ABC cognitive assessment procedure of REBT (Dryden, 1995). 
The 
interviews were carried out by an experienced and trained REBT therapist 
(Peter Trower) and 
the author. The author was trained by Peter Trower in the administration of the 
interview (see 
appendix D), including supervision of tapes. Since all the data was provided by the participants, 
and no ratings or judgements made by the interviewers, inter-rater reliability checks were not 
relevant, except for rater categorisation of Activating Events, where an inter-rater reliability 
check gave a kappa of 0.81 (see first part of results section). 
Sample interviews from both 
interviewers were rated by two external experts in REBT as to how the 
interviews were 
conducted. The experts were Dr. Antoni Diller and Dr. Andrew Jahoda, who were unaware of 
the hypotheses of the study. Tapes were rated for 1) fidelity (how faithfully the 
interviewers 
implemented the guidelines for the ABC sequences, 2) skill (how skilfully they implemented the 
guidelines and 3) bias (how much bias they demonstrated). 
Raters reports are included in 
appendix G, which show that both interviewers were rated to have performed very well on 
these 
Empirical Analysis of Dysfunction in Self Construction 120 
criteria. An annotated transcript of a sample interview is included in appendix F. Other aspects 
of validity and reliability for this kind of qualitative interview are discussed in appendix E. 
Camberwell Family Interview 
The Camberwell Family Interview (Leff and Vaughn, 1985) is a semi-structured 
interview completed with the relatives of clients. The complete transcript of the interview is 
rated using strict criteria for scores on 5 categories of communication- critical comments, 
hostility, positive comments, warmth and emotional over-involvement. 7 or more critical 
comments, any presence of hostility observed as generalisation of criticism or a rejecting atitude, 
or a score or 3 or more on emotional over-involvement is rated as `high' expressed emotion; 
otherwise the expressed emotion rating is `low'. In deciding the rating scores, behaviours 
referred to in the interview and non-verbal communications during the interview are also taken 
into account. Rating scores are then most commonly used to divide relatives into two categories, 
high and low Expressed Emotion (EE), the dichotomous nature of the categorising reflecting the 
fact that the most frequent use of the scales is to predict or not predict relapse in the future. 
Clients whose relatives are classed as "high EE" are generally twice as likely to relapse 
(Bebbington and Kuipers, 1994). Little is known for sure about the mechanism whereby high EE 
translates into symptoms, except for non-specific theories about EE just being very stressful. The 
CFI has good psychometric properties, and the present author was trained in administering and 
rating it by its originator, Christine Vaughn, to an acceptable criterion standard on rating tapes 
blindly. 
Level of Expressed Emotion scale (Cole and Kazarian, 1988; Kazarian et al, 1990). 
Because the CFI is so time-consuming to learn and administer, a number of alternative 
measures have been devised, such as the Level of Expressed Emotion scale (LEE; Cole and 
Kazarian, 1988; Kazarian et al, 1990). The scale is completed by the client about their relative, 
and therefore measures the EE that the client is aware of receiving. It has been shown to 
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correlate significantly with EE as measured by the CFI (Kazarian et al, 1990), and has an internal 
reliability coefficient of 0.95 (Cole and Kazarian, 1988). Some client's parents were not 
available to take part in the CFI, and for these clients their LEE score was used to rate parental 
EE. 
Self and Other Scale (Trower, Dagnen and Chadwick, 1997). 
The conflicts assessed by the ABC interview are fairly concrete examples of threats and 
defences; in order to assess more general ongoing vulnerability to the two main types of threat, 
the Self and Other questionnaire was used (Trower, Dagnen and Chadwick, 1997). This asks 
clients to endorse common phenomena relating to alienation and isolation experiences and has 
been shown to have good reliability (r=0.82-0.84). 
Impact Control Inventory (Kiesler, 1987) 
There was a need for another validatory measure of how the relationship between parents 
and child was currently, so the Impact control inventory (Kiesler, 1987) was used. This is a 
measure of how people's interpersonal styles pull at each other, in effect the impact they have on 
each other and how this impact affects the relationship. It has been shown to have satisfactory 
internal consistency scores (Cronbach's alpha> 0.71), and has been used to investigate a number 
of topics including assertiveness and maladjustment (Kiesler, 1987). 
Beliefs about Voices Questionnaire (Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994). 
This instrument differentiates primarily between clients who hear malevolent voices and those 
who hear benevolent voices, and gives a quantified score for each type. It has been shown to 
accurately classify 90% of individual's voices (Birchwood and Chadwick, 1995). 
Manchester Scale (Kraweieka et al, 1977). 
Two widely-used measures of symptomatology were used, the first of which , the 
Manchester scale (Kraweieka et al, 1977), is filled in by the interviewer, and consists of around 
5 
items, each one answered on a5 point scale. Previous work has shown this scale to 
have 
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satisfactory psychometric properties (average co-efficient of concordance W> 0.7). This scale 
has commonly been used in drug trials because it is weighted towards assessing physical 
symptoms. 
Symptom CheckList (52 items) or Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis and Melisaratos, 1983). 
The SCL-52 is filled in by the client (see chapter 4; Derogatis and Melisaratos, 1983). It 
has a test-retest reliability of 0.87 and consists of 52 items related to psychological experiences 
and physical signs such as breathlessness or palpitations. 
6.1.4 The ABC Structured Interview and Interview Procedure 
As described earlier, the interview is designed to capture in an operationally defined way 
the two main threats to self construction, the participants' cognitive, emotional and behavioural 
responses to them, the other's reaction to the participant's own reaction and the repeating chains 
of such sequences during a complete conflict episode. The interview accommodates threats that 
occur in a complex sequence, and responses to threats that were inhibited as well as those that 
were executed. To recap, the two main threats are insecurity (I), where the other fails (for 
example, through indifference) to recognise and objectify the presented self, and Alienation (a), 
whether the other either coerces the client to construct a false self that is usually of demeaned 
status (coercion subtype) or defines the client as bad or flawed (redefinition subtype). There may 
even be a complex dynamic interaction of the two, where indifference is followed by control or 
vice versa, depending upon the situation, and the response of the individual to the initial threat. 
A fictitious description of each of these types is as follows: 
6.1.4.1 First situation: Insecurity threat. 
John (excited and expectant): Hey Mum, look what I've made! 
Mum (watching TV): Not now, John, Just be quiet a minute, will you? 
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John (angrily): Piss off then. 
In this situation, John makes his `self-presentation' and looks for affirmation from Mum. 
Mum however is indifferent, leaving him `unconstructed' with the consequence of angry feeling, 
angry behavioural intentions and critical thoughts about Mum. 
6.1.4.2 Second situation: Alienation threat. 
Dad: God, you are a lazy young man. Get out of bed and find yourself a job! 
John (lies there, says nothing) 
In this situation dad ̀ constructs' John's self by defining him with the phrase ̀lazy young 
man'. By saying nothing, John allows this definition to be true, and is alienated negatively 
from 
his `true' self-construction goals ((x-). 
Alternatively, Dad might be actually praising John in some way, and defining him in 
what he (Dad) thinks is a positive way, but John doesn't. If it isn't a role that John would 
have 
chosen for himself according to his own self-construction needs, and if it is odious to him, then 
this is defined as an experience of positive alienation (a+). 
Dad: Your room looks so much better now you've tidied it- you really are an obedient young 
man. 
John (fumes) 
6.1.4.3 Third situation. Alienation-insecurity complex threat. 
Husband: Look at this dust. Some wife! 
Wife: Sorry dear, I've been cooking you this nice meal instead- would you like some? 
Husband: No thanks, I'm off down the pub. 
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In this situation both threats are in the same interaction. Husband `constructs' a bad self 
for his wife by the term "some wife". By apologising, she allows this definition of herself. She 
then makes a self presentation, to which he is indifferent, leaving her unconstructed. 
Clients were taught the concept of self-construction and threats to self-construction; most 
clients grasped the ideas fairly quickly. In the conflicts reported, the categorisation as to whether 
the conflict is an a or I or whatever was made by the client themselves. In some cases, the 
interviewer described the types of threats very carefully and the client said which (if any) applied 
to their situation (there were a number of situations where no category applied; see results). 
6.1.4.4 How the types of threat were used to build up sequences. 
The main aim of the interview is to elicit from the client an account of an entire 
emotional episode, usually a family conflict, defined as any interactive incident between 
themselves and one or more members of the family (usually a parent) or peer group, in which the 
client feels significantly distressed. A wide range of conflicts were reported, and an attempt was 
made to get something in each of the following categories- an important issue with parents, a 
day-to-day repetitive issue with parents, a issue from with their friends, a symptoms issue, a 
romantic issue. Some clients did not talk about family issues; however after a lengthy 
engagement process it usually became clear that there were issues, but the client was reluctant to 
disclose them for whatever reasons. For example, some clients initially claimed to never feel 
uncomfortable in their relationships with their parents, and yet spent the best part of their day 
avoiding their parents at all costs. Obviously clients were not coerced and were free not to talk; 
clients were also continually reassured that they were free to discontinue the interviews at any 
point, an option some chose. It was important during engagement that it was essentially client- 
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led, and that they felt able to talk freely and be supported; the interviewers were careful not to 
put words in the client's mouth. For example, it was also important that the client felt able to 
contradict and disagree with the interviewer should the need arise. 
The interview is designed to assist the client in reconstructing the `story' of the incident, 
from the point where he started to feel an emotional reaction, to the moment he judged the 
incident ended. The account usually starts with: 
-a description of an event, e. g. a critical comment by the other, 
- the client's emotional and behavioural reaction, e. g. anger and a critical counter-retort, 
and 
- his appraisals of the event which mediate the emotional and behavioural reaction. 
This `first sequence' is then followed by another, in which the client is asked to describe: 
- the other's reaction to his actual or imagined behaviour, e. g. an escalation of criticism, 
- his emotional and behavioural reaction, e. g. an escalation of anger and angry 
behaviour, 
and 
-a second set of mediating beliefs. 
There may be a third, fourth or even fifth sequence, each linked to the preceding one to make a 
complex chain. 
The framework for the interview is the ABC (Activating event, Belief, Consequence 
[emotional and behavioural]) method from REBT, but modified in a number of ways (guidelines 
and an assessment form for the interview are given in appendix D). 
The client is asked for the initial emotional reaction they experienced at the beginning of 
the selected incident. Key aspects of the emotional response are then explored (noted under C for 
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Consequence). Clients identify the general emotion or mood they experienced (the 
phenomenological aspect) including anger, anxiety or depression/ dysphoria (see Figure 6.1 for a 
map of the interview results sheet; the emotion is identified as item 1 on this figure). Second the 
client is asked for a specific emotion within the general mood such as guilt, shame, hurt, grief, 
etc. ) (see Dryden, 1990, for a list of key emotions). This specific emotion (item 2 in figure 6.1) 
may be experienced currently (I feel ashamed) as would often be the case in anxiety. Third the 
client identifies the emotional impulse- the behaviour that they felt they impulsively wanted to 
carry out at the time, such as aggression in anger, or avoidance or escape in anxiety (item 3). 
Finally the client is asked to report whether this is an actual or inhibited behavioural impulse 
(item 4), 
The triggering event that set the emotional reaction off is asked for, and key aspects of 
this noted, particularly verbal or non-verbal communications by the significant other towards the 
client (These are noted under A for activating event; item 5). 
The next part of the interview is concerned with the client's beliefs (B) about the 
activating event (A) which cause the emotional and behavioural responses at C. Beliefs are 
divided into those that constitute the appraisal (or evaluation) of the event and those that 
constitute the coping response to the event- a distinction borrowed from Lazarus (1992). The 
three main appraisal beliefs are the three person evaluations- other-to-self (what the other thinks 
of me; item 6), self to-self (what I think of me; item 7) and self-to-other (what I think of the 
other; item 8) (Trower, Chadwick and Dagnen, in press). The questioning begins with the first of 
these- the client's appraisal of the other person's explicit or implicit evaluation of him- and 
continues to the second and third. A number of other measures are taken such as conviction level 
in the beliefs, and `negativity' (in a sense the badness potency of the evaluation; item 9). The 
coping response beliefs are those beliefs that define the actions that the client wants to take, 
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given the appraisal of the event and their emotional reaction to it. The first of these beliefs 
concerns the emotional goal (item 10). For example, the emotional goal for anger, given a 
negative appraisal, may be to stop, coerce or discredit the other. Finally the action beliefs are 
rated (item 11) for whether they are something the client feels they want to do for themselves, or 
whether they are something they feel they ought to do for others (Higgins, 1987)), the intensity 
with which they want this goal (item 12), and the discomfort experienced if they fail (item 13). 
Although each sequence has the ABC structure, all sequences subsequent to the first are 
`chained' to the one before, in that the behavioural C of the previous sequence becomes new A 
of the next. This can happen in two ways: 
First the client may report carrying out a behavioural C, (e. g. getting aggressive such as 
throwing cups, shouting), which become the first part of the A for the next sequence. The client 
reports the other's reaction to their aggression, and his reaction becomes the second part of the 
new A. The interviewer explores the emotional and behavioural Consequences to this new 
A, 
and finally the appraisal and coping response beliefs. 
Second, the client may report that they inhibited their behavioural 
impulse at C, (e. g. they 
had an impulse to be aggressive, but inhibited this behaviour). In this case the client 
is asked to 
imagine carrying out the inhibited aggressive behaviour as the new 
A in an imaginary ABC 
sequence. The client reports how he imagines the other would have reacted 
(second part of the 
A), how he would have felt and behaved at C, and what appraisal and coping response 
beliefs he 
would have had at B. 
The final sequence in the chain is the one in which the client judges that the episode 
comes to an end. In truth, sequences have no ends and no beginnings- actual conflicts 
have 
histories of preceding sequences that set the scene, and following sequences 
that set the 
conditions for the next conflict. 
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Results 
The first part of the results section details the self-reported accounts of all the conflicts 
selected by the 21 participants. The second part of the results shows the findings from the 
questionnaire data. The third and final part contains a more interpretative account, looking for 
themes within the data and using individual cases to illustrate these themes. All names and other 
such identifying details have been changed to preserve anonymity of the participants. 
6.2 Results part I- All conflicts 
In all 50 conflicts were recorded. Each conflict starts with an engagement between client 
and a significant other, (real or imagined) and ends with disengagement. Each conflict also has 
an internal structure, consisting of a linked series of between 2 and 5 sequences, each of which in 
turn consists of a sequence of activating events, beliefs, and emotional and behaviour 
consequences - the ABC structure as described in the method section. 
Each conflict contains 
within it a `difficulty' in self-construction, and the descriptions show the unfolding process of 
this difficulty. The results and interpretations will be presented sequence by sequence, beginning 
with the first and continuing through the last, in a way that tracks the unfolding process. Parental 
conflicts and peer conflicts appeared to be substantially different and so these are considered 
separately as we go through the results. 
6.2.1 First sequence 
The first sequence encompasses the interpersonal events that mark the opening of the 
conflict (the Activating events or As), the appraisals of those events (the Beliefs or Bs) and the 
emotional and behavioural consequences (the Cs) that follow from the Bs, given the 
As. The 
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first sequence therefore captures the first, immediate impact of and response to the other's 
behaviour. 
6.2.1.1 Activating Events. (The `facts' as perceived by the client) 
There is substantial confirmation of the well-established finding from the expressed 
emotion literature that the conflicts are initiated primarily by actual and/or perceived critical or 
hostile communications. Table 6.2.2.1 lists the activating events that start the conflicts, and 
range from seemingly innocuous requests like "make us a cup of tea" through to "policeman and 
father coming up the fire escape and grabbing me by the arms". To give an overall impression of 
what types of scenarios were involved, two raters agreed (kappa= 0.81) that: approximately 16 
incidents were the other being critical, 6 were the other being hostile and I was them being 
emotionally over-involved. Six were the client showing annoyance, 4 were neutral, 2 positive, 4 
being ignored, 2 shame, and 7 were a demand from the other. This confirms an original 
expectation, that key conflicts reported by the clients would provide specific, concrete examples 
that would exemplify (for example) the high expressed emotion assessed in a general way by the 
Camberwell Family Interview. 
6.2.1.2 Consequences (emotional and behavioural) 
This section reports the emotions and behaviours that clients reported in response 
to the actions by the significant other that started the conflict. These are also shown in table 
6.2.1.2 (on the same sheet as table 6.2.1.1). The main finding here from parental conflicts is that 
a majority (79%) involved the client getting angry in response to the activating event, usually 
intensely so (average of 7.5). Of this group, just over half (52%) also wanted to shout something 
angrily. However this was inhibited in all but 2 cases (88%). 
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Only 42% of peer conflicts show clients reporting anger (5/12); in these none actually 
expressed their anger behaviourally, although two did resolve not to have anything to do with 
their friends again. 
The finding that there was a lot of anger in parental conflicts is consistent with the notion 
of the existential imperative, which would predict some degree of annoyance/anger and 
assertive/aggressive intent as the immediate normal response to the thwarting of self 
construction. Evidence for this was obtained with a non-clinical group of first year psychology 
undergraduate students in a parallel study to this one, where the majority (91%) of students 
responded with irritation or annoyance to criticism (Huber, 1997). The clients responded with 
roughly the same level of anger as the students (both had an average anger intensity of 8). 
Students also inhibited their aggressive impulses, but to a lesser degree- 61% of students 
inhibited their impulses, compared with 83% of clients. Students also expressed a more 
moderate and appropriate level of assertion. 
A small percentage did not get angry. It may be that these clients did not have any anger 
at all, or that they were not admitting to it. Clients generally found it very difficult to report their 
anger, depending on whether or not they anticipated being judged critically for it; in some cases 
there was even a fear that they would get their medication increased, or perhaps be sectioned. 
Certainly client reluctance to report anger can explain why their anger is so often overlooked. 
The fact that clients found anger so difficult was due to an inhibitory process, the nature of 
which is uncovered in the analyses. 
6.2.1.3 Beliefs (primary and secondary) 
Thus far results show that a majority of clients respond angrily or with aggressive but 
inhibited impulse to perceived criticisms or hostile or indifferent communications. However to 
gain an understanding of the psychological mechanism - in particular whether this really 
is a 
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response to a thwarting of the existential imperative - it is necessary to examine the types of 
beliefs; these are shown in table 6.2.1.3. 
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Almost the entire sample (92%) perceive the other (other-self) as communicating a 
negative evaluation of one form or another. A majority were classic put-downs, defining the 
client as bad or flawed in some way (a-) but about a third were interpreted as coercions to fulfil, 
and thereby be defined by, a menial role which, to the relative and outside observers (for 
example, staff) would be seen as evaluatively neutral or even positive (a or (X+), and thus the 
patient's interpretation would be regarded as surprising or simply paranoid. The other's 
evaluation of themselves was not endorsed (self-self evaluation) by the majority of clients 
(55%), though this majority group did think that the negative evaluation was "potentially" true. 
However, 61 % also express critical put-downs ((x-) of the other (self-other). The interpretation is 
that these data reveal an anger-driven defence of the self, (shown by the clients' refusals to 
endorse these evaluations) against a perceived threat to the desired self or imposition of the 
undesired self (Markus and Nurius, 1986). In other words they attempt to protect their desired 
self and reject the undesired self. It is important to show the connection to A and C thus: A 
picture emerges in which clients, driven by the existential imperative, (I) perceive the other as 
rejecting or indifferent to their desired self and/or imposing an undesired self (negative other- 
self), (ii) mirror the rejection, indifference and/or negative labelling of the other and thereby 
attempt to discredit them as evaluators (negative self-other) and thereby (iii) protect their 
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6.2.1.4 Interpretation 
The first sequence shows the participants perceived threat to, and attempt to defend the 
constructed self (i. e. paralleling Bentall's concept of attributional biases as evidence of 
psychological defence; Bentall, Kinderman and Kaney, 1994). The angry response, rejection of 
criticism, and externalising of negative evaluation (external attribution) are consistent with the 
notion of the existential imperative - the psychological motive to have the desired self affirmed 
(constructed) and the undesired self disaffirmed (deconstructed). The first sequence, primarily 
exemplifies the operation of the existential imperative. 
6.2.2 Second sequence 
The second sequence starts where the first left off, that is, the consequence (C) of the first 
sequence is the activating event (A) for the second. It might be expected that the second 
sequence should embrace a second line of defence of the desired self if the first has not been 
successful. As shall be seen, there were two quite different types of second sequence - those 
reporting actual events, beliefs and consequences, and those reporting imagined events, beliefs 
and consequences. 
6.2.2.1 Activating events 
The two types of second sequence (actual/ imagined) are immediately apparent in two 
types of activating events: those actual responses of the other when the client actually responded 
impulsively, and those responses of the other anticipated if they had not inhibited their impulse 
(table 6.2.2.1). Plainly, there was a large discrepancy in the majority of cases (89%) between 
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6.2.2.2 Consequences 
The `existential imperative' having been thwarted in sequence 1, most clients had strong 
impulses to do something about this, but in the second sequence the majority do not in fact 
respond. What stops them acting are strong feelings of anxiety at C, in both parent and peer 
conflicts, (especially in peer conflicts). The anxieties are listed, along with the other emotional 
responses, in table 6.2.2.3 (on the same page as table 6.2.2.2). Most of the anxious consequences 
are the imagined results of purely imagined assertive action. It is interesting to point out that the 
only 2 `happy' emotional outcomes are from the only two real instances of acting upon the 
initial self-affirming urges. It is also apparent why so few clients actually act self-affirmingly- 
they are anxious about what might happen. 
6.2.2.3 Beliefs 
The form of these anxieties becomes clearer when the Beliefs behind the emotional 
consequences are considered (table 6.2.2.2). 70% of clients held beliefs that could 
be considered 
as catastrophic. It seems that the people who inhibited their angry 
impulses did so because they 
were scared of having their self constructed in an unpleasant way if they expressed their anger. 
The majority of clients not only felt that it would be unpleasant, but actually expected the results 
to be catastrophic. Those expected outcomes that we would rate as catastrophes are marked 
in 
bold in table 6.2.2.4; one or two of these outcomes may not immediately appear to 
be 
catastrophes but are when the client is known- for example, Sandra, feels that to be seen as a tart 
(in her second conflict, with her peers) is the worst thing that could happen to 
her. It is also 
interesting that 5/6 clients who showed guilt as their second sequence C showed a 
Self-Other 
belief that viewed the other positively; their guilt appears to reflect a 
belief of having wronged 
someone virtuous. 
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6.2.2.4 Second sequence interpretation 
Taken as a whole, the second sequence shows that many clients have enormous fears of 
impending catastrophes which they feel may occur if they were to act on their existential 
imperative urges. Even without catastrophe, all but a few of the clients experience anxiety 
provoking beliefs are around themes of having their self constructed in an unpleasant way, and 
loss of social support. These beliefs therefore are consistent with the idea of the `moral 
imperative'. It seems as if the moral imperative stymies the existential imperative, with the effect 
that the existential imperative is driven elsewhere. So what is the result of this `double-bind'? 
6.2.3 Third sequence 
In what was predominantly the final sequence, clients told how they actually acted and 
how it left them feeling. 67% of participant's conflicts went to a third conflict; on the whole 
these were the people who had an imaginary 2nd sequence. 
6.2.3.1 Activating events 
The Activating Events of the third sequence were how the client actually responded at 
the time of the conflict. In most cases, what clients actually did was nothing. In table 0,82% 
showed submissive or appeasing withdrawal responses, where the client apparently did what was 
required of them by the other, or remained motionless. 
6.2.3.2 Consequences 
Table 6.2.3.1 also shows how clients were left feeling at the end of the episode. It is 
interesting to note that the majority of the clients whose conflicts went to a third sheet felt 
depressed (62%). Without the benefit of knowing what emotions and beliefs had gone before in 
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anhedonia, depression, withdrawal, apathy. This is the prevailing picture for most of the time 
(i. e. the first two sequences are over very quickly, the third sequence extends in time to hours 
possibly days and is typically the `presenting' picture). In these situations, the final feelings 
make more sense when the beliefs which are driving them are known. 
6.2.3.3 Beliefs 
Again to understand the link between A and C it is necessary to look at B, and B here for 
65% of clients is typically of being useless and impotent. In other words they interpret their own 
submission as helplessness and are forced to finally endorse the negative self construction. The 
remaining 35% were left with the more extreme belief that they were bad people as a result of 
the submission and withdrawal. 
6.2.3.4 Third sequence interpretation 
In most situations the client did not construct their desired self because of the fear of being 
reconstructed in extremely negative terms and ended up submitting to the lesser of two evils - 
submitting to the alien definition of self which they so angrily wanted to resist. Having 
being 
thwarted in their self-construction needs, and unable to do anything about this, they were 
left 
feeling depressed and, in their eyes, valueless selves. In effect, not being able to throw off the 
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6.2.3.5 Whole conflict interpretation: summary of main themes 
The activating events cover a variety of situations, but with the REBT paradigm, it is 
possible to make useful comparisons between conflicts in terms of the underlying beliefs and 
emotions. Conflicts can usefully be described in terms of self-constructions, failures and 
defences. As the initial conflict was to do with either ignoring the client's self- presentation, or 
steam-rollering it into an alien and unpalatable form, then the end product of the first sequence 
was the resultant angry and self-assertive urge, the "existential imperative". 
However very few clients actually acted on this impulse, and therefore could not 
construct a desired or even more bearable self thereby. For the vast majority of clients there was 
an overwhelming fear of the consequences of self-affirming action; the consequences were all 
along the lines of being reconstructed as a terrible person and thereby losing one's social 
support, often to a catastrophic extent. The catastrophes were far more extreme than anything 
found in the brief student comparison study (Huber, 1997). 
In the final sequence, therefore, the client was prevented from taking overt defensive 
action, and hence the majority were on the whole blocked from self construction, trapped in an 
alien construction and consequently depressed. They also showed - as the pathway to this fate - 
submissive and avoidant behaviours, of a sort which have been thought to be partially 
characteristic of post- acute schizophrenia. A conventional psychiatric view of this data would 
be that the clients are showing that particular manifestation of the underlying illness that 
commonly emerges after recovery from an acute episode and which is marked by negative 
symptoms and depression. However putting two of the findings together- that conflicts are 
initiated by abrasive communications and end with depression/ dysphoria- an alternative and 
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more psychological picture appears, namely that patients get depressed because of the style of 
communications and the calamitous self-constructions, and not because of any underlying 
illness. ) 
6.2.3.6 Function of the conflict as a whole 
As a whole the conflicts generally represent a type of entrapment in which clients cannot 
self construct, either because they feel coerced into either abandoning the struggle for self 
construction or accepting an alien self imposed upon them or both. Most of these conflicts are 
either frequently occurring or infrequent `defining moment' occurrences which set the precedent 
and pattern for future interactions. As such, a sense arises of how such conflicts perpetuated on a 
larger time scale could certainly contribute to the emergence of `negative symptoms'- apathy, 
withdrawal, and anhedonia were all amongst the majority of end-products. 
What is more surprising is the thwarting of the self-constructions themselves, and the 
alien selves sometimes taken on by clients (under perceived duress) also contribute to symptoms, 
but this time to the creation of the `positive symptoms'. Section 6.5 looks for themes within the 
individual clients and reports in a more qualitative manner, using specific single cases to 
speculate about the formation of positive symptoms. Initially the issue of repression of anger and 
self-construction needs is considered, which looks more closely at those clients who are similar 
on these scores. Other clients do not have problems expressing anger, in fact they almost have a 
problem with being too angry; in these cases, the moral imperative seems to be the one awry. 
Finally some clients never get angry at all; these clients are then considered. Similarly, some of 
the conflicts were around specific themes and also contribute useful insights into those areas. A 
number of such themes are considered including symptom issues- relating to voices and 
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delusional characters, experiences of reference, and romantic issues, as another important area 
that is often overlooked. Before this, the data from the questionnaires are considered in the next 
section, to see what evidence they provide to show that the trends and instances reported here are 
in fact typical patterns and fit into the wider ongoing context of the relationships the client has 
with parents and peers. 
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6.3 Results part II 
Quantitative data. 
All 21 clients filled in most scales. A number of data-points were missing, for instance 
some clients did not have both parents, and therefore the PBI and Impact 
Inventory could only be used to assess the remaining parent. Other clients did not want their 
families interviewed, and so the LEE was used to judge EE instead of the CFI. It is probably this 
that causes the CFI and the LEE to be so poorly correlated, as can be seen in Table 6.3 which 
shows the intercorrelations between the various scales used. In all, 29 sub-scale categories were 
used, and each sub-scale was therefore compared to 28 other subscales. This means that a large 
number of comparisons were made, and that (statistically speaking), one in twenty of them could 
be expected to be significant by chance alone. Using a bonferroni correction on such a large 
number of comparisons is not practicable, as only five of the observed significant results can be 
said to be there with confidence. Hence the results should be treated as purely preliminary, pilot 
data, indicative of potential trends that may be explored in future research. 
The CFI scale of Emotional Over-Involvement (EOI) correlated significantly with the 
LEE scale of Control, as would be expected because a high level of control is a major 
determinant of high EOI. Two measures were used to explore the relationship between self 
construction threat vulnerability and voices. The Beliefs about Voices questionnaire gives scores 
for whether the individual regards their voice(s) as malevolent or benevolent, and whether or not 
they resist any instructions their voice might give (obviously not all individuals heard voices). 
The Self and Other questionnaire measures whether a person is particularly vulnerable to either 
alienation or insecurity self construction threats. The prediction was that people who were 
particularly vulnerable to alienation threats were significantly more likely to rate their voice as 
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strongly malevolent, because they are used to seeing interactions as intrusive and undesired; this 
was indeed found to be the case. 
Three of the questionnaires were relationship measures- the Parental Bonding Instrument, 
the Impact Inventory and the Level of Expressed Emotion scale. As predicted, people who were 
vulnerable to alienation threats were significantly likely to see their parents as controlling and 
irritable (on the LEE), although they were also significantly likely to see their mothers as 
submissive (according to the Impact inventory), which was not expected. People who were 
vulnerable to insecurity threats were significantly likely to not see their fathers as friendly (on 
the Impact inventory) and to see both parents as over-protective (on the PBI). They also 
significantly did not see their parents as being emotionally unsupportive (on the LEE). 
To measure how unwell the client was currently, two symptom measures were used: the 
Manchester scale which is completed by the interviewer, and the SCL-52 which is completed by 
the client. It is interesting to note from table 6.3 that the two scales were not significantly 
correlated. Interviewers had doubts that the SCL-52 was particularly effective for measuring 
symptoms, because some clients who were plainly quite unwell gave themselves very low scores 
on this measure. 
The PBI as mentioned above refers to how the client saw their parents throughout the 
first 16 years of their life. The "Care" and "Over-protection" subscales of the PBI were 
significantly inversely correlated, which was expected - those parents who were seen as caring 
were not seen as over-protective and vice versa. In this study the PBI Over-protection scales 
were significantly inversely correlated with the Manchester scale symptoms rating. Non-voice 
hearers tended to be less unwell on the Manchester scale, unsurprisingly since there are only a 
few items on the Manchester scale and hearing of voices is one of them. 
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Perceptions of past parenting were consistent with how the client perceived their parent 
currently, as demonstrated by scores on the Impact inventory: Over-protection (PBI) significantly 
correlated with Maternal Dominance (Impact), and significantly but negatively correlated 
inversely with Paternal Friendliness (Impact). There was a level of consistency between how 
clients viewed both mother and father as there were signs that they tended to view them 
similarly- mother and father measures of Care on the PBI correlated significantly, as did mother 
and father Dominance and Hostility measures on the Impact inventory. The few people who 
heard benevolent voices also significantly endorsed maternal hostility (Impact). Paternal care 
was linked negatively with Over-protection (PBI) and maternal hostility (Impact). 
To tie the measures of the current relationship in with the EE paradigm, the LEE was 
used, as a self-report questionnaire version of the CFI. There was some correlation between the 
LEE and the impact inventory, as two measures of the current relationship. Both Dominant and 
Submissive mothers were significantly seen as controlling and irritable on the LEE. (Within the 
LEE, Control and Irritability were significantly correlated, suggesting a degree of overlap 
between these sub- scales. ) Surprisingly, friendly fathers were seen as significantly unsupportive 
and not very good at helping with matters to do with being ill. 
6.3.1 Discussion 
The sample size is small, and the validity of the results is brought into question because 
there are a large number of comparisons, therefore it is unwise to read too much into these 
results. There is however, preliminary support for the main themes of the study in these data. In 
this study the PBI Over-protection scales were significantly inversely correlated with the 
Manchester scale symptoms rating, suggesting perhaps that clients valued parental involvement 
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when they were ill but found it annoying when they were more well. That client's perceptions of 
the parenting they received vary with how ill they are currently suggests that great caution is 
needed in interpreting PBI scores in studies using a psychotic group. 
As predicted, people who were prone to alienation-type threats were likely to see their 
parents as controlling and irritable. Similarly, they were likely to see their voices as malevolent; 
this is interesting because it agrees with other current studies which have suggested that the way 
people relate to their family is very similar to and indicative of the way they relate to their 
voices. Birchwood, Meaden, Gilbert and Trower (1998) have shown that people who saw 
themselves as low rank in their interactions with their families also saw themselves as low rank 
in relation to their voices. Hence here it sounds like people who feel intruded upon and alienated 
by their family members also feel intruded upon and alienated by their voices. People who 
endorsed worries such as "If I'm getting too much attention it can feel like I'm being taken over" 
were also likely to say "My voice is persecuting me for no good reason" or that "my voice 
frightens me". 
People who saw their mothers as submissive tended to be highly vulnerable to alienation 
threats; possibly they were similarly submissive themselves? Submissive mothers were also 
linked to high EOI scores, as was dominance in mothers and control in both parents. Only two 
clients had particularly over-involved mothers (rated as 4 or over on the CFI), and both these 
clients rated their mothers as both dominant and submissive. This surprising result seems to 
illustrate some of the confusion within psychosis-sufferers as to how to relate to EOI parents 
who have both submissive and domineering traits, and perhaps indicates why high EOI is so 
deleterious for clients. The two cases here are described in more detail as part of the next 
section, under the names of Den and Imran. 
As predicted, individuals who scored highly on vulnerability to insecurity threats (S&O) 
were likely to see their fathers as unfriendly (Impact). Against prediction, they were also likely to 
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see both parents as over-protective (PBI); closer examination of the data revealed that for a large 
sub-group this was because they tended to have argued with their parents and moved out, and 
now lived in semi-isolation on their own. In a few cases, isolation-prone clients lived at home 
and were very dependent on their parents, needing instruction to do virtually anything, as if their 
parents were the originators of their selves. Furthermore, they seemed to massively resent their 
parents role somehow, presumably because of the absence of their own self-construction needs 
being met (hence both the isolation and over-protection scores); this resentment is studied in 
greater detail in the next section. Clients who showed low scores on insecurity vulnerability 
indicated their parents were unlikely to take their illness seriously and were fairly demanding 
(LEE; lack of support). It seems that fairly intrusive demands on the clients to perform acts they 
may not want to do may actually insulate the clients against loneliness and isolation. 
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Results Part III 
6.4 Qualitative Account of Themes for Individual Clients 
The results reported previously using the data from the ABC interview compared the 
underlying fundamental beliefs held by clients across a number of situations (section 6.3). In this 
section, clients are grouped by themes, each illustrated with prototypical case studies, including 
biographical information and symptom profiles. In looking for themes in the way clients 
functioned in terms of the self construction process, two broad groups appeared. In the first, 
majority grouping, despite wide variation between individuals, there was a broad theme of 
inhibition of self construction. In the second grouping there was an opposite theme of 
uninhibited self construction. 
6.4.1 Inhibited Self: Anger Held In 
As we saw in section 6.3, the largest group of clients (12/ 21) felt they could never get 
angry because they were too scared of the consequences. Since anger appears to be driven by 
thwarting of the existential imperative, it is proposed that this group are characterised by 
inhibition of self construction, because of fear of consequences. Some of these clients would 
rarely express anger, and when they did it was in tended to be in an extreme form, almost a 
rampage. The illustrative case studies that follow are described using a particular structure: how 
the client presented at first interview, then the content of their conflict with their parents. Some 
information about the parents from the CFI completes the dyadic picture, and finally the client's 
symptoms are described. This is followed by an interpretative summary of all the inhibited self 
cases (table 0) 
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6.4.1.1 David 
6.4.1.2 Presentation 
David presented as an affable white twenty-four year old dressed as a skinhead. He had 
been unwell for 6 years and was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia (ICD-10; 
section F20.0). He left school aged 16 and attended a local agricultural college for a year; he 
later worked in an abattoir for a year. He was first admitted to hospital aged 21, has had 4 re- 
admissions since then and has been unemployed since his first episode. He was the youngest 
child of three and lives with his Mum and Dad. 
6.4.1.3 Family Background 
From the Camberwell Family Interview, David's mother was rated as High EE. She was 
really very critical of him ("he really is bone-idle", "he is the most selfish person"), scoring 16 
for Critical Comments and 1 for Hostility (generalisation of criticism from one-off instances to 
long-standing character traits). Both of these scores qualify for a rating of high EE. She scored 2 
for Emotional Over-Involvement (this would be low EE, as the cut-off point for high EE is 3 on 
this scale; however, she was already rated as high EE on the basis of her critical comments and 
hostility scores); although she prompted him to do things a lot, and felt sure he couldn't exist 
without her, she fully accepted his right to his own life and to do independent things such as 
leave home (eventually). She rated as 3 for warmth, and 3 for positive comments, which are not 
used in the rating of EE. 
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6.4.1.4 Conflict 
In conflict 1, David was asked by his Mum to make a cup of tea (Activating event or point A), 
and that the request was made in such a way that he took angry exception to this (Consequence 
or point Q. David was angry because although his mum liked him in this role as dutiful son, he 
felt he was being treated like a slave (Belief or point B, coded a+), a self construction which he 
far from endorsed. Therefore his action impulse was to refuse to do such a thing and `tell her to 
piss off' (point Q. However, when he imagined the consequences of this in a second sequence, 
he experienced anxiety (point C), because he predicted that if he told her to `piss off', she would 
define him as a bad person (point B, coded (x-). If this imaginary outcome actually happened, he 
would have largely endorsed this definition (actual = 4/10; potential= 9/10), and he would have 
experienced shame (9). Hence in reality, in order to avoid this traumatic reincarnation, in the 
third and final sequence he said nothing and did as he was told (point A). Consequently, David 
felt depressed (point C) because he was trapped in a construction of himself which was 
demeaning and which by now he fully endorsed (10/10): `She's pleased but it sticks in my 
throat' (point B, coded (x+). 
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6.4.1.5 Symptoms 
David's symptoms on acute admission included command hallucinations, episodic severe 
depression and suicidal urges, and ideas of reference. His voices were mainly expressing anger at 
his Mum, and others, sometimes commanding him to kill others, but also to kill himself, because 
`everyone is against me'. There were periods of aggression, during one of which he was retained 
at a secure unit. At that time he kept a collection of knives, and there were also an incident when 
he trashed the late-night garage where his parents had got him a job. At other times he felt 
ashamed for this behaviour and became very low. At these times David was severely depressed, 
and was hospitalised after a number of suicide attempts. David's history then showed an 
oscillation between anger and aggression on the one hand, and low self esteem and depression 
on the other. The interpretation is that the command hallucinations function as a kind of 
`solution' in allowing him to express the existential imperative (to be the person he wanted to 
be, i. e. macho) that was being thwarted by the moral imperative in his interactions with his 
mother, and which he was too anxious to express directly. In other words, the voice enabled him 
to be macho without the normal consequences. The conflict analysis described above and 
summarised in Table 6.4.1 helps to uncover the entrapment that David experiences and the role 
that the command hallucinations may play in `resolving' the conflict. 
6.4.1.6 Den 
6.4.1.7 Presentation 
Dennis was 19, and had been diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia with 
his first 
hospitalisation occurring only a few months ago. He became overtly unwell as he left school and 
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started working in a butcher's shop. He had also experimented with drugs such LSD and 
Ecstasy, but reported he was `losing it' before that. At interview, Den presented as being very 
meek, shy and `small', despite being a heavily built person; if anything his behaviour was 
reminiscent of a small child. He lived with his Mum and younger brother. 
6.4.1.8 Family Background 
Prior to his first acute episode, Den spent most of his time with his mates, experimenting 
with drugs and hardly ever at home. At this time his Mum felt she had "lost" him. After the 
acute episode this situation markedly changed and Den became very dependent on his mother. 
During the CFI, she expressly said that "I feel I have my 12 year old back, that I lost years ago. 
I've got my son back, and he's lovely. He's nothing like the child he was before, he was so self- 
centred and... obviously I don't want him as he is, but now he's so loving, so concerned. He was 
never concerned about anyone before. And this is what I always believed was inside him. 
Although it's really painful to see -I could cry sometimes, just weep and weep - I'm like a 
mother hen with him now, like he's 12 years old again". Whereas the self Den wanted for 
himself was trendy, fairly macho, unconventional and independent, the self his Mum wanted for 
him was of a good boy who respected and looked up to his mother. She rated for high EE on 
critical comments (scored 13: critical of nearly everything he initiates), Hostility (rated 1: 
generalisation of criticism: e. g. "He does nothing, now, absolutely nothing. I can't even get him 
to wash up after tea. ") and Emotional Over-Involvement (rated 5: dramatising, self-sacrificing 
behaviour "there's no point me getting a job", "I say to him- `yours isn't the only life ruined by 
this you know, Den"', wants to do everything for Den and knows everything he wants). She also 
scored a number of positive comments (3) and warmth (3). Of this conflict situation, she said "it 
was a real battle to make him do anything. It was a real shouting match". 
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6.4.1.9 Conflict 
In his first conflict (conflict 2), Den reported an incident in which his Mum attempted to 
get him to get up, to get him to the hospital gym. He felt that he hadn't slept very well that night 
and did not want to get up (he liked to sleep a lot, and when he did get up he would mostly sleep 
in front of the TV). He said he resisted his Mum's attempts to get him up, until she got angry 
with him. In terms of the ABC sequence, in sequence I he says she urged him to get up, 
appealing to his sense of the moral imperative, that he ought to get up (point A). He felt that 
although she wanted him to be a `good boy', he would find it as being a silly kid (point B, code 
(X+). He himself certainly rejected this demeaning definition of himself (self self: 1/10), and felt 
really angry (point C: rated 8/ 10). Yet the second sequence showed that he felt very anxious 
about his angry impulses (point C), because he imagined (at point A) that if he acted on his anger 
his mum would get even more angry and label him as a little shit (point B; code (X-). He would 
largely accept this definition of himself (rating 8/ 10), and would have felt great shame (rating 
10/ 10). This anticipated consequence was what caused such anxiety, and because of this Den 
got up and did as she wanted. Finally, in sequence 3 he felt very depressed (point C; rating 9/ 
10), because he had yielded to and become the "good little schoolboy" that he so despised. In 
sum, Den showed a very typical pattern of anger repression brought about by the anxiety he felt 
from how he imagined his assertive actions would go down. 
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It transpired that rebellious episodes such as this one happened every few months, and that 
usually he later become so ashamed of his earlier "outburst" (as defined by his Mum), that he set 
about "winning back her good opinion". He did this by doing things he thought his mother 
wanted him to- continuing from sequence 3 of conflict 2. Den was especially compliant and 
meek until he had another angry episode, which his Mum saw as a setback after a period in 
which he had been `doing so well'; as she said to him to override his anger "Den, I'm doing 
everything in my power to stop you becoming a vegetable". But why was Den so vulnerable to 
being defined as `bad'? The extent to which Den feels ashamed of himself if he incurs her wrath 
and how he spends months trying to win back her good opinion is unusual- if his behaviour is 
seen as typical of adolescents (Smetana, 1989), then it is only natural for people his age to be 
contrary and changeable and to exasperate their parents. It certainly should not be the cause of as 
much life-enveloping shame as it was. Den thought at these times that he was so worthless that 
everyone else was conspiring to sacrifice him to the devil. 
6.4.1.10 Symptoms 
Moral theme 
The power that Den's anxiety sequence had over him is apparent in his symptoms. At 
times he was convinced that he was bad, that everyone hated him and was intensely ashamed. 
Den was obsessed with the devil, and at times feared everyone else was in league with the devil 
and about to sacrifice him. He told of how, while sitting in a pub he had seen the Devil's face 
reflected in his pint glass, about to sacrifice him. He also saw people as having one red eye, 
which meant they were half in league with the Devil. At night he could hear people chanting 
(preparing an alter for him), and said "I could see hoofprints and smell the goat". Earlier we 
considered David who heard angry voices against his mother, which we interpreted as being due 
to the existential imperative for self assertion. In contrast to David, Den's hallucinations seemed 
Empirical Analysis of Dysfunction in Self Construction 175 
to come from his sense of the moral imperative. Hence many of his delusions and voices came 
from the idea that he was awful and deserved punishment. For Den, the moral imperative was to 
both avoid being labelled as bad, and thereby preserve the social support of his Mum, because he 
was very dependent on her; he had to a large extent lost contact with his friends and was scared 
of them (see later). One function of the delusions was to squash any actions that might jeopardise 
her continued mirroring and validation. 
Existential theme 
Incongruent with Den's anxiety and shame behaviour was a story his mother told of a 
terrifying physical assault where Den actually threatened her with knives and picked her up by 
the throat (she weighed about 18 stone at this time). On this occasion, Den was speaking in a 
way that suggests he felt he had been taken over by the Devil. At interview, the most he would 
say about this was that it was something he feared; he was reluctant to talk about times when he 
got angry, but this incident suggests that he did have much anger. There is too little evidence to 
do more than speculate, but it is plausible that at this time he felt he had been taken over by the 
devil, and that this could be driven by his existential imperative. Den's existential imperative to 
self-assert therefore refuses to be quashed and manifests itself in hostility towards his mother 
and psychotic episodes along the themes of the devil. One might wonder why this might happen, 
but as Homey (1950) said, "There is simply nothing that may not be invested with pride... One 
person is proud of being rude to people, another is ashamed of anything that constitued as 
rudeness. " (p93). It would seem unavoidable that a purpose of these themes would be to give 
him a tolerable level of power against his Mum. Den's Mum gave him a lot of consideration 
(in 
fact bent over backwards to accommodate him) when he was in this psychotic episode. 
In his 
role as the devil, he was very abusive, insulting and demanding; at one point he insisted she stay 
with him at all times. His Mum had to really wheedle him to be allowed out of the house. 
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The conflict shows that in the final sequence, Den was left feeling thwarted and 
impotent. This was reflected in his long term behaviour, because he withdrew as much as he 
could from interaction with his mum, although he didn't want her to know that he was 
withdrawing from the interactions because that too would be a source of shame (he preferred to 
be up at night, when there are no people about). If one was unaware of the power struggles 
involved, this social withdrawal, anhedonia, depression and perhaps `bizarre behaviour' could 
only be explained by a disease model. But the alternative propsed here is that it is the entrapment 
created by the conflict of the imperatives, revealed in the analysis of the sequences, sequences 
and the subsequent thwarting of Den's efforts to construct a viable self that bring these 
behaviours about. 
6.4.1.11 Discussion 
These two cases are representative of a number of clients in that all these clients felt 
thwarted in their self-construction urges and yet repressed their anger. In table 6.4.1,12 clients 
who fitted this pattern are shown, with an abbreviated account of their conflicts. An attempt is 
also made in each case to show a functional link to symptoms. This group all follow the same 
theme in that they repressed their angry impulses to assert themselves because of their sense of 
the moral imperative. As mentioned in the previous section, in many cases the moral imperative 
took the form of fearing catastrophic consequences, an especially common worry for clients (for 
example for Imran and Den, being chucked out of the house or sacrificed to the devil). The 
anxieties they experienced led them to feel trapped and unable to pursue their self-construction 
needs. As a result they acted submissively, allowing themselves to be constructed by the other, 
and they felt depressed. The anger repressed in these instances is driven underground, 
but it 
doesn't just disappear; instead it seems to reappear in symptoms. 
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For example, David (and possibly Den) heard voices expressing hostility towards their 
parents. Such voices might be described as malevolent (Chadwick and Birchwood, 1996), but a 
closer examination reveals that much of their malevolence was directed at their mothers or other 
people they felt controlled and defined by. In this context, even malevolent voices might be seen 
as supportive, if they are serving a need. Den heard voices that were hostile and critical of 
himself, which seem to partially reflect the moral imperative (i. e. their guilt and anxiety for 
asserting himself) and a need for some sort of mirroring of his self (as if the anger from sequence 
1 gets directed at himself, to stop him being ignored and unconstructed). The methodology 
would perhaps need refining to take this aspect into account. 
Most people will be able to empathise with the unstoppable nature of unexpressed anger, 
as most people will have had the experience of coming away from an argument and finding 
themselves ruminating about all the good argument lines that they wish they had thought of at 
the time, perhaps even saying them out loud or acting them out. (Bentall et al, 1994). In fact this 
`rehearsal' is a popular coping strategy in normal people, for dealing with stress (Roger and 
Najarian, 1989). Rehearsal and efficacy of emotional coping have been shown to be positively 
correlated (Roger and Schapals, 1996). If this is the form that anger can take in normal people, it 
should not be surprising that held-in anger could take the form of uncontrollable thoughts or 
voices or acting out behaviour. In this instance, such thoughts might be a coping strategy, as they 
are in normals! One possibility by which the thoughts might become voices was discussed earlier 
and would depend on the attitudes the client has towards their own thoughts (for example if they 
felt that it wasn't acceptable to think angry thoughts against their parents). In chapter 7 the 
hypothesis is examined (and support found for it) that clients who heard voices were more likely 
to think that they ought not think bad thoughts against their parents. This is especially pertinent 
given that many clients are suffering in a state of objectite, which entails a feeling of 
transparency in which the other may be aware of and judging a person's thoughts. 
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If it seems that even mild angry emotions would be followed by strong guilty and anxious 
thoughts, (perhaps self-critical ones like Imran's voices), then extremely angry thoughts would 
bring about intolerable guilt and anxiety, and yet the imperative is an unstoppable force. Hence 
the only way out for the client might be to attribute responsibility and ownership of the angry 
thoughts to something external to themselves. Furthermore, if the client's own anger is cause for 
shame, then clients might also vacillate from one emotion to the other (one imperative to the 
other) and back again, from anger to anxiety, in a self-perpetuating manner. 
People with Obsessive Compulsive disorder have the common experience where the 
more they try to repress intrusive thoughts, the more impossible such repression becomes and the 
more likely the thought is to be intrusive (see Salkovskis and Campbell, 1994). The same 
principle may apply here- if a client has an angry thought about their mother, they may try to 
repress it, and this very act of repression may make it worse. Whereas OCD people deal with the 
guilt (and responsibility) by elaborate ̀ rectifying' thought rituals or compulsive behaviours, the 
clients here do it by attributing the thought to an external voice. 
6.4.2 Clients who preferred not to talk about parents 
A sub-group of clients never once spoke remotely critically of their parents; in fact they 
carefully avoided bringing up any issue involving a parent. Because of this, there are no conflicts 
from them involving parents, although there are conflicts around other issues. Clients are 
perfectly within their rights to not want to talk about a personal area, and during interview we 
took care not to pressure anyone into talking about something they didn't want to. We are within 
our rights to speculate whether clients avoided parental topics because they chose not to, or were 
unable to countenance such topics. The reader must decide for themselves but our 
interpretation 
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is that the majority of this group are on a continuum with the inhibited self first group. The 
current group are almost completely defined by their moral imperative. The repression that 
comes out of the moral imperative cuts right into the core cognitions that underlie self- 
construction needs, to such an extent that they are ashamed of even having such thoughts about 
self-assertion. See chapter 7 for an exploration in a larger group of clients of beliefs about 
getting angry with parents and idealisation scores. 
In one of the previous examples, Den was very wary at first of expressing any criticism 
because he feared the interviewer being on the side of his mother. After much engagement he 
really opened up on these issues, and said how glad he was of the support. Given that the other 
clients needed such support to bring up parental issues, and that a feature of these parental 
conflicts was immense guilt and anxiety about ever thinking ill of their parents, it seems likely 
that there are similar inhibiting fears on the part of the clients who would not talk about parental 
issues. 
It is difficult to report any data on this, because by definition it is a lack of data, but we 
estimate around 5 out of the 20 clients did not say a word against their parents throughout the 
interviews, and this probably reflects their behaviour with their parents- they have never said a 
harsh word to their parents at all. We suspect this reflects an idealised view of their parents (as in 
chapter 4). For example, towards the end of our study, clients were asked to name 3 good points 
and 3 bad points of their parents. Of 5 clients asked, only two could name a single fault their 
parents had, one of which was leaving the top off the toothpaste. The others were utterly 
surprised that we should ask such a thing, because their parents were obviously beyond reproach. 
In the CFI, none of the parents seemed as perfect as their offspring thought, (as indeed the 
interviewers aren't! ). Jack's Dad seemed a very warm man, and yet when he found Jack drowsy 
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in their kitchen apologising for having just taken an overdose, all he (the father) could think of 
to say was how selfish Jack was to do this, and how he would never like him again after this, he 
would always hate him for it. Jack very unhappily told of how he sat in the ambulance, crying 
because he'd made his Dad hate him, and even 8 months later on, his main concern was 
worrying whether he would ever win back his father's good opinion; indeed this was the only 
aspect of the whole suicide attempt that he regretted). Jack's dad scored highly on warmth and 
positive comments in the CFI, and a son's attempted suicide must be unbearably stressful. Jack's 
Dad made a very understandable human, emotional response to the situation, but Jack did not 
have a sophisticated enough understanding of his Dad as a fallible human being to understand, 
and hence was far more hurt than he needed to be by the situation. Jack's primary symptoms 
were depression and grandiose delusions where he thought he was about to become "The Chosen 
One". 
6.4.3 Self Uninhibited: Anger Expressors 
Everyone is an anger repressor to some extent, as was found in the comparison study on 
students commented on earlier (Huber, 1997), but the clients above repress far more, and repress 
desired actions that most people would usually express. They suffer excruciating guilt and 
anxiety when they even think of standing up for themselves. At the other end of this continuum, 
there were 3 clients who had the opposite problem. They appear to experience no moral 
imperative whatsoever, and their existential expressivity appears to know no bounds. However 
this is clearly no solution as these clients probably have more severe problems and probably 
suffer more as a result of their marginalisation from family and peers. 
In the following example, Elizabeth acted on her anger, and although her reaction was 
perhaps extreme, the result for her was a feeling of happiness. However the down-side to such 
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behaviour was that Elizabeth, being generally quite an angry person, was in trouble for beating 
her 4 year old daughter. 
6.4.3.1 Elizabeth 
6.4.3.2 Presentation 
Elizabeth was 44 and had been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia since late 
adolescence. She had been in and out of various hospitals since her first acute episode at 21 and 
even living rough on the streets with her child for 2 years. She left school at 18 and studied hotel 
management at college. She was now in a much better state and hadn't been unwell for ages; she 
had been married for 13 years. She presented as affable but perhaps rather touchy. 
6.4.3.3 Family Background 
We never met Elizabeth's mother so we only have one side of this argument. Elizabeth 
had a very volatile relationship with her mother; in fact she had had cut her parents off to an 
extent, only having as much contact as she felt happy with. This situation worked well for 
Elizabeth, and she was very self-assertive, as is seen in conflict 3. Its tempting to see this as a 
blueprint for healthy expression of anger: although she was particularly nasty to her mother "I 
wish she was dead, I'd be better off and so would Gill", the second sheet seems like a much more 
satisfactory outcome than any of the others. In fact, this was one of the only conflicts with 
parents where the client expressed their anger- and Elizabeth really let rip with everything she 
felt- and said what they thought. The result was feeling happy (rating of 10), and beliefs of 
"Mum had to accept that I am a warm and caring person instead of just a machine who does what 
she's told; I Do matter". 
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6.4.3.4 Conflict 
In her conflict (conflict 3), Elizabeth described how her mother wrote her some letters 
talking about how Gill should be brought up (sequence 1, point A). The letters made her angry 
(point C) because she felt they were implying that she was no good at anything (point B). Her 
action of choice was to ring her mother up and tell her exactly what she felt, and this is what she 
did (sequence 2). Sequence 2 is the final sequence because Elizabeth felt really happy afterwards 
(point Q. "I felt I had really achieved something, I felt a lot better". "She had to accept I am a 
warm and caring person" (point B). 
6.4.3.5 Symptoms 
One of Elizabeth's main problems was really that she was too angry, too much of the 
time. Her symptoms were that she was very grandiose, and deluded; she felt she was very special 
and better than everyone else. She also suffered from paranoia and felt that people were out to 
get her, although she felt she hadn't really done much wrong. She heard a number of different 
types of voices, some of which were benevolent and others which were malevolent. They were 
usually voices of people she knew telling her secrets, advising her on what to do, and 
occasionally barracking her. She also heard God talking and saw signs from him in birds and 
cars, and on TV. 
She described how she felt that her 5 year old daughter Gill wasn't doing the things that 
she was suppose to do, and that she felt "I have to do all the work", and "She wasn't doing 
things quickly enough". She "shouted at Gill, slapped her and ripped things up" (in fact she beat 
Gill quite badly on a number of occasions and even lost custody of Gill). 
6.4.3.6 Discussion 
The small group of clients who fitted the category of being anger expressors were angry 
to an extent that was problematic. It seems therefore that there are problems with some clients 
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expressing themselves fully, and that some clients may be right to hold in their anger somewhat. 
These clients were typically poor-me clients, who were sure that they were OK, and that the 
problem lay in other people (Trower and Chadwick, 1995). In the next example, Mick was so 
prone to blaming others and demanding that others don't ignore him and must validate his 
grandiose self presentations that that he became a monstrous tyrant to his family. 
6.4.3.7 Mick 
6.4.3.8 Presentation 
Mick was 35 and had been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia since the age of 
20. He lost his job as a trainee train driver at this point when he was first hospitalised, and had 
been unemployed since. He had been in hospital only once and lived in supervised group hostels 
for a while. He now lived alone, living within walking distance of his parents. He presented as 
scruffily dressed, and as very confident and magnanimous. 
6.4.3.9 Family Background 
Mick's mother was rated as high EE, and presented as completely exhausted and at the 
end of her tether from Mick's abusive behaviour. The CFI was virtually an hour and a half list of 
horrible things he had done when he was being grandiose and abusive (for example, he said 
hurtful things like "I can't wait 'til you are dead so I can spit on your grave"; he had also 
threatened to kill her and had assaulted both her and her husband on a number of occasions; 
usually after one of his frequent heavy drinking sessions). On the CFI his mother was rated 
20 
for Critical Comments, 1 for Emotional Over-involvement, 2 for warmth and 3 for positive 
comments. Hostility was rated as 2, because of a rejecting attitude ("I dreaded coming 
home 
because I was so scared of him", "For 2 pins I'd have put a pillow over 
his face". His parents 
blamed the stress Mick caused for his father's quadruple heart bypass (although his father was 
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still a heavy smoker), and his mother's depression, and hearing them relate Mick's tyranny this 
didn't seem totally unreasonable. The only people that Mick would act in such a derogatory 
manner with were his Mum, Dad and sister; when he met other relatives or strangers he was very 
quiet, almost too shy to speak. When in the street, or during his times in hospital he would run 
everywhere to protect himself. 
6.4.3.10 Conflict 
In Mick's conflict (conflict 4), he put himself in an embarrassing position, where his 
Mum found out that he had been wearing his little girl cousin's lingerie (sequence 1: point A). 
Mick was upset about this (point C) because he felt "They would think I was a right dirty- 
minded little prat" (point B), although his actual endorsement of this was 0. He felt confident 
enough to explain to his parents about the situation, and felt he had told them what the situation 
was (sequence 2: point A). This made him feel much better and happy (point C) because he felt 
"She believed in me, she took it in". To Mick's distress, this was the last in a line of odd 
behaviours and in sequence 3, his parents arranged for Mick to be sectioned. Even when 
sectioned, Mick felt sure that there wasn't anything wrong with him, and said "I wanted the truth 
brought out; I couldn't stand them thinking something was wrong with me when there wasn't" 
(point B). His actual agreement with their impression of him as odd was 0. Even at this stage, he 
still saw himself as high rank (whereas bad-me client would see themselves as low ranking). He 
reported some guilt and shame in sequence 2, but this doesn't refer to accepting the label; this 
arose because of the perceived rejection from his Mum and Dad. 
6.4.3.11 Symptoms 
Mick was very deluded and would talk for hours about space and cosmology in a way 
that didn't make sense. He seemed to see his subject matter as being very significant and 
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important. He wrote `books' of philosophy and regarded himself as a prophet. Although he had a 
high opinion of himself, he also spoke of his parents in a very idealised manner, and to him at 
interview, they were the best parents of all time, who had no faults. His speech veered from one 
topic to another in a way that only made sense to him, and produced many neologisms and clang 
associations. He also spoke of many reference experiences such as TV and passers-by referring 
to him. 
6.4.3.12 Discussion 
Because he was hospitalised, and hence isolated and ignored, he lost a mirroring 
audience. Any doubts he had about his own behaviour came from having to accommodate that 
trauma. (Mick's behaviour was eventually modified by a behavioural program in which his rages 
were ignored until he had to accept certain ground rules, for example not coming home drunk 
and abusive. ) This conflict shows the power of the existential imperative, in that when the 
existential imperative expresses itself so unrestrainedly, the moral imperative is completely 
disregarded. For example, in conflict 4, Mick must be ashamed in some sense because otherwise 
he would not be motivated to do anything about the situation. He is not reporting any self shame 
belief and instead simply demanded that everyone else change their way of thinking (a dominant 
strategy). 
Conflicts that fit with this theme are in table 6.4.3.12. This group fit the second group 
mentioned in chapter 2 in that they seem to have individuated from their parents somewhat, 
but 
have lost contact with their peers and are possibly scared by them. Mick was 
dictatorial to his 
family but was very shy and withdrawn when anyone else such as wider family came to the 
door. 
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The conflicts in table 6.4.3.12 are typically two-part conflicts because the client says exactly 
what they think and represses nothing; in fact the moral imperative seems to have no influence 
or be almost completely missing. Some of the clients in the previous group of anger inhibitors 
may well have originally been anger expressors but learnt through experience (perhaps through 
being sectioned like Mick was) to hold themselves in by conforming excessively or totally to the 
demands of the moral imperative. Conflicts reflected the difficulty of respecting a person's right 
to do what they want, and yet wanting to protect the client from harm as best they could. 
Clients learn a certain pattern of relating to others with their parents that they then 
transfer into interactions with their peers. Conversely, they also evolve patterns with their peers 
which they can use with their parents. However, peers are generally less tolerant and more 
hurtful than parents, and other than closer friends have little investment or obligation in looking 
after the client's well-being. Clients who feel inhibited by their parents would be predicted to be 
even more inhibited by their peers. Similarly, anger-expressing clients would presumably be less 
tolerated by their peers than their parents. 
6.4.4 Peer Conflicts 
In assessing how clients got on with their peers, it became apparent hat few of the clients 
had many peer friends who were not part of the psychiatric services. Clients without friends were 
asked about their relationships with their friends in late adolescence, as this was the time when 
clients crucially needed their peers' support and theoretically may not have found it. Often they 
detailed the last interactions they had and the reasons why contact ceased. Peer conflicts fell into 
two categories- 6 situations where the client perceived being evaluated negatively and rejected 
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by their peers, and 3 situations where the client grandiosely rejected their friends. Peer conflicts 
are detailed in table 6.4.4. 
6.4.4.1 Rejection by Peers/ Non-family others 
Three participants entered the company of strangers, and felt sure that the people there 
were laughing at them or talking about them. Imran related how he felt even complete strangers 
hated him when he passed them. Imran showed the same pattern of interaction with his peers as 
he did with his parents, as did most of other clients in table 6.4.4 However, even those clients 
who showed the same pattern showed some key differences from parental conflicts. For 
example, clients could usually only suspect what the criticism was, because it was rarely made 
explicit; sometimes a vague reason was given but even then it was fairly indistinct. It was 
common for participants to not really know why their peers rejected them (although this might 
be because they did not want to talk about why they were disliked at interview). The first 5 
conflicts in table 6.4.4 show people who were rejected by their friends were rejected for no 
reason, or for vague and unlikely reasons. In Cathy's conflict, for example (3rd in table 6.4.4), 
she felt sure that everyone present knew about her psychiatric history, almost as if they could 
read it on her face, or as if everyone in the world knew anyway. Furthermore, the evaluative 
belief attached to being "one of those ill people" is instantly one of being worthless, an instance 
of stigma as a very real and very upsetting entity in Cathy's life. 
O^ 
t '° Oäoä en 
3ooýyý' 3 oövý oýýý ° 
GO2 










>, äö h aä ö3 
o ^o 
x° q- v aý a a° G 
ä 




ý a °: pö oö r " > °' a i w 
.o r a) aw °'' 
+c i ý,, " 3 ä  0 Ü"3ý vii äi"ß 
ý> Ü oG ° 
u 
41.1 3 
ý aý Ucö e- 
C VO 
mä 
h b0 N ý.., i CS 
0L 








- = Ij 
- q o n" 
N 
. te 
r"t! cu r. Ö 
ý 
N> 
3 -3 ýg 
3 
OY ;' cti 
C ý 
d 3Üa 
G cý W 
p: 0 







cd Q U rn 
n , jam 
fn 3 p 
ZZ 2.2 3' 3 W, O a 
ý 'v, (V ° . 
mac a 
ö 











aý ö ' 9ý ýxuw3z. Ü 
"ä 'v i; 
5 va,. ý 
o° 




aýi by' % 
E 
Gn3 ywN. 2b. 0 yC "'- o : ý_ g2,402 °j wN 
v, O C7 
>0O Z° h cd 
ug 
ry ýo oU.. -o o 
rA 
e^x 






. 'd wý ++ ý' 
bývý cd y W äi °ý "ý aýi 
0 
ej c4. 'Z 
G 41 0 ° 
4 r o" 
CU , Er-2 
i. ' C"b er cUN .ýU 
' 
tr äý 3 ý 7 Cy . , ,ý 
ýq 
"ý o i 
° ä? 0 CL) Ö 
bD >' CE2_w .- end 
3 >' vö 
.3zky1 
:1 -a 
Qi i tj 4) 
10 e: Ee 2e , 00 02 
.-30 
ää eoý aý c 
AUa. '"E-o ß . 
Empirical Analysis of Dysfunction in Self Construction 200 
Cathy's immediate impulse was to flee the pub and escape, yet she felt that if she were to do this, 
yet again the people in the pub judging her so badly would be proved right, and she would be 
totally trapped in this self of "one of those ill people". So her situation was unbearable, because 
whatever she did she felt was being used against her by the people there, and there was no 
escape. Not only were these clients rejected for unclear reasons, but they could do nothing; if 
they did respond to it, then it would be the worse for them. They typically avoided or just keep 
quiet throughout the incident, hoping not to make things worse. Its interesting how the 
psychiatric label itself is seen as the thing that their peers hate or reject them for, when the label 
mainly refers to the sorts of behaviours they show in these cases when they are worried about the 
label. Its almost as if the client's own fear of madness brings about some of the `mad' 
behaviours that they are worried about. 
As well as being rejected for vague reasons, another group of 3 clients rejected their 
friends. Jack was in awe of his friends and preferred not to see them until he was well again (this 
transpired at interview although he did not want to complete a conflict around it). He was sure 
they had not thought ill of him, but was worried they might if they knew more about how he was 
now. He'd rather have them think well of him, and not see them again until such a time when he 
was better, rather than to have contact with them now and risk them knowing how badly he'd 
fallen). In the last two conflicts of table 6.4.4.4, the participants grandiosely rejected their friends 
for not being good enough or recognising the participants' worth. Pete's never once said 
anything to his friends, feeling that it would be enormously traumatic for everyone involved if he 
did. He preferred to just avoid his friends and not have them know he was so angry with them. 
Elizabeth also related a conflict in which her friends had not done anything specifically wrong, 
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Again, she would never have dreamt of expressing how she felt to her friends "it would just be 
bringing misery upon yourself; its just not something you do". 
In summary, some clients commonly felt rejected by their peers, often for reasons that 
were never expressed. These clients preferred to say or do nothing about the perceived rejection, 
for fear of making it explicit and thereby more real. Clients felt sure their peers on the whole 
disliked or rejected them, especially strangers. Another group of clients felt that their friends 
liked them, but rejected their friends for not being good enough, or acknowledging their 
grandiosity enough. The end result of peer interactions was nearly always loss of contact and 
isolation. 
6.4.5 Romantic conflicts 
The most crucial peer interactions are ones with potential romantic partners, and hence 
these situations also have the potential to be the most rewarding and also damaging. Few clients, 
especially the younger clients in this survey, had much experience with the opposite sex, if any. 
Hence real-life romantic conflicts were difficult to get. Instead, clients were asked to imagine a 
hypothetical situation in which there was the possibility of a romantic encounter (only a small 
number completed this task because this avenue was only explored towards the end of the 
study). 5 male clients completed conflicts around this situation: "Imagine you are sitting in a 
public place like a cafe and a pretty girl smiles at you in an encouraging way. How would you 
feel? What would you expect to happen? What would you like to happen? ". As it happened, all 5 
clients had never really had girlfriends, or even been out on a date. As Pete said "If you want to 
know the truth, I've never really got on with a woman, either physically or whatever. " As the 
conflicts in this section are more exploratory than in previous sections, they follow a slightly less 
rigorous REBT format than the previous conflicts. In particular, the second sequence does not 
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chain from the first sequence as in previous sections. Instead the second sequence is the 
imagined best possible outcome, and the third sequence is the imagined worst possible outcome. 
For the 4 older clients, the situation did not contain any positive feelings at all, just anxiety, and 
fear. All 4 clients said that they would never make any sort of move on the girl, and would prefer 
to ignore her (most clients possibly would not have been sitting on their own in a public place). 
Table 6.4.5 lists the 5 romantic conflicts. The themes running in these conflicts are very 
similar. Sentiments from one of the youngest clients, Jack (aged 18) reflect a common fear of 
every adolescent starting out with romantic relationships: 
"I might not know what to do, I might do the wrong thing and really hurt her or 
something", "She would have really hated me if I had somehow messed it up". 
These fears are probably familiar to everyone who has ever been an adolescent, exploring 
romantic situations for the first time. Jack had never had a girlfriend and admitted that 
it was 
something he wanted in principle but not in practice, because he was a little scared of girls. 
He 
also felt really inadequate and childish around his friends who had got girlfriends. 
He felt he had 
lost a lot of status with his friends through not having a girlfriend and it was one more arena 
within which he was now fairly crap in their eyes. His friends had all gone to University and 
successfully made the transition to independent living, whereas Jack was still living at home and 
if anything had regressed to a more childish, dependent state. 
In summary then, clients showed a fear of the opposite sex in general, and romantic 
relationships in particular. Only a small number were asked, but of these, all clients asked were 
adamant that they would be very anxious about a possible romantic relationship and 
felt sure that 
the potential partner really disliked them, no matter what. None 
had much experience of dating 
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6.5 Discussion 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy has made great advances in recent years in understanding 
schizophrenia; current trials are showing it to be effective treatment alternative (e. g. Haddock 
and Slade, 1996). CBT practitioners have been successful despite many of them using 
fragmented, quasi-biological theoretical models, where the psychology is seen as an add-on 
extra. For example, Tarrier et al (1989) used pragmatic coping strategies and generic counselling 
skills; even the family interventions of the Expressed Emotion paradigms do not have any one 
explicit mechanistic model, and hence work in a "we don't know why it works but it does" 
manner. Such work originated from behaviour therapy as applied to learning disabilities 
(Haddock and Slade, 1996), and as behavioural approaches are specifically devoid of the concept 
of self, it is not surprising that the resultant treatments do not include any stated convincing 
theory of `the person', despite the repeated calls for such a paradigm mentioned earlier 
(Chadwick, Birchwood and Trower, 1996). 
6.5.1.1 Methodological considerations 
A feature of the study has been demonstrating that REBT can be used to probe more 
deeply into what clients are thinking. Much of the detail of the study would not have been found 
without having a theory driven reason to probe. The study also shows the benefits of more 
extensive engagement with the client, and the potential benefits of using real-life situations and 
interactions with real people. Using hypothetical situations might be particularly unwise on a 
client group which divorces reality from fantasy quite often anyway. Similarly, a flavour is given 
of how research not only needs to respect the differences between clients, but also between the 
same clients over time- some clients symptoms change over time. 
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There is a striking difference between the traditional questionnaire data in the second part 
of the results section, and the rest of the results, in that the questionnaires really do not yield 
particularly interesting results. They show that the themes are consistent even when measured 
this way, and suggest that the same patterns extend into the client's past, as demonstrated by the 
relationship measures such as the PBI and Impact Inventory. The powerful exploratory 
techniques from the rest of the results section highlights glaring limitations in questionnaire 
designs. 
The study has shown that there is much coherence in the thought processes of the clients. 
Even with the interviewer's questioning, the conflicts are still authentic, and in all places the 
quotes are genuine client quotes (except in the tables in 6 part III where the clients are 
paraphrased for brevity). The study shows very clearly that the client's cognitions are not bizarre 
and incomprehensible; they are certainly not "empty speech acts, whose informational content 
refers to neither world nor self' (Berrios, 1991, p 12). 
If anything the many situations covered are surprisingly mundane. The significance of the 
scenarios is more obvious to the clients themselves, because they cite these situations as being 
very important to them (although perhaps these situations are as controversial as they feel 
comfortable with, and they do not want to talk about bigger issues). The assumption that 
essential roots of the problem can be found in the minutiae of interactions was an important a 
priori stance ("Life is a filigree of tripwires" Goffman; 1971, p3l). Much previous research has 
looked at instances such as these and see them as evidence of the wider problem (i. e. the disease 
or attributional bias) rather than being more directly responsible. This change is something that 
follows directly from the stance in chapter 5 where the self was defined as something being 
constantly created and re-created in interactions. By this definition the self is far less stable and 
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more transient than in other conceptualisations of the self. If the effects of these interactions 
build up over time and each had a small incremental effect in the same direction, this is 
consistent with the fact that psychotic delusions generally build up over time. Commonly about 2 
years elapses between the first signs and a florid illness (Beiser et al, 1993). 
Another merit of the study was that clients were asked what they would have ideally have 
wanted to happen or to act in the situation in very concrete terms. Typically work on `ideal 
selves' or `future selves' considers client's wishes in the abstract (Marcus and Nurius, 1986; 
Bannister and Fransella, 1966). In this study clients are asked which actions they would like to 
have taken (a very different sphere of operations from ticking statements about "how I would 
like to be... "). On the whole clients were shown to have wanted to be more powerful and 
assertive, although often just to defend themselves against perceived threats. 
6.5.1.2 Conclusions 
On the whole, it was shown that most clients did not act the way they would have liked 
to because they had crippling fears about what would happen if they did. These fears were often 
catastrophic and in most cases much worse than the interviewer would have judged the action to 
have merited. Although the literature demonstrates that families are often much more reactive 
than normal (for example a high EE family would be almost likely to react in a catastrophic 
manner like the client predicted, Vaughn and Leff, 1976), it seemed likely that the catastrophes 
imagined were grossly excessive. 
The fears clients had caused them to be (on the whole) anger inhibitors, and to not 
express themselves. In normals, repressed anger has been linked to rehearsal and rumination as a 
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coping strategy, and it was suggested that clients show the same tendency to such intrusive 
uncontrollable automatic thoughts. Furthermore, there was evidence that the anxiety and guilt 
producing cognitions that led the clients to initially repress their anger might make clients feel 
afraid to own such thoughts, so they would have to experience them as voices. Future research 
might profitably look at any connection between repressed anger and voice hearing or voice 
content. This should be fairly simple to do as there are questionnaires to measure repressed 
anger. In chapter 7 the hypothesis is examined that clients have rules about what it is and isn't 
acceptable to think. 
The Existential and Moral imperatives were cast as the prime movers behind many of the 
symptoms. Evidence was presented for this in the tables in part III. The two types of imperative 
illustrate the observation that a large proportion of the symptoms are concerned with themes 
"... which invariably reflect the patient's concern about his or her position in the social universe" 
(Sims, 1988). Many of the supposed symptoms of schizophrenia can be seen as meaningful and 
purposeful behaviour when the full situation is known- for example social withdrawal and the 
lethargy and depression of negative symptoms make more sense in the context of the entrapment 
sequence demonstrated here. 
The study shows there appears to be two flavours of madness. They depend on which 
side of the existential-moral equilibrium the balance has shifted to. For the inhibited self group, 
the balance has shifted almost entirely to the moral imperative side. Their moral imperative- 
influenced symptoms are about being disliked and useless, and they feel compelled to accept 
threats to self-construction that the people in their life bring about. The other smaller group, the 
anger expressors were ruled mostly by the existential imperative. Although this group gets to 
pursue their grandiose needs, in the long term their behaviour is self-defeating because it annoys 
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other people and therefore separates them from them. This group was almost the most overtly 
disturbed of the two. A simplistic conclusion from the moral imperative group would be that all 
clients should be encouraged to express themselves more. However the anger expressor group 
need almost the opposite sort of encouragement as they need to give moral goals precedence and 
be more considerate. 
There could be said to be a third flavour of psychosis in a third group which has both 
imperatives to excess. Some of the clients in the first group also showed strong existential 
symptoms, and hence had both grandiose existential themes and self-hating moral delusions. 
Here the two imperatives clash violently with each other to produce terrible conflict within the 
person themselves. These issues are discussed more completely in the final synthesis of the next 
chapter. 
Chapter 7 
7. An Exploratory Study of the Moral Imperative: how Clients 
perceive their own behaviour with their Parents 
The analysis reported in the last chapter showed that while a minority showed unbridled 
self-construction, the majority were blocked from constructing a self by an abnormally powerful 
inhibitory process that has been called the moral imperative (see chapter 5). This majority show 
the clash of the two imperatives- the existential imperative to construct a self, and the moral 
imperative to subordinate the self to the other. This chapter further investigates the moral 
imperative. 
Clients whose behaviour, emotions and possibly symptoms were driven by the moral 
imperative gave the impression that it crippled their self-construction capacities. It appeared to 
dominate their core cognitive self- schema. Part of the moral imperative is that people have a set 
of demanding or `must' rules about how they themselves should behave towards other people 
(Dryden, 1995). It was speculated that such rules are so important to those people with a 
psychosis who are dominated by the moral imperative that they may find it catastrophic when 
they cannot conform to them. Hence if the existential imperative brings them to think angry 
thoughts about (for example) a parent, the moral imperative `must' blocks this and the client is 
motivated to find another way out, such as denying responsibility for the thought. The client 
looks for alternative explanations as to where it came from, and decides someone else is 
responsible for it- perhaps it is a voice. 
Hence it is suggested here that the moral imperative rule is vitally important in the 
formation of symptoms, both those symptoms that come directly from it, and those existential 
ones that the moral imperative represses. In the following study, a number of potential moral 
imperative statements were listed on a questionnaire, and a group of psychosis-sufferers were 
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compared to normal student controls. The study attempts to fill in a bit more context around the 
cognitions involved, for example, it was common for clients to speak very highly of their 
parents, but to spend most of their time avoiding them. One contention (from chapter 2, and 
confirmed in chapter 4) was that this was because in many cases they idealised their parents, and 
therefore wanted to make sure they reacted in an ideal way to their parent. Therefore it was 
expected that clients would endorse items about their parent's ideal qualities (e. g. "I have never 
known X to lie"), and also items about how important it was to comply with parents wishes and 
to not argue with them. 
Part and parcel of the moral imperative are issues of morality and responsibility, 
essentially issues of what constituted good behaviour and a good person. One way of looking at 
these issues is to see them as power games; such judgements perhaps are commonly used to 
control another person's behaviour. For example, the person who can invoke the most amount of 
support from the community or authorities is likely to have more power, and can define `the 
rules'. For the core of the questionnaire there were a lot of items derived from ideas as to what 
`the rules', the syntax of arguments, should be. A rough theoretical outline was decided on thus: 
If a person is arguing with another person, very often there would be a demand along the lines of 
"do x", or "don't do x". If these demands failed, then the next line of argument would be to at 
least ensure that the person continues talking to the arguer- "listen to me when I'm speaking to 
you"-a person who can control the target with this line can at least continue to puts their point 
and make life difficult for the target by sheer stamina. Finally, it appeared that our clients often 
might feel compelled to listen but tried to escape the scene as soon as possible, having 
acquiesced in the short term for the sake of an easy life. The final rule might therefore be "Don't 
leave the room when your father wants to talk to you". 
All these statements thus derived reflect an opinion or label on the behaviour of the 
target- from the observations of objectite (in chapter 5) it appears that this is likely to make the 
target very self-aware, and also prevent them entering the subject state where they would be able 
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to judge the other's behaviour (Duval and Wicklund, 1972), (which might explain their poor 
mentalising for other skills seen in chapter 4). It was likely therefore that if a client endorsed a 
lot of items indicating a set of strong beliefs about how they should act and behave, then they 
might be vulnerable to objectite types of experience. Hence even behaviours that the other 
person could not possibly have access to or knowledge of (for example, the client's own 
thoughts) might feel to the client like they were open to criticism. One of the hypotheses that has 
emerged during this thesis is that some voices may be the client's own thoughts that they dare 
not feel responsible for. If this was the case, then it could be predicted that the client would have 
a lot of beliefs about the types of thoughts it was acceptable to think, and what type of thoughts 
it wasn't, along the lines of "it would be terrible to ever think ill of Mum". 
There were also a number of questions based around the idea of catastrophising, using 
the idea that clients can sometimes be scared of their parents and of the consequences of 
misbehaviour. Other questions were about more frankly psychotic experiences; in some cases, it 
seemed like the parents had become embroiled in delusional beliefs. It was difficult to find a 
format that would take these into account because delusions are so idiosyncratic, but it was 
decided that parents might be involved in delusion of control or reference, for example mind 
reading or thought broadcasting (e. g. "Sometimes it seems like Dad can control my thoughts"). 
7.1 Method 
7.1.1 Participants 
Participants were consecutive referrals to the study from psychiatrists and other mental 
health workers in South Warwickshire, Northern Birmingham and South Birmingham Mental 
Health NHS Trusts. In all 21 clients (of whom only 2 were female) completed the 
questionnaires; a further 10 declined to take part. All clients had an ICD-10 diagnosis of 
paranoid schizophrenia or delusional disorder. The average age was 31.9 (s. e. =2.5 years), and 
Exploratory Study of the Moral Imperative 217 
the average number of years spent in education was 12.7 (s. e. =0.3 years). No clients were 
included who were currently misusing drugs or alcohol, or who had a primary organic 
impairment. All clients were in "regular and meaningful contact" with their parents. Interviews 
were completed in client's homes or in outpatient facilities. No one else was present during the 
interviews. 
The controls were 20 students (10 were female) at the University of Birmingham. Their 
average age was 24.1 (s. e. 2.8), average number of years spent in education was 13.7 (s. e. = 
0.18), although all were of college standard IQ. They were paid a nominal fee for taking part in 
a day of psychological experiments. They were not read the questions, but were left to fill our the 
questions themselves. 
7.1.2 Measures 
The Communications about Behaviours Gauge (CAB-Gauge; see appendix F) asks 
participants to choose how much they agreed or disagreed with 52 questions relating to various 
themes of idealisation, arguments, how the client should behave and how the client feels about 
the other. Statements were endorsed using a7 point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree 
(0) to strongly agree (7). The statements were sentences containing a variable (e. g. "X is always 
right"); before starting, the participant nominated the person "X" who was the most influential 
in 
the their life- all chose a parent. 
To see how the themes in the CAB-Gauge related to symptom issues, and particularly 
voices, clients also completed the Beliefs about Voices Questionnaire (Chadwick and 
Birchwood, 1994). This instrument differentiates primarily between clients who hear malevolent 
voices and those who hear benevolent voices, and gives a quantified score 
for each type. It has 
been shown to accurately classify 90% of individual's voices (Birchwood and 
Chadwick, 1995). 
Finally to check the validity of the CAB-Gauge, the Parental Bonding Instrument 
(Parker, 
Tupling and Brown, 1978) was used; this widely-used scale provides orthogonal scales of 
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perceived care and over-protection for both parents. This scale has been shown to be related to 
many aspects of psychopathology such as depression and bipolar disorder (Parker, Tupling and 
Brown, 1978). 
7.2 Results 
The scale as a whole was found to have excellent internal consistency (Cronbach's 
alpha= 0.85; split half reliability= 0.78). Analysis proceeded with questions being into a number 
of different a priori theoretical categories (see Table 7.1). T-tests were used to determine 
whether the schizophrenia group differed from the control group. As the variances were usually 
unequal, Levene's test was used, which adjusts for this (two-tailed tests were used, because this 
was more stringent, but as the directions were predicted in advance, one-tailed would also have 
been appropriate). As can be seen from table 7.1, clients were significantly more likely than 
controls to idealise their parents- they endorsed items saying they saw their parents as unlikely to 
have ever lied, to always be fair, to nearly always be right, etc. Clients were also more likely to 
feel that the contents of their thoughts were subject to moral standards imposed by the other- for 
example "I shouldn't think thoughts X wouldn't like" (category 3 in table 7.1). Clients who 
heard voices were not different from non-voice-hearers on the categories of type of thoughts, or 
origin of thoughts. 
As can be seen in table 7.1, some of the items that might have been expected to 
differentiate best between psychotics and controls in fact showed no difference - fairly florid 
statements about the parent reading the clients mind and controlling their thoughts or body may 
well have been too transparent and socially undesirable for clients to endorse. 
Table 7.1: Table showing how psychosis-sufferers differed from student controls on a priori 
categories of `beliefs about one's own behaviours'. Levene's t-test for unequal variances was 
used, and statistically significant differences are in red. Kev: `*' =n<0.05. `**' =n<0.01. 
Category Questions in this Category T test p value 
of Belief score 
Idealising 10. X is always fair. t= p= 
18. X knows better than me what is bad and what is good. -1.99 0.05 
20. Most people agree with X. 
26. I have never known X to lie. 
35. I rely on X for my judgements about people; they are 
better than me at that sort of thing. 
47. I would like to be like X. 
49. X is nearly always right. 
Type of 11. I shouldn't think thoughts X wouldn't like. t= p= 
Thoughts 29. X knows if I am thinking thoughts they wouldn't like. -2.95 0.005 
46. Its terrible to ever think ill of X. ** 
Origin of 6. Sometimes, its as if X can read my mind. t= p= 
Thoughts 14. Sometimes it feels like X controls my thoughts. 0.28 0.78 
41. Sometimes, its as if X gives thoughts to me. 
50. X can take away my thoughts. 
Psychotic 14. Sometimes it feels like X controls my thoughts. t= p= 
13. I often get confused around X, which I try to hide. 0.96 0.34 
17. Sometimes, its as if X controls my body. 
"Talk to 19. If I don't want to, I don't have to speak to X. (neg rate) t= p= 
me" 25. I would hate X to think I ever didn't want to speak to -2.19 0.002 
them. 
33. I could never end a conversation with X, even if I 
wanted to. 
43. I sometimes don't want to speak to X. (neg rate) 
"Don't 21. I ought to be around X if I can be. 1)= 
leave the 37. I avoid X if I can. (neg rate) -2.21 0.034 
scene" * 
"Do y" 1. Its important to me to follow X's advice. t P= 
3. People who argue with X are awful. -2.69 0.012 
40. X knows best; I should not go against their advice. 
"Don't 5.1 can tell X if I think they are wrong. (neg rate) t-= p= 
argue" 9. I can't have my own opinions around X. -3.74 0.0006 
3. People who argue with X are awful 
51. I never say things X may not want to hear. 
Fear 15. X doesn't want to hurt me. (neg rate) t= P= 
28. X scares me, if truth be known. -3.94 0.0005 
30.1 find it difficult to speak to X. 
** 
Exploratory Study of the Moral Imperative 220 
Nearly all the other categories in table 7.1 differentiated significantly between controls 
and clients. Clients more strongly endorsed items about having to talk to the parent whether they 
wanted to or not. Clients were more likely than controls to feel they had an obligation to remain 
in the vicinity of the other. They were also more likely to feel they should do what they were 
told, and that they shouldn't argue with their parent. Finally they were more likely to be scared 
of their parent or feel that the parent might want to hurt them. Because of the highly significant 
statistical effects seen in these last two categories, especially considering that the sample size 
was so small, the data are looked at more closely in figure 7.1. Of the many clients who scored 
high on `Don't argue', many were not voice hearers. In fact 6/ 7 non-voice hearers were in the 
high-scoring section of the sample for the `Don't argue' category, significant using a Mann- 
Whitney U test (U=20.5, n=7,14, p=0.03). The same trend was seen for the `Fear' category but 
this was not significant. 
Clients who heard benevolent voices showed much lower fear scores than clients who 
heard malevolent ones (Mann Whitney U test: U=6, n=8,6 p=0.02). Benevolent voice hearers 
also scored higher than malevolent voice hearers on `Do x' (U=8, n=8,6, p=0.043), but not on 
any of the either categories. 
There was no evidence that those who heard malevolent voices scored higher than the 
rest of the group on any other category, including `fear'. Similarly, clients who showed social 
withdrawal were not more likely to endorse any of the categories than clients who didn't. Some 
concurrent validation (that the categories were measuring something like that which they were 
intended to) comes from the Parental Bonding Instrument. The scores on this scale were 
consistent with the findings on the various categories of the CAB-Gauge (table 7.2). Splitting the 
sample into those who scored high on the PBI sub-scales such as `Maternal Care' and those who 
had low scores, and measuring the scores that these two groups got on the CAB categories, 
it 
transpired that a number of relationships were significant. 
in 30 
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='Don't argue' score I= Not voice hearer 
Figure 7.1 Graph showing the two different distributions observed for controls 
and psychosis-sufferers for the category of DON'T ARGUE. This category 
contained statements such as "people who argue with X are awful". Clients 
who were not voice hearers are labelled in yellow. 
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(The direction of the relationship is indicated in the table with any significant results- 
"high" means that high PBI score corresponded to a high score on the CAB-Gauge category. ) 
Significant results are only reported as such when the corresponding p-value is significant after a 
Bonferroni adjustment, to correct for the fact that in some cases a number of tests were carried 
out on the same data. Clients who perceived their parents as caring were higher on idealising, 
and lower on fear, but also significantly high on obedience to Mum ("do y"), and not leaving 
Mum's vicinity (don't leave the scene"). Clients who perceived their parents as over-protective 
tended towards lower scores on idealising, and were significantly lower on "don't leave the 
scene" and "Don't argue" for fathers. They were high on Fear towards their fathers. 
7.4 Discussion 
The data here suggest that psychosis sufferers are far more likely than student controls to 
have extensive moral imperative rules as to how they should act. This is interesting because the 
man-in-the-street's conception of a `schizophrenic' is that they are dangerous, unprincipled, and 
perhaps morally unrestrained. In fact, the data here show that the majority are much more 
inhibited by moral considerations than controls and if anything far too moral. The presence of 
strong rules as to how to behave was a better differentiator between the two groups than more 
typical psychotic features such as "they control my thoughts" or "I can't think straight". 
Within the various categories of moral rules, a large sub-group of clients felt that their parents 
could somehow tell what sort of thoughts their offspring were thinking. These clients felt that 
they shouldn't think wrong thoughts (it would be interesting to investigate what sort of thoughts 
clients would see as `wrong'). The result here confirms that these clients were suffering from 
objectite- that they felt so immensely self-conscious and under scrutiny from the other that they 
even felt their thoughts were transparent to others. 
Table 7.2 Table showing how the psychosis group's scores on the PBI related to their scores 
on the CAB-Gauge using Mann-Whitney U-tests. Clients high on the PBI scale were compared 
to clients low on the PBI scale as to whether their CAB-Gauge category scores were different. 
The direction of the difference are shown beside any significant result - e. g. "high" means 
individuals high on that PBI category were also high on that CAB-gauge category. Significances 












PBI: Dad Over- 
protection 
(p values) 
Idealising 0.05 high 0.14 0.1 0.1 
Type of 
Thoughts 
0.5 0.7 0.8 0.4 
Origin of 
Thoughts 
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.8 
Psychotic 0.5 0.1 0.48 0.1 
"Talk to me" 0.6 0.5 0.53 0.6 
"Don't leave 
the scene" 
0.01 high 0.06 low 0.54 0.01 low 
"Do y" 0.028 high 0.30 0.1 high 0.038 low 
"Don't argue" 0.30 0.01 high 0.06 low 0.12 high 
Fear 0.013 low 0.16 high 0.12 low 0.06 high 
Exploratory Study of the Moral Imperative 224 
This category could not distinguish voice hearers from non-voice hearers, unfortunately, 
so there is no evidence here that such rules are specifically important in voice formation. 
However there was evidence that benevolent voices are a useful support against feeling scared of 
parents. 
There was also evidence that non-voice hearers were likely to feel they weren't allowed 
to argue. This may reflect that people who believed they shouldn't argue were more successful in 
stifling argumentative urges even in their voice form. Voice hearers alone were still more likely 
than controls to feel they shouldn't argue, which still supports the idea that such beliefs are vital 
to voice formation. 
The psychosis group were more likely to deny that they avoid their parent, and to say that 
they ought to be around their parents if they can- this is surprising given the high level of social 
withdrawal in the client sample. It possibly reflects that clients feel guilty for withdrawing as 
much as they do, or perhaps would like to withdraw more than they do but dare not. 
Worryingly, many of the categories refer to quite a high level of control over the client's 
behaviour. Clients were more likely to say they have to talk to their parents, that should obey 
their parents advice and that they should not argue: "people who argue with X are bad". Most 
worryingly of all, the final category of fear contains items such as "They scare me, if truth be 
known", "I find it difficult to talk to them", and even "they do want to hurt me"; if anything the 
strongest difference between psychosis and controls was on this category. Endorsement of such 
controlling items was significantly linked to perceived over-protection from parents. 
Similarly there was confirmation of the result from chapter 4 that clients are more likely 
than controls to idealise their parents. Such idealisation was statistically linked to high 
levels of 
perceived parental care on the PBI. 
There are a number of obvious limitations to this preliminary study. The control group 
was not appropriately matched for age, amount of contact with parents, IQ, gender and ethnicity. 
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The sample is only small, but the PBI data that serves as a concurrent validation check suggests 
that if the sample size had been larger, more significant results would have been found. It is 
interesting that the categories corresponded to PBI scales because the CAB -gauge refers to only 
one parent; ideally this should have been filled in for both parents. 
The data confirms that an important aspect of therapy for psychosis will be addressing 
the prohibitive and demanding rules of the moral imperative and REBT would seem appropriate 
given the focus on demanding thinking (Dryden, 1995). It also seems likely that in everyday 
interactions, guilt and shame based strategies for modifying a client's behaviour will be much 
more counterproductive than more positive reinforcements. 
Chapter 8 
S. Synthesis and Discussion 
Most explanations of schizophrenia are on the level of the biological. There are partial 
psychological theories, e. g. in explanation of paranoid delusions (Bentall, Kinderman and 
Kaney, 1994), or voices (Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994), but it should be possible to develop a 
more complete explanatory theory at the psychological level. In the fullness of time there will be 
theories at each level (social, psychological, biological) which can be mapped one on to the other 
for a comprehensive biopsychosocial theory. So far there is incompleteness at all levels, let alone 
any real attempt at vertical integration. This thesis marks a step towards the goal of a more 
complete theory at the psychological level. 
8.1.1 Biological versus Psychological 
To set the scene for a psychological theory, it was necessary consider the relationship 
between the biological and psychological to show that the biological is not a priori necessarily 
pre-eminent. Chapter 1 was written in conjunction with a neurobiologist (who may well yet fill 
out the picture at the biological level with his work on corticosteroids and psychosis; Mitchell et 
al, 1998); it was intended to be read by both biologists, biological psychiatrists and psychologists 
to find common ground between them. If there are three useful conclusions from this chapter 
they are 1) that the discovery of apoptosis means that there is no scientific need to look for brain 
injuries incurred during pregnancy or birth. This undercuts a large literature, and shows how an 
entire paradigm can be built up based on flawed assumptions (Crowe, 1994). 2) Although there 
are undoubtedly some biological differences between the brains of people with schizophrenia 
and normals, there is no evidence that they are there before the psychological symptoms or that 
they cause the symptoms. 3) Clients in an acute episode may be behaving in a fragmented way 
that justifies a brain-damaged or lesion-in-the-information-processing-systems approach, and can 
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be worked with in all the traditional manners, but theoretically this is still compatible with the 
condition being primarily psychological. That clients can descend to this biologically damaged 
position does not entail that when they are in remission their cognitions and experiences are 
unstructured and meaningless. Most of this thesis deals with the more coherent client who is in 
remission. 
8.1.2 Part 1: Adolescent Development 
Chapter 1 therefore provides the rationale for the rest of the thesis, which sees the 
psychological level as a crucial and neglected level to investigate. Any psychological approach 
to schizophrenia that would like to be more than a bolt-on to the biology has to deal with the fact 
that the scientific zeitgeist sees the old 1960's causal theories as discredited. The 60's work was 
seen largely as unscientific and blaming the family; however that was thirty years ago and 
psychology has made many relevant advances since then. Chapter 2 details a fresh approach to 
investigating psychological mechanisms in schizophrenia valid by the criteria of philosophy of 
science and recently developed social-psychological qualitative methodologies. To briefly 
summarise, the theory draws on the current literature about what is known of normal adolescent 
development, and draws parallels with the current theories of psychosis, and what is known 
about schizophrenia. It concludes that there are such strong parallels between the theories that a 
compelling case can be made for late-adolescent onset schizophrenia being actually an extreme 
manifestation of the normal psychological turmoil associated with adolescence. 
Such a theory is obviously ambitious and is best seen as another theory to be added to the 
clinician's repertoire; perhaps also one that will be more appealing to clients. Proof of such a 
theory (if ever possible; Popper, 1963) would be beyond the scope of a PhD thesis, but some 
corroboration is given in chapters 3 and 4. The data in chapter 3 are consistent with the theory; 
they show that normal adolescents show high amounts of quasi-psychotic symptoms, and that 
such signs are intimately linked to their current level of autonomy development. Those who are 
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most advanced for their age in terms of autonomy are those who show the highest level of 
Schizotypy and Early Signs. It was concluded that this was probably because these teenagers 
were undergoing the stresses associated with attaining psychological maturity. The data for 17 
year olds are probably the most convincing, consisting as they do of around 300 people. For 
young women, both autonomy measures, but particularly parental autonomy show robust 
relationships with schizotypy and prodrome scores. The same result was seen for young men, 
except here it is low peer autonomy that is related to higher schizotypy/ prodrome scores. 
Interpreting these data is difficult. Conservatively, the most that can be said is that they 
show a quantitative relationship between psychosis-like symptoms, and the views individuals 
have of their parents and peers. The close relationship demonstrated in chapter two suggests that 
future research along these themes could make it possible to predict which teenagers are most at 
risk for a psychotic episode. It would be important for future research to explore further, for 
example later age groups could be studied. The teenagers in chapter 2 are still at school and 
when they leave school and try to work in the adult world, they might show more extreme levels 
of distress and symptomatology. A study of nineteen and twenty year olds might be much more 
revealing as to which students actually become psychotic. Alternatively, following the current 
students through longitudinally might be revealing. The study does suggest the exciting 
possibility of better tools for predicting who might be at risk, and potentially offers a clearer 
understanding of what actually precipitates a breakdown, and how it works functionally. 
Apart from the exciting possibilities for earliest possible intervention, the data goes some 
way to corroborating the theory in chapter 2, which is an entirely fresh theoretical perspective on 
the etiology of schizophrenia. Much of the review in chapter 2 asserts facts that are verified in 
the following studies. For example, the data in chapter 4 confirm the idea that clients are on the 
whole less autonomous and more idealising than controls (idealising was confirmed again in 
chapter 7). Clients are also much more extreme in their peer autonomy scores, even if their 
average peer autonomy score was similar to adult controls. The exception to this was clients 
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living away independently from their parents, who showed higher peer autonomy than either 
controls or psychotic clients living at home. This is particularly interesting given that in the rest 
of the thesis, losing contact with the peer group is seen as being the factor that really maroons 
the vulnerable late-adolescent. Normal young men show lower peer autonomy as they traverse 
adolescence. Clients living away seem to be very isolated from their peer group, a finding that 
was repeated in chapter 6 (quantatative data). 
The two groups in chapter 6 part III, where clients are grouped into inhibited self and 
anger expressor categories, are roughly analagous to the two groups in chapter 2- those who 
have not become autonomous from parents and those who have become autonomous from 
parents but not peers. It was because of the anomaly in the data in chapter 6 ("if they haven't yet 
individuated, how come some of them terrorise their families? ") that the two groups in chapter 2 
were hypothesised. 
The majority of the psychosis group were also significantly lower than the two older 
groups of teenagers from chapter 3, and thus more similar to 12 and 13 year olds than the adult 
controls. That they are even below 12-13 year olds suggests that at least some of the autonomy 
difference has come about since psychotic breakdown, but it is still consistent with the notion 
that they were not particularly autonomous in the first place. Future research needs to refine the 
concept of autonomy; currently it is used rather nebulously as `psychological development', and 
although it certainly comes close enough to that for the purposes of this thesis, future research 
may want to clarify what exactly psychological development is. This study sees Elkind's (1979) 
paradigm as particularly appropriate (the development that comes from a greater understanding 
of other people's minds- and therefore the development of such empathy could be an important 
tool in therapy), but more detailed accounts may be possible. 
Another form of entrapment as demonstrated later in the thesis (in chapter 6) comes from 
the fact that clients are almost seeking validations in the wrong arena. Clients and parents are 
trapped in the parental conflicts shown because offspring should naturally be being more 
Synthesis and Discussion 230 
independent of parents and standing up to them. Therapy could help clients to establish better 
peer relationships, because very few of them have any friends to speak of. Clients were generally 
even more cautious with their peers than with their parents and many of their symptoms could be 
understood as following perceived rejection or isolation from their peer group. It seems likely 
that peer relationships will be an important focus for future research, including employment as 
an useful means of fostering peer relationships (Shepherd, 1997). Similarly, the romantic 
conflicts showed that this is also an area that clients have great difficulty, almost terror, and as 
romantic relationships are of paramount importance to many clients this might also be a fruitful 
area for future research. This is especially true if the fears clients have are not just fears of 
intimate relationships, but fears of the opposite sex in general, as the data in chapter 6 implied. It 
cannot be helpful for clients to be scared of approximately half the population! 
8.1.3 Part 2: Self-Construction 
The theory in chapter 2 revolves around the idea of normal teenagers renegotiating the 
relationship they have with their parents; they have to establish their autonomy and adulthood 
while at the same time not rejecting the parents too abruptly. The urge to be one's own person 
(gaining autonomy) and the urge to remain supported and loved by those one is close to 
(affiliation) are two recurrent types of motivations in the literature. Such conflicting goals can 
create a lot of problems for both teenagers and parents: "The parental job is to be there to 
be left" 
(Coleman and Hendry, 1980). The same two themes are considered in more 
detail in chapter 5, 
as the `Existential Imperative' and the `Moral Imperative' (to reiterate, the choice of the 
term 
Imperative is meant to indicate the unstoppable nature of these goals, encapsulated 
in REBT as a 
demanding philosophy; Ellis, 1994, Dryden, 1995). Having set the scene as to the main arena 
where the battle for individuation takes place, the rest of the thesis 
looks in more detail at the 
actual mechanics of how this works and where it falters. The theory 
is based around the theory of 
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self construction (Trower and Chadwick, 1994). Chapter 5 sets out the theory and chapter 6 tests 
aspects of it. 
The core theme of the self construction theory was the existential imperative: the need to 
construct a self is the psychological equivalent of the `Darwinian' motive to survive and flourish. 
The need is compelling, and psychological survival depends upon it. For this reason, people 
continually attempt to construct their desired selves, experience joy, pride, satisfaction and other 
positive emotions when they achieve it, get angry when thwarted, anxious about having their self 
condemned or in some other way redefined, and dysphoric or depressed when they actually fail 
to construct their desired self, or even perhaps when they are coerced into constructing an 
undesired self. Why should people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (or indeed any other 
diagnosis) be any different? The contention was that they are no different, that they have the 
same self construction needs as anyone else, and actually or potentially can experience the whole 
range of associated emotions, from joy through to depression, depending on the successes or 
failures of their self construction careers. The only difference, it was suggested, is that people 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia experience much more failure than success - to such an 
extreme degree that normal psychological representations of reality breakdown and their 
experiences find expression in psychotic phenomena. 
What is the evidence from chapter 6? The first aim was to see if people experienced the 
full range of negative emotions when their self constructions were under threat. Conflicts were 
chosen as the occasions when self constructions were most under threat. 
1) Psychosis-sufferers got angry when thwarted. Most first sequences showed clients got angry 
because they saw themselves as being treated with indifference, being constructed as 
low 
ranking subordinates or coerced into such a role of what might be called a "bad or 
demeaned 
self' (Gilbert, 1993; Price et al, 1994). The majority of clients also experienced an angry impulse 
at point C to try to belittle or discredit the other, or compel the other to give them the recognition 
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they wanted. This angry response is no different from how anybody would respond. What is 
different in the client participants is what they do about it. Normally people would express their 
anger or assert themselves in some way, or they would, like adolescents who have successfully 
established a peer group, go elsewhere for their affirmations. However the participants rarely 
acted on this impulse with their significant relative, and they usually had nowhere else to go. 
They instead sometimes dealt with their need to construct a self by inventing it in a delusional 
world. This too is a mechanism that is part of our common psychology- in that people fantasise 
how they would like to be in an ideal world. However these clients seem compelled to invent 
and inhabit a fantasy world which they may believe is real. Many of the participants of this study 
not only constructed an imaginary self in this invented world, but also constructed the others 
who gave them affirmation. Usually the self was not just a desired yet ordinary self; it was an 
ideal, grandiose self, and the affirming others did not just affirm the presented self but were 
adoring of it. (Similarly, in chapter 7 there was evidence that benevolent voices go with people 
being less scared of their parents than those with malevolent voices or those who didn't hear 
voices. ) Later in chapter 6, an explanation was offered for this leap into psychosis. This notion 
has some similarities with Laing's ontological insecurity (Laing, 1965). 
2) They got anxious about having their self condemned or in some other way redefined by the 
other. Many participants anticipated receiving critical evaluations that would have the effect of 
objectifying them as shamefully bad and flawed. This, it was argued, using Sartre's notion of 
objectite, means being turned into an alien object, in the sense that their self becomes 
defined 
and constructed by the other and out of their control. They anticipated that they would 
feel 
ashamed and would experience many impulses to hide, avoid and escape. 
It was argued that this 
vulnerability to feeling like a shamed object before the other is also part of the 
human 
psychological inheritance (Duval and Wicklund, 1972), and that people also normally cope with 
it by avoidance strategies, either before the event when is anticipated, or 
by escaping after the 
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event after it has happened, or by reparations or giving justificatory accounts of an action that 
would change the way we were being defined. However in this study, participants were seldom 
able to successfully take these often subtle avoidant strategies; this was because they feared the 
consequences of such actions. Typically they feared being defined as `even more bad' or 
worthless if they tried to assert themselves, and many feared actual catastrophe such as being 
thrown out of the house. Because they had nowhere to escape to, they were rendered unable to 
escape the shaming, defining look and intrusive, engulfing presence of the other; they were 
subject to extensive demands from the moral imperative. This often happened with the ever- 
present and omniscient voices (Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994). Consequently they suffer the 
objectite experience - they feel taken over, controlled to the core with the resultant symptoms of 
alogia, avolition, loss of the sense of willed action, thought insertion, thought broadcast, 
flattening of affect, possibly catatonia etc. In chapter 7 it was shown that clients had more rules 
regarding their own behaviour than student controls; such rules regarded how they should 
behave and even what sort of thoughts they should think. It was shown that many clients 
virtually have a rule for every occasion, and are in fact fairly scared of their parents. The moral 
imperative is a particularly central set of `musts'; according to Ellis (1994) and Dryden (1995), 
the primary irrational belief is the `must'. This is the central component in dysfunctional core 
beliefs and the main thrust of BEBT is to `eradicate the must'. The existential imperative is also 
a set of `musts'; in their most extreme forms (as was seen for some clients in chapter 6), the 
exaggerated imperatives clash against each other, and the client's ruminations oscillated between 
existential and moral goals. 
3) Finally the participants got depressed through the experience of having no constructed self or 
an alien self. Again it was argued that everyone suffers dysphoria or depression as a result of the 
loss of their self (with varying degrees of severity, depending on how briefly, how important the 
particular self and associated role is, for example; see Champion and Power, 1995). Again this is 
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no different from "normal" depression, except that depression is extremely common in 
schizophrenia, and the loss of self is more severe, for reasons such as the fact that the diagnosis 
of schizophrenia is inescapable and severely stigmatising and entrapping (Rooke, and 
Birchwood, 1998). Evidence from this study showed that the outcome of the conflicts analysed 
most commonly resulted in dysphoria or depression, and resultant behavioural consequences of 
withdrawal, characteristic of a submission response (Price and Sloman, 1987). The structure of 
the conflict as a whole forms a total entrapment, a kind of double-bind which blocks self 
construction (but notably not a double-bind as the people who coined the phrase, Bateson et al, 
(1956) would recognise the term). A succession of overt and covert conflict-type interactions can 
build up over time to such an extent that self-construction becomes chronically impoverished 
and practically non-existent. Where this becomes a prolonged experience, this may lead into 
negative symptoms, such as anhedonia, apathy, poverty of speech. 
8.1.4 Therapeutic Implications 
The self construction analysis and formulation gives greater precision to cognitive 
interventions. Instead of blindly challenging the client's symptoms which the client may at that 
point in time be unwilling to relinquish, the self-construction formulation enables the symptoms 
to be utilised as a marker of the underlying beliefs, which then can be the target of the cognitive 
intervention. 
There are three ways that this can be done: first, the dysfunctional beliefs underlying an 
all-engulfing moral imperative could be targeted, in those cases where clients self-constructions 
are profoundly inhibited. The case of Den from chapter 6 illustrates challenging the moral 
imperative: the formulation conceptualises his paranoid delusion of people intending to sacrifice 
him to the Devil as symptomatic of his underlying belief that he is inherently unlikeable, bad and 
evil. Having identified this belief, mainstream cognitive interventions would be employed (for 
example, Chadwick, Birchwood and Trower, 1996; Fowler, Garety and Kuipers, 1995). 
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Second, the dysfunctional beliefs underlying an unbridled existential imperative could be 
addressed in those clients who are totally lacking in any inhibition from any moral imperative. 
For example, Louise: the formulation conceptualises her command hallucinations as 
symptomatic of her underlying belief that her husband is wrongfully demeaning and 
marginalising her and must be killed. 
However there are some slight dangers to this second approach, and hence the third 
scenario, which concerns the entrapment sequence more explicitly, where the moral and 
existential imperatives are in direct conflict, resulting in the self-construction entrapment. The 
purpose of the formulation here would be to identify the dysfunctional beliefs underlying both 
imperatives, and target them in tandem in a cognitive intervention. Louise can be used as an 
example again: the fact that Louise's aggression against her husband appeared as a voice 
suggested- and she confirmed in interview- that she had issues of massive shame and guilt 
around having such thoughts, indicative of a strong moral imperative. The formulation therefore 
would direct the clinician to challenge both her shame and guilt beliefs (moral imperative) and 
her murderous anger beliefs (existential imperative). 
Effectively this approach is not doing that much that clinicians are not doing all ready 
in 
terms of actual CBT techniques - for good reason because this theory strongly stresses that we 
are dealing with ordinary human emotions and beliefs. What is new about this approach 
is that it 
gives a strategy for deploying therapeutic resources at the right targets. It is also genuinely 
person-centred because it is working with the client's own self-construction goals, and not 
against them which can be the case in a narrow symptom-focused approach. The symptoms 
should in any case be at least weakened by this approach which is designed to undermine 
the 
psychological needs and vulnerabilities which maintain them. The symptoms can then 
be more 
effectively targeted. The emphasis here is similar to the emphasis in preferential 
REBT which 
targets the irrational evaluative beliefs first, in the expectation that this will weaken the 
distorted 
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inferences, since the evaluative beliefs maintain the distortions (Ellis, 1994). 
8.1.5 Limitations of Thesis 
Throughout the thesis, limitations have been addressed where appropriate, in particular in 
the discussion sections of the empirical chapters (Chapter 3,4,6 and 7), for example limitations 
such as small sample sizes, innovative techniques and validity of findings. However it is worth 
re-iterating some of the wider issues that the thesis addresses. First is the problem of inclusivity. 
It is common for theories to address more than they can sensibly aspire to. It would be tempting 
to use the adolescence angle (of chapter 2-4) to account for all psychoses, but this would be 
unwise. It is valid for those people whose psychosis arises during late adolescence, but although 
this is a sizeable group, only 50% of people with a psychosis had their first hospitalisation before 
they were 25 (Sartorius, 1986). It could also be said that the same adolescent issues apply to the 
80% who are under 35 (Sartorius, 1986), because adolescent-type problems don't only apply to 
those who are chronologically adolescent. It is plausible that some people managed to soldier on 
into adulthood and stave off psychosis for a few years (for example Brian had many friends after 
leaving school until they all started having families and children and had less time for him; his 
first admission at 28 came after a number of years of struggling). However it would be 
inappropriate to expect the adolescence theory to explain (for example) the statistical increase 
in 
post-menopausal women among psychosis sufferers (Hafner et al, 1993b), which almost 
certainly has much to do with life-roles and identity (Hassett, 1997), deterioration in health, and 
a rapid drop in oestrogen levels (Mitchell, 1997). Similarly post-natal psychosis, steroid-induced 
psychosis and other biological psychoses may be more biological in origin. 
However it has not 
been shown that these types of `psychoses' are the same as the types addressed 
here; in fact it 
seems likely that they are substantially different. For example, the `psychosis' commonly 
thought to be concomitant with Huntington's Disease is actually very rare indeed, and when 
manifested is more akin to a stubborn, aggressive insistence on ritual and sameness 
(Garron, 
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1973). Other psychoses with a known organic origin show untypical psychotic symptoms such as 
a feeling of imminent catastrophe befalling someone else nearby (Cutting, 1987) or visual 
hallucinations, which are still comparatively rare in schizophrenia. 
A second limitation might be that the theory does not address why more males than 
females are vulnerable to psychosis, although perhaps it should and could. A speculative 
argument would be along the lines such as how males are expected to take the dominant role in 
courtship (in Western cultures at least) and thus females would find it easier to establish 
romantic relationships. Alternatively, generally speaking female gender roles give them closer 
peer relationships and more scope to be emotional (Griffin, 1953), as opposed to males who 
have pressure to appear as strong and powerful (a very common fantasy amongst the male 
clients). The reader might also feel that the adolescence issues in chapter 2-4 are fairly global 
and could apply to any condition- therefore why psychosis and not, for example, anorexia? As 
regards anorexia, there is a good degree of overlap between many of the major 
psychopathologies, and perhaps as anorexics are mainly female this may be just a more 
culturally appropriate way for women to channel their psychological distress. There may be 
various different solutions to unsolvable conflicts. 
A third limitation might be that no attempt has been made to apply the adolescence 
theory to why there are such cultural differences in schizophrenia in terms of onset and relapse 
(Birchwood et al, 1992), but the theory could as easily be applied here. For example Asian 
culture is far more hierarchical than white European culture and as such it may be more difficult 
for offspring to debunk their parents and assert jurisdiction over their own lives. Different 
religions place different emphasis on the importance of correct behaviour, and such emphasis 
can be seen as a difference in the moral imperatives; hence some religions predispose individuals 
to be more vulnerable to a overwhelming moral imperative than others. Different cultures also 
have different norms regarding romantic relationships and marriage, all of which reflect different 
pressures and supports for vulnerable people (Cochrane, 1983). 
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In conclusion, it is hoped that the thesis will aid many new research projects and inform 
new approaches to therapy with people with a psychosis. 
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